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Abstract 
This thesis reports five studies that investigate the impact of trust on driver response to 
forward collision warning systems (FCWS). The experiments, while self-contained were 
conceived to relate together in a cohesive way. 
The first three studies investigated the relationship between alarm timing and driver 
performance in collision situations in a broad range of driving conditions. These studies 
also established trust models describing changes in driver subjective ratings of trust in 
response to alarm timing. It was found that an early al~rm timing led to quick braking 
reaction times, resulting from prompt accelerator release. A middle alarm timing induced 
more consistent braking response than a control condition in which no alarms were 
presented. A late alarm timing had the potential to delay braking response when driving 
with long time headways. With respect to trust, early alarm timings induced higher levels 
of trust than late or middle alarm timings. Moreover the results suggest that the conflict 
between driver expectation of alarm performance and actual alarm timing results in 
decreased trust. 
Experiment four explored the nature of trust in FCWS. A trust model was proposed that 
described driver response to false and missing alarms in terms of changes in trust ratings 
(the 'dynamics oftrust'). The proposed model was tested in a driving simulator study in 
order to confirm its validity. It was found that trust had two different aspects; trust in 
individual alarms (TIA) and trust in system integrity (TSI) and false and missing alarms 
affect TIA and TSI respectively. Furthermore, driver response to alarm failure could be 
interpreted by using TIA and TSI. 
The final study considered the effect of alarm timing on driver response to alarm failures; 
false and missing alarms. It was found that drivers who experienced early alarm timing 
exhibited negative effects of alarm failures. On the other hand, drivers who experienced 
late alarm timing were not affected by alarm failure. These phenomena were interpreted 
from the viewpoint of the relationship between alarm timing, trust, and event awareness. 
The contribution of the experimental work to the integration of trust into the design of 
alarm timing is discussed and the relationship between the experiments explored. 
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Definitions of particular terms in this thesis 
Here terms that were used with a particular meaning in this thesis are defined. 
Term: Definition 
The dynamics oftrust: Changes in driver subjective rating of trust in response to 
experimental conditions. 
Time headway: The time interval between two vehicles in a car following situation 
based on the driving speed of a following vehicle. 
Discouragement: Driver's perception of alarms which are presented after they have 
started to brake in response to a potential collision event. 
Confirmation alarms: Alarms which confirm driver's decision to brake. 
Tolerance: Perception of trust that are not impaired by the experience oflate alarms. 
Triggered alarms: Alarms which are presented based on pre-determined alarm 
trigger logic. 
Un triggered alarm: Alarms which are not presented in imminent collision situations 
because the warning distance is not achieved. 
Behaviour robustness: The degree to which drivers' braking response is affected by 
false and missing alarms. 
Automated response: A tendency for drivers to respond to all alarms without regard 
to their validity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The background to the study 
When driving, drivers must successfully manage the following major tasks; (i) 
maintenance of lateral control in response to road geometry, (ii) management of 
longitudinal speed in response to road geometry, forward vision and other vehicles 
and (iii) achieve adequate awareness of static and dynamic hazards. Failure of driver 
decision making related to anyone the above tasks has the potential to result in traffic 
accidents. 
At a superficial level these do not seem to be hard tasks for drivers to achieve, 
however, Institute for Traffic Accidents Research and Data Analysis reported that in 
2002 there were an estimated 940,000 motor vehicle-related accidents involving 8800 
deaths in Japan. In particular, according to the National Police Agency in Japan, rear-
end crashes comprised approximately 30.2% of all crashes in 2002. With 'respect to 
rear-end crashes, maintaining awareness for forward vision is one of the crucial 
factors in determining the number of accidents and driver inattention, distraction, and 
improper lookout (i.e., the driver looked but did not see) have been identified as major 
causal factors in rear-end crashes (Dingus et aI., 1998). Given the number of motor 
vehicles travelling the roads and freeways throughout the world, not surprisingly, 
traffic accidents have been recognized as a major social problem to be solved with a 
high priority. 
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1.2 The role of technology 
Advances in information processing, communications, sensing, and computer control 
technologies have been achieved to improve the safety of driving or to increase driver 
comfort. The Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) has been adopted as a general 
term to describe innovative systems which use the above technologies. However, the 
road transportation system is extensive and complex and is typically regarded as a set 
of inter-related sub-systems. Accordingly many terms have been used to describe the 
introduction of new technology; Advanced Traveller Information System (A TIS), 
Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems (lVHS), and Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADAS). 
These systems have been classified (Galer, 1993) into broad categories according to 
whether they: 
i) directly impinge on the driving task (e.g. collision avoidance, intelligent cruise 
control). 
ii) provide general information relevant to the driving task, environment, and driver. 
For example, traffic status, accidents, etc. 
iii) enhance the efficiency of driving by providing task specific information (e.g. route 
navigation systems, surface function condition). 
iv) are unrelated to driving (e.g. telephone, e-mail, fax etc.). 
The central focus of this thesis is forward collision warnmg systems (FCWS). 
Individual FCWS have slightly different features and functionalities however the 
design approach typically follows a basic architecture, which is presented in Figure 1-
1. Multiple system functions, inclu~ing sensing, intelligent processing, and 
communications are required to deliver FCWS and these must be successfully 
integrated in order to provide drivers with an effective warning system capable of 
helping to reduce collision accidents. 
2 
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Collision Warning 
Processor 
-
Alarm Design 
* Visual 
* Audio 
* Tactile 
Communication 
Interface Bus 
Data Acquisition 
System 
Forward Sensor 
(Data logging) 
Figure 1-1 Forward collision warning architecture 
1.3 Human factors concerns 
-
-
Once FCWS are a common feature in vehicles it is hoped that they will achieve their 
promise of increased driving safety. However it has been recognised that human 
factors considerations are critical to system efficiency (Mast, 1998) and are a central 
feature of the currently prevailing design philosophy; human-centred system design. 
Hancock and Verwey (1997) note that current and further technology will allow the 
system designer to create increasingly intelligent systems, however this does not 
necessarily mean that the systems are designed intelligently. Inadequate system 
design without consideration of the human factors perspective will not fully 
accommodate driver requirements, resulting in poor total system performance under 
some circumstances. 
One of the most frequently proposed arguments is that the introduction of new driver 
oriented technology may substantially. change the driving task (for example Mast, 
1998; Dingus and Hulse, 1993). FCWS help drivers to perceive critical situations 
rather than intervene in the driving task, however, this does not mean that alarms do 
3 
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not affect driver tasks. Janssen and Nilsson (1993) and Reichart (1993) insist that the 
way in which the responsibility for action is divided between the system and the 
driver is a crucial aspect of system design. In an extreme case this may mean that 
drivers regard alarms as direct triggers for braking actions, as a result drivers mistake 
the means for the end. The inherent risk of this situation is realised become when 
alarms are missed due to a system fault and drivers fail to respond to the threat. 
Conversely past research indicates that there is a possibility that frequent alarms, non-
critical event related alarms and false alarms may all reduce driver response to alarms 
(for example, Horowitz and Dingus, 1992; Dingus et aI, 1998). As a result of this the 
system safety benefit is impaired. 
In general, forward collision situations are very time critical and drivers are normally 
required to take appropriate action within a relatively short time period. Accordingly, 
alarm timing is a crucial factor for determining alarm effectiveness (Janssen and 
Nilsson, 1993). Obviously an alarm must provide adequate time for a driver to react 
to imminent collision situations and alarm timing must be determined with the aim of 
preventing as many collisions as possible .. On the other hand, the determination of 
effective timing is highly linked to the occurrence of alarm failure (i.e. false or missed 
alarms) (Hancock et aI, 1996, Lee and Kantowitz, 1998). Thus, a comprehensive 
understanding of alarm timing and its influence on driver behaviour and driver 
response to alarm failure play a crucial role in the design of FCWS that are effective 
in all circumstances. 
The cognitive characteristics of drivers help to define their information requirements 
and the optimum formats for ITS interfaces (Lee and Kantowitz, 1998). Furthermore 
the driver's subjective feelings of trust towards an FCWS plays an important role in 
its effective use. These considerations indicate that driver trust toward a FCWS 
should be considered in the design of the system and it is necessary to investigate the 
above issues from the viewpoint of driver trust in order to accommodate driver 
requirements in the system design. 
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1.4 Overall aims of this thesis 
This thesis considers three human factors issues which are critical to effective alarm 
design: driver trust, alarm timing and alarm failure (false and missed alarms). Their 
interactions are considered in order to establish guidance on the design of FCWS. In 
particular, it aims to explore: 
• alarm timing and its relation to driver behaviour and trust 
• the nature of driver trust toward FCWS 
• driver response to alarm failure and its relation to alarm timing and trust 
• the determination of optimal alarm timings 
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis comprises five empirical studies and one literature review, each of which 
addresses particular issues relevant to the design ofFCWS. An overview chapter then 
synthesises the results and knowledge obtained by these studies, enabling 
recommendations regarding alarm design. 
Figure 1-2 attempts to show the relationship between the chapters in this thesis. The 
specific literature relevant to driver characteristics and driver performance with and 
without FCWS and methodologies for assessing driver behaviour comprise the 
existing knowledge (left hand column). The human factors issues considered in this 
thesis are represented in the centre column and how they relate to the new research is 
summarised in the right hand column. 
1.6 Chapter-by-chapter brief summary 
The first step of this study is a general review of human factors knowledge for FCWS. ' 
It considers driver characteristics and performance in collision situations and driver 
interaction with FCWS. It is clear from the review that FCWS have the potential to 
reduce accidents caused by driver error. However system effectiveness is highly 
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dependent on alarm modality and its relation to driver behaviour and the type and 
timing of alarms may affect the efficiency of driver behaviour. Furthermore, driver 
interactions with the collision warning system are influenced by multiple factors; 
situation awareness, complacency, trust, etc. However research has not identified the 
relationship between these factors and driver behaviour. 
Existing knowledge Issues considered 
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In chapter 3, several methodologies for assessing the effect of the introduction of 
FCWS on driver behaviour are reviewed in order to identify the most appropriate 
strategy for the current research. Driving simulator studies were subsequently chosen 
for the behavioural experiments reported in this thesis. 
The first three empirical studies reported in chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide a broader 
understanding of the relationships between alarm timing, driver behaviour and trust. 
In chapter 4 the effects of three different alarm timings on driver behaviour and trust 
are investigated with respect to a single scenario. Chapter 5 considers how the 
presentation of alarms may influence driver behaviour and attitudes toward alarms in 
more depth by incorporating a wider range of driving conditions; three different 
driving speeds and two different time headways. Furthermore, chapter 6 reports a 
study that involves a low speed driving condition (30 mph) with two different 
decelerations of a leading vehicle. 
Accordingly, driver behaviour towards alarm timing with various driving conditions 
is investigated and the contribution of alarm timing to safe driving is assessed. 
Furthermore, the relationship between alarm timing and driver trust is established and 
several important contributing factors which affect driving trust are identified. 
Chapter 7 explores the nature of driver trust with respect to FCWS. A trust model is 
proposed that describes driver response to false and missed alarms in terms of 
changes in trust ratings (the 'dynamics of trust'). The proposed model is tested in a 
driving simulator study in order to confirm its validity. It is proposed that trust has 
two different aspects; trust in individual alarms (TIA) and trust in system integrity 
(TSI) and false and missing alarms affect TIA and TSI respectively. Furthermore, 
driver response to alarm failure is explained by using TIA and TSI. 
In chapter 8, the effect of alarm timing on driver response to alarm failure is reported. 
It is proposed that impaired system effectiveness caused by alarm failure may be 
mitigated by manipulating alarm timing. This phenomenon can be explained by way 
of the trust model that accounts for the relationship between alarm timing, subjective 
ratings of trust and event awareness. The empirical results suggest that alarm timings 
have the particular potential to induce inappropriate driver mental models relevant to 
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the relationship between trust and event awareness gained through a potential 
collision event. 
Chapter 9 discusses the combined results of the various studies and in doing so forms 
the basis for provisional design guidelines for alarm timings which are applicable to 
most circumstances. This is mainly argued from the viewpoint of driver trust. 
The conclusions ofthe thesis are summarised in chapter 10. This includes a statement 
of the overall and most important contributions of the thesis to new research 
knowledge and specific requirements for further work. 
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warning syste~s: A review of the literature 
2.1 Introduction 
There are numerous human factors issues relevant to warning systems that must be 
taken into account in order to successfully determine system design characteristics. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to understand which human factors issues related to 
driver-alarm system interactions should be investigated and to determine which issues 
must be resolved. As a result, this chapter provides a critique of the literature related 
to the current thesis. 
Figure 2-1 comprises a model for considering driver interaction with forward collision 
warning systems (FCWS). The original diagram draws on the framework described 
by Lee and Kantowitz (1998), it is modified for this study. It integrates three 
important themes that must be accommodated in determining the requirements of 
design characteristics of FCWS. More specifically, system capabilities, 
environmental factors, and driver characteristics provide the context for driver 
interaction with FCWS and play an important role in determining how alarms should 
be presented to drivers. 
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Figure 2-1 The joint influence of system capability, human characteristics and 
environmental factors on warning system design characteristics 
The role of driver characteristics in driving is considered first (section 2.3), this is 
followed by driver errors (section 2.4). This section includes general human error 
models and, more specifically, driving-related errors such as late detection which have 
the potential to induce collision accidents. The driver-based aspects of car following 
behaviour, including driver choice of speed, perception of imminent collision 
situations, and basic driver ability to respond to imminent collisions are discussed 
(section 2.5). Finally driver trust (section 2.8), complacency, and situation awareness 
(section 2.9) are considered from the view point of driver perception ofFCWS. 
The section concerned with system capability (section 2.6) describes the primary role 
of alarms in order to understand the changes in the driver's role following the 
introduction of FCWS. This is followed by a consideration of alarm modality and 
alarm timing, which may have the potential to determine system effectiveness. 
Furthermore the notion of alarm malfunction (section 2.7) is considered as an 
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importation mechanism for gammg knowledge about driver response to alarm 
malfunction and its relation to impaired system effectiveness. 
It should be stressed here that environmental factors (driving conditions including 
driving speed and driving severity) are treated as the need arises as issues which may 
affect alarm capability and driver performance but are not considered independently. 
2.2 Overview of drivers' roles in driving 
Rasmussen (1983) classified human behaviour into three basic hierarchical categories: 
namely skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based behaviours. This classification 
is referenced most frequently when general human behaviour in response to 
differences in human tasks are described. Skill-based behaviour is the lowest level 
and requires minimum conscious control. It involves automated schemata, or action 
plans, which enable routine behaviour. For example, walking in familiar places or 
starting a car by an experienced driver is classified as Skill-based behaviour. Rule-
based behaviour involves automated activation of rules or productions. Specifically, 
pre-Iearnt rules or know-how are applied to cope with problems when current 
situations depart from routine ones. Knowledge-based behaviour applies to situations 
where it is not possible to use typical action patterns in response to past experiences. 
In such situations people require new decisions or diagnoses to resolve the problems 
with which they are faced. It can be said that knowledge-based behaviour is one of 
the most characteristic traits of human beings. 
When describing the driver's typical tasks, it is commonly stated that they can be 
divided into three hierarchical levels (Michon 1985). The three levels underlie the 
cognitive control of driving and they provide a useful general understanding of the 
driver's roles in driving. Figure 2-2 shows the hierarchical structure of the road-use 
tasks, proposed by Michon (1985). In this diagram the strategic level involves the 
general planning stage of a trip, including the determination of trip goal, route, and 
modal choice. Plans are derived from consideration of mode, route and timing that 
can lead to an efficient trip and also accompanying factors such as aesthetic 
satisfaction that can lead to a comfortable trip. The manoeuvring level defines 
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negotiation of common driving situations such as curves and intersections, gap 
acceptance in overtaking or entering the traffic stream. Obstacle or collision 
avoidance including static obstacles or a leading vehicle are also driver tasks involved 
in the manoeuvring level. The control level represents driver automated action 
patterns (i.e. steering, braking, and shifting). At the tactical level it is assumed that 
each hierarchy dynamically interacts with each other. That is the control level reflects 
the general goals set at the strategic level. Conversely general trip plans may be 
occasionally rearranged in response to the outcome of specific manoeuvres. 
The different level of decision making reflects the different amount of time available 
to implement tasks. Decisions at the strategic level generally do not need real time. 
Trip plans can be implemented before starting to drive and changes in trip plans can 
be decided many minutes before execution. Decisions at the manoeuvring level are 
constrained by real time. It is necessary for drivers to implement the appropriate 
actions in seconds. The control level is mostly time critical and demanding. It 
requires only milliseconds to implement the critical decision making that may 
contribute to safe driving. In other words, failure of appropriate decisions at the 
control level may directly cause accidents. 
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Figure 2-2 Hierarchic structure ofthe driving task (Michon, 1985) 
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Table 2-1 Classification of selected driving tasks by Michon's control hierarchy and 
Rasmussen's skill-rule-knowledge framework (Ranney, 1994) 
Strategk Manoeuvring Control 
Knowledge Navigating in an Controlling a skid Novice on first 
unfamiliar area lesson 
Rule Choice between Passing other vehicles Driving unfamiliar familiar routes vehicle 
Skill Route used for daily Negotiating familiar Vehicle handling on 
commute intersection curves 
The control hierarchy of driving has been related to Rasmussen's taxonomy, as shown 
in.Table 2-1 (for example, Hale et aI., 1990; Ranney, 1994). For experienced drivers, 
most driving tasks cluster in the three cells on the diagonal that runs from the upper 
left to the lower right box in the figure. The control, manoeuvring, and strategic level 
tasks are implemented as skill, ruled and knowledge based behaviour respectively. As 
shown by the examples in other table cells, however, exceptions may occur in 
response to skilled or novice performance and familiar or unfamiliar situations. For 
example, novice drivers initially use knowledge based behaviour to shift gears, while 
experienced drivers use skill based behaviour. Experienced drivers can generally use 
skill based behaviour for navigating along highly familiar routes or for negotiating 
familiar intersections. Rule-based behaviour will dominate in unfamiliar situations 
where previous experience helps select rules in order to manage the situations. 
However novel or unexpected situations, for which no applicable rules can be adopted 
will disrupt skill based behaviour and necessitate knowledge based behaviour. 
To sum up, driving tasks can be understood in terms of their basic content of skilled 
human behaviour. In potential collision situations, where drivers must act to prevent 
collision events occurring, drivers need to expertly execute tasks at the control and 
manoeuvring levels. These tasks are implemented as automated action patterns (skill 
based behaviour) or rule based behaviour in response to driving experience or driving 
situations. Accordingly there is a possibility that a driver's response for surviving an 
imminent collision situation will be implemented as different types of behaviour in 
the three-level hierarchy according to their experience or the driving conditions. 
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2.3 Driver's error in driving 
For the last two decades, considerable research has been conducted from various 
perspectives in order to understand the nature of human error (Lourens, 1990; Michon 
et aI., 1990; Norman,1981; Reason, 1987; Rumar, 1990;). Rasmussen (1990) has 
proposed that errors should be considered as a part of normal behaviour. Drivers must 
cope with a considerable amount of information of an increasingly complicated nature, 
covering all three levels of the driving tasks discussed above (Michon et aI., 1990), 
and this provides new opportunities for human error to precipitate hazardous 
situations. 
This section will review models of human error in order to provide a background 
against the behaviour of drivers who have the support ofFCWS can be assessed. 
2.3.1 Norman's error theory 
One of the most influential descriptions of human error has been provided by Norman 
(1981). He proposed the following three types of errors. 
Slips: This is a type of error which is related to events in which the planned action 
would have achieved the desired goal. In other words, slips may refer to execution 
failure. 
Lapses: This is a type of error which occurs in a memory process. It involves simple 
forgetfulness, inaccurate memory and so on. 
Mistakes: Mistakes reflect execution of plans that would not have achieved the 
desired goals. They could be called a planning failure. 
Generally, slips derive from intrinsic factors which are relevant to personal resources. 
On the other hand, mistakes derive from external factors such as human interface 
design for human-machine systems, task environments etc. 
2.3.2 Generic error-modelling system (GEMS) 
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Table 2-2 The major error-shaping factors at each level of performance (Reason, 1987) 
PERFORMANCE LEVEL ERROR-SHAPING FACTORS 
SKILL-BASED 1. Recency and frequency of previous use 
2. Environmental control signals 
3. Shared schema properties 
4. Concurrent plans 
RULE-BASED 1. Mind set ( 'It's always worked before') 
2. Availability ('First come best preferred') 
3. Matching bias ('like relates to like) 
4. Over-simplification (e.g., 'halo effect) 
5. Over-confidence ('I'm sure I'm right) 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED 1. Selectivity (bounded rationality ) 
2. Working memory overload (bounded rationality) 
3. Out of sight out ofmind(bounded rationality) 
4. Memory cueinglreasoning by analogy 
5. Matching bias revisited 
6. Incomplete/incorrect mental model 
Reason's (1987) generic error-modelling system (GEMS) is a well-established error 
theory, describing a cognitive framework for identifying common error types. GEMS 
has integrated theory from information-processing models and Rasmussen's 
taxonomy of human behaviour. In GEMS, Reason classifies errors as skill-based slips, 
rule-based mistakes and knowledge-based mistakes. In the domain of human-
machine systems, the principal role of the human which is relevant to skill-based 
behaviour is that of monitor, and thus the preventative form of error is a monitoring 
failure. Rule-based mistakes and knowledge-based mistakes result from actions th~t 
were insufficient to meet the intended goal. 
GEMS has not only provided a description of the character of errors, it also includes 
useful elements called error-shaping factors. Reason describes error-shaping factors 
at each of the three human behaviour levels and they may be useful in predicting the 
form of driver errors in driving (Michon et aI., 1990). The details are shown in Table 
2-2. 
Taking the three levels of driver tasks mentioned earlier into account, drivers are 
likely to make slips or monitoring failures (e.g., passing the intended junction from 
the motorway, colliding with the vehicle in front) at all task levels. Furthermore at all 
task levels, drivers are also likely to make mistakes or fail to solve problems (Michon 
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et aI., 1990). In the manoeuvring level, for example, drivers may misjudge the speed 
of oncoming vehicles, or changes in relative speed with a leading vehicle or attempt a 
pass that might result in a collision. 
The analysis above clearly indicates that the execution of driving tasks is not simple, 
and in order to prevent drivers from making errors, a very comprehensive and 
technically sophisticated support system might be needed to cover all situations. 
2.3.3 Late detection 
With regard to collision accidents between road users, 'Recognition errors', 'Decision 
errors', and 'Performance errors' might be used to describe the main types of human 
error (Dingus et aI., 1998; Rumar, 1990). Recognition error refers to failure to detect 
another road user in time to avoid a collision and is the most frequent error type 
(Dingus et aI., 1998). Two main categories of the causes of failure to detect another 
road user can be given as follows (Rumar, 1990): 
• A cognitive error; "illustrated by a failure to look in the direction of the road 
user in question, or failure to look for the specific type of road user type in question ". 
• A perceptual error; "illustrated by the failure to detect another road user in 
peripheral vision or in situations of reduced ambient illumination". 
Rumar (1990) insists that the task of detecting oncoming vehicles is not automated 
and skill-based, but controlled and rule-based. Moreover given the speeds and the 
masses involved, it is difficult to recover from a detection error once it has occurred, 
so the driver is particularly vulnerable to this type of error. 
In order to decrease collision accidents, the provision of improved support for driver 
recognition tasks is likely to be a crucial factor. FeWS have an important potential to 
provide early detection of collision situations. An advance warning of only a second 
or two is important given the dynamic nature of driving, driver reaction time and the 
complex nature of the cognitive and perceptual tasks involved. 
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2.4 Driver response to imminent collisions in car following 
situations 
The review of the literature related to the driver's task and human error suggests that 
collision accidents may be caused by complex and coincident factors. Accidents may 
not only derive from late detection of imminent collision situations with a leading 
vehicle, resulting in a delayed response to the brakes, but also the driving speed or the 
headway distance with the leading vehicle immediately before the accident. This 
would be an example of inappropriate driver behaviour at the manoeuvring level. 
This section summarizes research on the factors which may determine the occurrence 
of collision accidents. Specifically the nature of 'headway maintenance', 'estimation 
of time to collision', and 'driver performance in braking response' are discussed. 
2.4.1 The notion o/headway distance in the vehicle-following situation 
A driver's speed choice is one of the most important contributing factors which 
determine accident involvement and excessive speed can be regarded as a driver error 
related to collisions (Rumar 1990). If drivers adopt a preferred speed that is higher 
than the mean speed of other vehicles then they will inevitably be involved in more 
following situations even if their accident involvement may be more dependent on 
their risk taking behaviour. However, a number of further driver choices regarding 
their driving behaviour may influence car following i.e. their propensity to overtake a 
lead vehicle; their adaptation of short or long headways, their willingness to accept 
risk of collisions etc. In this section an overview is given of car following strategies 
including speed choice. 
Noguchi (1990) investigated drivers' speed choice by way ofin-depth interviews with 
26 Japanese drivers. The subjects were asked to imagine themselves driving on a 
highway or on a motorway with speed limits of 50kmlh and 100kmlh, respectively. 
They rated what actual speed they would drive, and also what they would consider to 
be economic, safe, and pleasant speeds. As can been seen in Figure 2-3, the results 
suggest that the subjects placed the safe speed above the speed limit. The chosen 
speed appears to represent a compromise between competing desires for pleasure and 
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Figure 2-3 Driver's speed choice according to driving speed (Noguchi, 1990) 
safety. Interestingly safe and actual speeds are both above the speed limit on both 
road types. Previous research suggests that increased driving experience leads to 
increased confidence in one's own driving skills but also reduced concern for risk and 
driving safety (Duncan et aI., 1991; Lajunen and Summala, 1995; NiUiHinen and 
Summala, 1974). It has been suggested that a driver's behaviour in traffic may reflect 
their attitudes, and beliefs and personality characteristics, however, comprehensive 
understanding of individual driver characteristics and their relation to driver 
behaviour and accident involvement is still not clear (Lajunen and Summala, 1997). 
Evans (1991) argued that speed variance is a more important factor when considering 
safety than speed itself. This was based on data produced by Solomon (1964) and 
Cirillo (1968) that showed that a driver driving at close to the average speed has a 
lower crash risk than drivers driving at higher or lower than average speed. Evans 
(1991) referenced another study by Hauer (1971) in order to emphasize the 
importance of driving at a consistent average speed. This research found that crash 
rates are proportional to the number of times a vehicle is overtaken or overtakes. 
These are at a minimum when the vehicle is driving at the average speed. 
This review will now consider driver behaviour in car following situations using a test 
vehicle. Colbourn et aI., (1987) conducted an experiment using a controlled-track in 
order to estimate the effect of driving experience on driver behaviour in a vehicle-
following situation. 18 male drivers took part in the experiment and were assigned to 
three distinct groups according to driving experience: inexperienced drivers, drivers 
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with low experience and experienced drivers. Each group had 6 drivers. Two 
independent variables were manipulated; driving speed and an instruction to the 
participants about the possibility of the lead vehicle braking. The different driving 
speed levels were 48.3, 66.0 and 80.5 kmlh and the two different instructed 
probability levels of the leading vehicle's braking likelihood were 'low' and 'high'. 
/ 
The headway distance to the leading vehicle was recorded and a margin of safety 
computed by calculating the amount of in,tial headway lost when the leading car 
braked rapidly. 
The results showed that. headway distance increased with driving speed but the 
difference in probability levels did not affect headway distance. Although there was 
no statistically significant difference a noticeable trend was found. The increase in 
headway with speed appeared to vary as a function of driving experience. 
Furthermore, the study found that safety margins did not change over the speed range 
tested. That is, drivers adopted headways which were long enough to allow them to 
stop safely following critical deceleration of the lead vehicle. 
Ohta (1993) demonstrated individual differences in headway distance. This study 
investigated the correspondence between changes in traffic environment and 
individual driver's car following behaviour with a field experiment. Headway 
distances were measured in response to three different driving speeds; 50, 60, and 
80kmlh and the drivers' attitudes regarding safety were investigated by way of 
questionnaires. The results showed that car following strategies may vary in response 
to both driving situation and individual differences. For example, some drivers 
increased headway distance with driving speed, while others tried to maintain the 
same headway distance despite changes in driving speed, depending on their attitudes 
to safe driving. 
Taieb-Maimon and Shinar (2001) conducted a field study to estimate drivers' 
minimum and comfortable driving headway. Thirty participants took part in this 
study and the participants were instructed to follow a leading vehicle driving at six 
different speeds (50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100 kmlh) at a' comfortable headway and a 
minimum safe headway as estimated by them. The results showed that each driver 
managed to successfully keep a constant headway time in response to the different 
19 
Chapter 2: Driver response to forward collision warning systems: A review of the literature 
driving speeds. Although the adopted headways were consistent within drivers, they 
differed widely between drivers. This result is consistent with Ohta's (1993) results. 
With respect to minimum headways, the average minimum time headway was 0.66s, 
and over 90% of the drivers maintained a minimum headway of less than 1.0 s. 
. Furthermore, 25% of the drivers adopted minimum headways of 0.5 s or less. In 
addition, they insisted that these minimum safe headway times were as short as, or 
shorter than, their average braking reaction time in conditions where they were fully 
prepared to react to imminent collision situations. The average comfortable time 
headway was nearly constant at all speeds, varying only from 0.94s to LOOs. 
In summary, the results discussed in this section suggest that drivers vary in their 
ability to implement car following strategies. That is, drivers do not always manage 
car following situations safely. Some drivers tend to keep short time headways which 
have a greater likelihood of resulting collision accidents. Although the results show 
the difficulty of generalising human behaviour it can be said that the possibility of 
occurrence of rear-end collision events is not low given the task complexity and 
opportunity for error in car following. 
2.4.2 Driver's estimates o/time to collisions 
To prevent potential collision events, a driver may implement steering or braking 
actions, or some combination of both, based on their judgement regarding the time to 
an impending collision. Time to collision (Tc) is the conventional term describing the. 
remaining time before the collision. When considering alarm characteristics, it is 
necessary to know driver ability to estimate the value of Tc in response to various 
driving conditions. The next section briefly summarises studies which are concerned 
with the estimation of T c. 
Cavallo et al. (1997) summarised several prevIOUS experiments where drivers 
approached a stationary obstacle and found that they tended to underestimate values 
of time-to-collision. More specifically, the combined data yielded an approximate 
underestimation of20-30% (Figure 2-4). 
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Figure 2-4 Estimated time-to-collision in prior egomotion experiments (Cavallo et aI., 
1997) 
Sidaway et al. (1996) undertook experiments to examine the role of visual information 
in the estimation of T c. In experiment I, they manipulated approaching speeds and 
viewing times to estimate how these factors may affect the estimation of Tc. Three 
different approach speeds (40,80, and 120kmlh) and six different viewing times (1, 2, 
3,4, 6, and 8 seconds) were involved. Pre-recorded video images that represented a 
target being approached at 40, 80, or 120km/h were used to create artificial collision 
scenarios. All the pictures were taken by a video camera positioned on the driver's 
side of the car. 24 subjects were instructed to observe the recorded view on a 
television and to estimate values ofTc with the target by pressing a foot switch. After 
a viewing time dependent on the experimental condition, the videotaped view was 
replaced by gray screen at 33m from the target. Thus actual time to collision was 3.0, 
1.5, and 1.0 seconds for the 40. 80, and 120 kmlh velocities respectively. The actual 
values were compared with driver estimations. The results show that Tc estimation is 
more accurate with higher approaching speeds and there is no significant difference in 
Tc estimation with respect to viewing time. That is with even small viewing times, 
drivers can estimate relatively accurate values of T c with very limited presentation of 
optic flow. 
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Experiment 11 is essentially a replication of experiment I. The main difference was 
that each videotape was occluded when the car was exactly 3.5 s from the target sheet. 
Six different approaching speeds (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, and 120 km/h) and 4 different 
viewing times (3, 4, 6, and 8 s) were used in this study. As a result, the distances from 
the target at occlusion were 19, 39, 58, 78, 97, and 117 m for the 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 
and 120 km/h velocities, respectively. The results revealed that there was a 
significant' difference in accuracy of Tc with different approaching speeds but the 
effect of viewing time on accuracy ofTc was not significant. 
To sum up, with both of the two experimental scenarios, i.e. a fixed distance and a 
fixed actual Tc value, the effect of approach speeds was significant. Given that, it can 
be reasonably concluded that velocity of approach in judging Tc is a crucial factor in 
accurate estimation. 
Cavallo et al. (1997) investigated the effect of road environmental factors on driver 
estimation of Tc using image sequences showing simulated collision situations. The 
image sequences showed an approach on a straight road at a constant speed towards a 
stationary obstacle using a Silicon Graphics workstation. The 'disappearance 
paradigm' was used in which the film stopped a few seconds before the fictional 
impact, and twenty-two subjects were instructed to press a button when they expected 
the collision to take place. Five different road environments were prepared according 
to the complexity of the visual information (one with only the vehicle obstacle present, 
and four involving gradual enrichment of the visual scene by adding the roadside, 
safety posts and texture on the carriageway, see Figure 2-5). Estimated Tc was 
compared in response to the different road environments. 
The results show that the differences in road environments significantly impacts on 
estimated time-to collision with greater accuracy in more realistic environments. In 
other words when considering driver performance in simulated imminent collision 
situations, it is crucial to create realistic road environments in order to increase the 
reliability of the data recorded. 
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Figure 2-5 The five categories of the road environment factor (Cavallo et aI., 1997) 
2.4.3 Driver's response to the brakes 
When considering human factors issues m FCWS, it is also necessary to gam 
knowledge about the nature of the driver braking response in critical situations. Here 
inherent driver performance in braking response without the aid of alarm systems is 
briefly summarised. 
Liebermann et al. (1995) explored the response of drivers to the emergency braking of 
a lead vehicle with respect to two driving speeds (60 and 80 km/h), two following 
distances (6m and 12m) and two braking conditions (real ~md dummy braking). 
Dummy braking meant that the lead vehicle turned on brake lights but without any 
braking effort. The dependent variables were the total braking time (TBT) and its 
subcomponents: braking reaction time (BRT; the time period between onset of the 
brake lights and release of the accelerator), and accelerator to brake movement time 
(MT; the time period between release of the accelerator and the application of the 
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brakes). Fifty-one drivers drove for 45-60 minutes on an open inter-urban road. The 
results showed that the difference in following distances influenced all three variables. 
For example, the 6m following distance elicited faster TBTs than the 12m. This 
tendency was also valid for the other two variables (BRTs and MTs). However the 
speed factors did not affect braking strategies. As for the comparison between real 
and dummy braking of the lead vehicle, TBTs for the real braking were faster than 
those for the dummy braking, resulting in a prompt movement from the accelerator to 
the brakes. 
Schweitzer et al. (1995) estimated drivers' maximum performance in braking reaction 
(i.e. the time period between onset of the brake lights of a leading vehicle and 
application of the driver's brakes) with relatively young drivers (aged 21-30 years). 
They implemented a field trial manipulating driving speeds (60 and 80 km/h), 
headway distance (6 and 12m), and driver expectancy of braking events (no-
expectancy, partial knowledge, and full knowledge of the forthcoming manoeuvre) 
and estimated how these factors may influence driver braking reactions. The results 
show that driver braking reaction is not affected by differences in driving speed but 
varies according to headway distances and driver expectancy. More specifically, the 
study found a mean braking reaction time of 0.678s for the non-expectancy condition. 
This mean value was lowered with expectancy and the reaction time reached 0.515s 
for the 6m headway distance in the full awareness condition. 
Green (2000) contributes to a broader understanding of driver braking reaction time 
by summarising a wide variety of past results and suggests important contributing 
factors which may affect braking reaction time. Specifically, expectancy has the 
greatest effect. With high expectancy and little uncertainty, he concludes that the best 
driver response time is about 0.70 to 0.75 sec, of which 0.2 sec is movement time i.e. 
the period. from release of the accelerator until brake application by referencing a 
variety of past studies (e.g. 10hansson and Rumar, 1971; Norman, 1952; Olson and 
Sivak, 1986). 
Green concludes that with normal, but common, signals such as brake lights, expected 
times are about 1.25 sec by referencing several studies (e.g. AIm and Nilsson, 1994; 
Chang et aI., 1985; van Winsum and Brouwer, 1997). However driver response time 
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for surprise events, for example an object suddenly moves into the driver's path from 
off the road, is about 1.5 sec, including 0.3 sec movement time. For these findings he 
cites the work of Hankey (1996) and McGehee et al. (2000). 
Green also indicates the effect of age, gender, driving urgency, and cognitive loading 
on braking response by citing past work. Age factors may also affect driver response 
time with older people responding about 0.3 sec more slowly in many cases (e.g., 
Summala and Koivisto 1990). With respect to gender, some studies showed that there 
is no significant difference in braking reaction time between male and female drivers . 
(e.g. Hankey, 1996) but other studies found a faster response by men (e.g. Lings, 
1991). Furthermore, cognitive loading significantly influences driver response time. 
Drivers respond more slowly when there is a high cognitive load, for example, when 
driving a complex roadway or when using cellular phones (e.g. Nilsson and AIm, 
1991). Finally, urgency may affect driver response to the brakes, specifically drivers 
respond faster when aroused by a shorter time-to-collision (e.g. Hankey 1996). 
2.5 Driver behaviour towards forward collision warning 
systems 
Up to this point driver performance without the aid of driver support systems has been 
considered. However the introduction of FCWS intended to decrease traffic accidents 
may change the driver's role and behaviour substantially. First this section will 
briefly summarise the role of alarms by considering past research, including general 
alarm systems, which have been introduced in industrial domains such as process 
control systems, aviation and power generation and distribution. 
FCWS are subject to a variety of human factors issues which have the potential to 
influence system effectiveness. When considering the design of in-vehicle collision 
warning systems, sufficient consideration has to be given to the following questions 
(Janssen and Nilsson, 1993, Hancock and Parasuraman, 1992): 
1. What should be the criterionfor alarm activation? 
2. What action will subsequently have to be performed by the drivers? 
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3. How does use of the warning system influence driver behaviour? 
The first two issues seem very simple but include fundamental concepts which may 
determine alarm effectiveness. The first and second questions are relevant to alarm 
timing and alarm modality respectively. Possibly the most important requirement for 
designing in-vehicle warnings which support drivers in avoiding accidents is to induce 
appropriate driver actions in a timely manner and without major disturbance to 
vehicle control. This section will review these factors from a variety of relevant 
studies in order to understand the requirements for alarm design that can improve 
driver behaviour in critical situations. This knowledge will help provide answers for 
the third question, which is the focus of this thesis. 
2.5.1 Role of alarms and their impact on human behaviour 
The aim of any warning system is to direct human attention away from other ongoing 
activities and towards the condition alarmed to reduce accidents and incidents (Wood, 
1995). Moreover, warnings have the potential to modify human behaviour in other 
ways that improve safety. A number of studies have provided specific evidence that 
human behaviour may be improved by warnings (Byblow and Corlett, 1989; 
Hakkinen and Williges, 1984; Singer and Dekker, 2000; Sorkin et aI., 1988; Stanton 
and Baber, 1997). 
Warnings can properly be viewed as communications between warning systems and 
the people that use them. A basic model is shown in Figure 2-6 (Laughery and 
Wogalter, 1997). The model includes a sender, a receiver, a channel or medium 
through which a message is transmitted, and the message. A receiver is the user of 
the system to whom the safety information must be communicated. The message is 
the safety information to be communicated. The medium refers to the channels or 
routes through which information is sent to a receiver. 
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Channel or Medium 
sender Receiver 
Message 
Figure 2-6 Simple communication model as a role of alarms (Laugbery and Wogaiter, 
1997) 
Stanton (1994) proposed a conceptual model showing the flow of information 
between system and users (Figure 2-7) where the transition of alarm information is 
shown by the arrows. If a safety relevant change has occurred, operators need to be 
informed about it. Whether alarms are provided or not is determined by measuring a 
value or, more probably, set of values. If this value is beyond the set threshold alarms 
are provided using several possible communication media, such as bells, flashing 
lights, etc. The presentation of alarms helps draw operator attention to the critical 
event, inducing appropriate operator decision and action. It should be stressed here 
that Stanton insists that only when the cycle of activities is successful will the 
appropriate action be taken. 
Lehto and Papastavrou (1993) proposed an information processing model in order to 
discuss issues associated with the effectiveness of warnings. A diagram of the model 
is shown in Figure 2-8. The model includes six stages, starting with the presentation 
of the warning information and ending with the required response. F our other 
intermediate stages are included; they relate to attention, comprehension, beliefs and 
attitudes and motivation. Given that the warning information is presented, the 
receiver must notice and attend to it and it is possible to estimate the attention-
demanding properties of warnings by measuring reaction time or eye movement. 
Next, having been attended to, the message must be understood. Having been 
understood, the warning needs to agree with the receiver's existing attitude and beliefs 
about a system's likely performance and operational capability. Whether information 
in a warning is accepted as true or not is critical at this stage. Next, it must motivate 
people to comply and perform the appropriate behaviour. Finally, the individual must 
be capable of carrying out the behaviour. It should be stressed here that for the 
warning to be effective, it must be successful at each of these stages. 
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Decision 
Operator 
Figure 2-7 A systems model of alarms (Stanton, 1994) 
Warning information 
Behaviour 
Figure 2-8 A human information-processing model of stages leading to compliance 
behaviour (Lehto and Papastavrou, 1993) 
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Ward and Hirst (1997) related Rasmussen's levels of cognitive functioning and 
information representation to Michon's (1985) levels of driving tasks. Specifically, 
skill, rule, and knowledge-based driving task levels of functioning mapped on to 
control, manoeuvring, and strategic levels respectively. Furthermore this study 
proposed levels of driving tasks which in-vehicle information systems, including 
FCWS, can support. They concluded that FCWS may help at the manoeuvring level. 
Janssen et al. (1993) also reached the same conclusion about FCWS and their relation 
to driving tasks. 
To sum up, when designing FCWS it is necessary to consider the entire flow of driver 
behaviour from the presentation of alarms to driver action to achieve the desired alarm 
effect. 
2.5.2 Alarm modality and its contribution to safe driving 
Although there are no particular recommendations for the selection and design of 
appropriate alarm modalities for in-vehicle warning systems, at least three types of 
modality (visual, audio and tactile) and their combination are available for collision 
warning systems (Gupta et aI., 2002). With respect to driver preferences for alarm 
modality, research in the aviation domain, where alarm systems have been commonly 
used, indicates that pilots prefer visual over auditory warnings when there is enough 
time to react Stokes et al. (1990). However, human preference for alarm types is 
likely to be different when a time critical response in required. The next section will 
review past research regarding alarm modality for FCWS. 
Hirst and Graham (1997) considered the differences in the kinds of images which 
have been provided as visual alerts in FCWS and found the following results. 
Compared to abstract visual displays, pictorial visual displays may induce more 
prompt response to the brakes. Their study indicated that the design of visual warning 
images is a critical factor in determining driver response. They found that more 
intuitive images, which represented critical situations directly, led to a quicker 
response to the brakes. Dingus et al. (1998) conducted several on-road experiments to 
determine how collision warning displays can influence driver behaviour regarding 
headway maintenance. First, they found that alarm displays, which gave graded 
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warnings as well as headway maintenance information, encouraged drivers to 
maintain larger, safer headway distances than when they drove without any display. 
Second, combined visual/auditory displays induced increased headway distance 
compared to solely visual or auditory displays. It was concluded that warning 
displays regarding headway distances have the potential to help drivers maintain safer 
headways. 
AIm and Nilsson (2000) investigated visual warning messages in incident warning 
systems and estimated the effect on traffic safety of the difference in level of detail. 
Simple white poles on the left and right sides of the road with a flashing red light and 
three levels of detail of warning messages were prepared; level 1 consisted of a 
warning pole plus information on the types of incident warned about (i.e., warning, 
congestion, accident, and roadwork), level 2 included warning poles, information on 
type of incident plus distance to the incident (i.e., warning, congestion, accident and 
roadwork in 1 km), and level 3 was a warning pole, type of incident, distance to 
incident and a recommendation of action to avoid the negative effects of the incident 
(i.e., warning, congestion, accident, and roadwork in 1 km, reduce speed). The 
distance between the location of the warning messages and the incident was 1 km. A 
driving simulator was employed in this study with fifty participants. Driving 
performance data. including driver speed and speed variation were compared in 
response to the differences in warning massages. 
The results showed that all warning messages influenced driver behaviour positively, 
resulting in earlier reduction of driver speed compared with a 'no alarms' condition. 
An assumption that a low leyel of detail in a message would cause greater variation in 
driver behaviour was not confirmed and relatively long warning messages were not 
found to affect driver workload. It can be said that for such incident warning systems 
in which alarms are provided that are not time critical, the difference in warning 
message does not impair alarm effectiveness and a range of message types may 
contribute to safe driving. 
However, it is should be noted that alarm modality may affect driver workload in 
some situations, resulting in impaired driver performance with a warning system. Lee 
et al. (2001) reported an investigation concerning a speech-based interface and its 
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influence on driver behaviour. In this paper a driving simulator study was conducted 
in order to estimate the effect of speech-based in-vehicle information on driver 
braking reaction. The results show a 30% (310ms) increase in reaction time when the 
speech-based system was used, compare with a baseline condition with no system. 
Subjective workload ratings also indicated that speech-based interaction introduces a 
significant cognitive load which has important implications for the design of warning 
systems. 
Alarms should be provided in a manner such that the presentation of alarms does not 
cause drivers distraction since drivers need continuous attention to the road in order to 
respond to changing traffic situations. However, in relatively time critical situations, 
such as rear-end collision situations, prompt response to alarms might be crucial to 
avoid collisions. Given these assumptions, auditory signals might be the most 
appropriate strategy for alarm presentation (Doll et aI., 1984, Zwahlen, 1985). 
Graham (1999) assessed the effect of differences in the characteristics of auditory 
alarms on driver response in a collision avoidance system. In this study auditory 
icons which convey system information by analogy with everyday events were used. 
Auditory icons are based on the way people hear the world in their everyday lives and 
their meanings should be easily learned and remembered (Gaver, 1986). Two icons, 
the sounds of a car horn and of skidding tyres, were compared with respect to 
conventional warnings, a simple tone and a voice saying 'ahead' in the imminent 
collision situation. Participants sat in im experimental vehicle with a road scene 
projected ahead, and they were instructed to brake in response to on-screen collision 
situations and their accompanying warning sounds. Driver responses to alarm sounds 
were measured. The results revealed that the auditory icon warnings in the 
experiment had a significant ability to induce drivers to respond to the brakes quicker 
than the conventional warnings. However, the auditory icons led to an increased 
number of false-positive reactions where drivers responded to the auditory icons and 
hit the brakes in response to a non-collision situation more frequently, compared to 
the conventional warnings. It can be concluded that the auditory icons may have the 
potential to induce a relatively high level of perceived urgency. However, with 
respect to the acceptance of auditory alarms, Dingus et al. (1998) suggest that drivers 
may be startled, annoyed, or both, by auditory alarms in some situations, resulting in 
disuse of warning systems. 
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2.5.3 Alarm timing 
In addition to alarm modality the timing of the alarm is a crucial factor in determining 
alarm effectiveness in time critical situations. A poorly timed warning may actually 
undermine driver. safety (McGehee and Brown, 1998). This section reviews alarm 
timing in FCWS. 
A time-budget analysis method has been proposed in order to determine the onset of 
alarms (Geiser and Nirschl, 1993). According to this analysis (Figure 2-9), a warning 
reserve time ~'t, i.e. the time span in which alarms are available, is derived based on 
time intervals i.e. driver reaction time to alarms ~ Trea, minimum duration of driver 
action needed to respond to a collision ~ T min, position of normal action onset without 
the aid of alarms T norm and so on. Alarms which are provided before ~'t can be 
regarded as early alarms, conversely alarms which are provided after ~'t can be 
regarded as late alarms. The timing of alarms might be chosen early enough to enable 
drivers to react appropriately, however alarms which are presented too early might be 
viewed as annoying ones. 
warning 
too early in time 
= 'tmin 
position of normal action 
onset (s 1Wrm) reached 
= earliest 
warning moment 
latest 
too late 
I 
driver's reaction time! 
to warning message i 
i 
.1.Traa .. , ... 
! 
Tmax 
, 
, 
, 
minimum duration il::' 
of driver action 
.1.Tmin 4 
"'i 
position of laust action 
onset (s mm) reached 
position of action 
end reached 
warning moment 
t 
Figure 2-9 Time schedule of driver-driver warning assistance interaction (Geiser and 
Nirschl, 1993) 
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Lee et al. (2001) note that if the collision warning system acts trigger an appropriate 
response from drivers, then a relatively late warning, that minimises false warnings, 
might be the best design alternative. However if the collision warning system acts to 
redirect driver attention towards a critical event, then early alerts would provide a 
greater safety benefit. This contradiction suggests that the best strategy depends on 
the driver's expected role in collision warning system design. 
Gupta et al. (2001) considered alarm sensitivity and type of alarm signal and 
investigated how these factors may affect driver behaviour using adverse condition 
warning systems for slippery road conditions. This type of system attempts to provide 
drivers with an alerting warning whenever there is a possibility of a skid or a roll over 
due to snow or icy road conditions. A driving simulator providing virtual driving 
conditions was employed. The Microsoft Sidewinder Force Feedback steering wheel 
package was used to cOQtrol the simulated vehicle, and to provide force feedback 
through the steering wheel. Two different values of alarm sensitivity (low and high 
sensitivity) were used which gave two conditions within the alerting level. 
Theoretically the high sensitivity alerting level should have inevitably produced more 
alerts, and thus might be expected to result in a perception of greater false alarms than 
the low sensitivity alerting level. Driver performance data regarding response time to 
icy road conditions with and without the aid of alarms were assessed. The results 
showed that velocity at the instance of a skid was higher for the low compared to the 
high sensitivity alarm. These results may be caused by more time being available to 
drivers in the high sensitivity alarm condition to reduce their vehicle speed before the 
onset of a skid. However an analysis of driver steering wheel response found that 
input was significantly greater for the high sensitivity, compared to low sensitivity 
alarms, indicating a greater deviation; drivers turned the steering wheel more for the 
high sensitivity alarms. Furthermore, high sensitivity alarms led to greater negative 
subjective evaluations by the drivers than low sensitivity alarms. These results 
indicate that high sensitivity alarms i.e. early alarms are not always necessarily 
preferable. 
A high fidelity driving simulator study was completed in order to investigate the 
relationship between alarm timing and driver response to alarms in the context of 
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FCWS (Lee et aI., 2000, Lee et aI., 2001). Relatively early and late alarms were 
considered in order to identify how differences in alarm timing might affect driver 
performance in imminent collision situations. This experiment involved 120 drivers 
and the results showed that the presentation of alarms reduced collision rates, 
compared to driving without alarms. Furthermore early alarms reduced collision rates 
more effectively than late alarms. The early alarms led to more prompt accelerator 
release than late alarms, resulting in a faster response time to the brakes. These 
results indicate that an early alarm timing has the potential to provide more effective 
warning of imminent collisions than a late alarm timing in some situations. 
To sum up, optimising alarm timing compnses a trade-off between alarm 
effectiveness and driver acceptance. An early alarm timing, certainly, has the 
potential to lead to a prompt response to critical situations, however it may cause a 
negative driver perception of the warning systems. When considering the design of 
alarm timing, it is necessary to chose alarm timings which can maintain alarm 
effectiveness and appropriate levels of acceptance. 
2.6 Driver response to alarm malfunction 
Reliability and its influence on driver behaviour is an important consideration for 
alarm design. Usually false alarms are the result of a fault indicated by monitoring 
circuitry where no fault exists (Bliss and Dunn 2000). Missing alarms can be seen as 
a fault of omission where alarms are missed even though critical conditions have 
occurred. Signal detection theory (SDT) provides a theoretical means of determining 
thresholds for alarm activation on the basis of achieving a balance between the need 
for secure detection of critical situations and the avoidance of false alarms (Swets and 
Pickett 1982). The fundamental issue in setting the decision threshold is a trade-off 
between the cost of a missed and a false alarm. However, Parasuraman et al. (1997) 
argue that if a system is designed to minimise missed alarms, then the problems of an 
increase in false alarms become inevitable. In reality the occurrence of false and 
missed alarms does not simply result from theoretical considerations but from system 
failure, e.g. sensor failure or inadequate performance, data processing limitations or 
output failure caused by electrical problems or component malfunction etc. 
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There now follows an overview of alami malfunctions and their influence on human 
behaviour followed by a review of previous studies concerned with driver response to 
alarm failure in order to identify human factors design requirements for FCWS. 
2.6.1 The effect offalse alarms on human behaviour 
Breznitz (1983) successfully demonstrated the effect of false alarms on human 
behaviour. Specifically, this .study introduced a 'cry-wolf effect in order to 
investigate human behaviour towards false alarms. The research successfully showed 
that false alarms may affect human behaviour by inducing increased physiological 
stress and predicted response behaviour using heart rate and skin conductance levels. 
This study suggests that people who experience false alarms may demonstrate a 
subsequent change in response to an alarm system. 
Bliss et al. (1995) also considered the effect of false alarms on people, using objective 
measures to describe their response to alarm systems. A total of 138 undergraduate 
students performed a cognitively demanding psychomotor primary task; at the same 
time, they were presented with alarms of varying reliabilities (25,50, and 75 % of true 
alarms) and urgencies (green, yellow and red visual alarms presented with low-, 
medium-, and high-urgency auditory alarms). All the auditory alarms representing 
different levels of urgency were recorded from commercial aircraft simulators. 
Frequency, speed, and accuracy of the subjects' alarm response were measured with 
respect to differences in alarm reliability and urgency. The results showed that the 
percentage of alarm responses observed decreased as alarm reliability decreased. 
Subjects made more responses to high-urgency alarms than to low urgency-alarms, 
regardless of the false alarm rate. However alarm urgency did not affect alarm 
response speed and accuracy. 
Bliss and Dunn (2000) investigated the effect of increased workload levels of primary 
and secondary alarm tasks on alarm response time, accuracy and frequency. All 
participants performed the tracking, monitoring and resource management tasks 
which were designed to simulate activities performed by pilots during flight. At the 
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same time, they were presented with intermittent alarms as the secondary tasks. The 
number and types of tasks to be performed were manipulated in an attempt to vary 
primary task workload. The difficulty of the secondary task, i.e. responding to alarms, 
was manipulated by changing the temporal spacing (activation rate) of the alarms: 
Specifically in the low workload condition, alarms were evenly distributed across the 
entire session. In the high workload condition alarms were presented frequently 
compared with the low workload condition. Each alarm had a visual and auditory 
structure. The auditory portion of the alarm signal was recorded from a commercial 
aircraft simulator. Alarm reliability was 60%. Accordingly 40% of false alarms were 
presented. Operator response time, frequency and accuracy were measured as 
dependent variables. The results revealed that response time was reduced with 
increased primary task workload. Response frequency also decreased as a function of 
increasing primary task workload. With respect to the effect of secondary task 
workload on alarm response performance, although there was no effect for response 
time or accuracy, alarm response frequency decreased as secondary task workload 
increased. This study indicates that alarm response performance may depend on the 
demand level of other tasks. Furthermore, if alarms are provided frequently, for 
example in situations where multiple alarms are introduced, operator response 
frequency may decrease. 
Getty et aI, (1995) considered positive predictive values (PPV) which theoretically 
determine thresholds for issuing a warning in the design of alarm systems. A low 
PPV value refers to high detection sensitivity, indicating a small proportion of missed 
events to which an alarm should be provided. By implication, a low PPV has the 
potential to provide an increased frequency of false alarms. PPV was manipulated 
with 5 different values; 0.25,0.39,0.50,0.61, and 0.75 and the effect of PP V values 
on the latency of operators' responses to a warning in a laboratory experiment was 
investigated. The results show that participants respond slowly to low PPV sand 
quickly to high PPVs. It would appear that in certain situations the cry-wolf effect 
may be manifested by degraded alarm response speed rather than by ignoring alarms. 
That is, participants tended to respond to non-valid alarms very slowly. 
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Other research has also considered the effect of alarm validity on human response to 
alarms and has generally indicated that people tend to ignore or respond to non-valid 
alarms slowly (for example; Kerstholt and Passenier 2000; Maltz and Meyer 2001). 
Historically, the aviation domain had problems with excessive false alarm rates, 
resulting in pilots ignoring or disabling warning systems with major implications for 
safety (Sorkin 1988). Alarm designers have developed improved ways of controlling 
cockpit alarm systems but the problem has not been solved completely (Bliss 2003). 
Given that, unlike commercial and military pilots, car drivers are not selected, trained 
or regulated, issues relevant to false alarms in the vehicle domain have an elevated 
importance (Hancock and Verwey 1997). 
The results of previous studies regarding driver behaviour towards FCWS suggest that 
a high frequency of non-valid alarms has the potential to induce the crying wolf effect, 
resulting in a reduced response to valid alarms (Horowitz and Dingus, 1992; Tijerina 
and Garrott, 1997). Bliss and Action (2003) manipulated alarm reliability (50, 75, 
100 %) in order to investigate its effect on driver behaviour towards a collision 
warning system. A driving simulator based collision warning system that warns 
drivers of the approach of a car from the rear of their vehicle was used. 70 
undergraduate volunteers took part in this study and they were instructed to maintain a 
maximum speed of 70 mph (112.65 kph) and also to check their rear view mirror 
frequently to avoid collisions with an approaching vehicle from behind their vehicle 
even though alarms were provided. False alarms were presented on occasion 
according to alarm conditions. Alarm response frequency and collision rate, 
according to alarm reliability, were measured. The results showed that alarm 
response frequency deceased as alarm reliability was impaired. This suggests that the 
cry-wolf effect may occur with automotive alarm systems, resulting in reduced 
response to unreliable alarms. An important finding of this study was that drivers 
who experienced the least reliable alarms avoided collisions most successfully. This 
indicates that low reliability alarms may induce more careful driving while drivers 
who have the support of high reliable alarms, may be subject to behavioural 
adaptation. 
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Finally it should be stressed here that driver perception of the validity of alarms may 
influence the occurrence of alarm malfunction. Wheeler et al. (1998) suggested that a 
perceived false alarm can occur in some situations and this type of false alarm may 
impair system effectiveness in a similar way to real false alarms (i.e. those that occur 
when alarms are presented to drivers in the absence of potential collision events). 
They argued that perceived false alarms are associated with situations in which a 
driver has already recognised critical events before the presentation of an alarm. It is 
arguable that alarms which are provided after drivers have already recognised 
imminent collision situations and begun to implement some action to avoid a collision, 
can be viewed as incorrect or inappropriate alarms. The issue of perceived false 
alarms can be linked to the design of alarm timing and it is necessary to explore the 
perception of alarms from the driver's position in order to understand alarm timing 
and its relation to perceived false alarms 
2.6.2 The effect of missing alarms on human behaviour 
The pnmary aim of alarm systems is to provide alarms when necessary, and 
considerable effort is usually made to avoid missed alarms. However Bliss (2003) 
found that the occurrence of missed alarms accounted for 13 % of all alarm-related 
events in the database of the Aviation Safety Reporting System. It is likely that 
FCWS in the vehicle domain will provide missed alarms at relatively higher rates due 
to the complexity of the driving situations involved and limited development of the 
technical systems. 
Missing alarms may reasonably be expected to result in more serious 'consequences 
than false alarms. Although final responsibility for avoiding collisions must be held 
by drivers if drivers are too reliant on an alarm system it is possible that a missed 
alarm may lead to a delayed response to an imminent collision situation. This 
phenomenon is predictable given the changes in driver tasks or work load caused by 
the introduction of in-vehicle information systems (Mast, 1998). However despite the 
considerable accumulated knowledge about false alarms there has been relatively little 
research on the human factors of missing alarms. An exception is the indication that 
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the failure to supply warnings could result in greatest risk (Hancock and Parasuraman, 
1992; Sorkin et aI, 1988). 
2.7 Driver trust in warning systems 
The concept of trust has been recognised as an important factor when describing 
interactions between human and machines. It is well established that trust between 
humans and automated systems can affect the degree to which people accept and rely 
on automated systems. It therefore follows that the level of trust between a driver and 
a driver support system may limit the situations in which a promised positive effect is 
possible. 
In this section the history of research on trust from both sociological and human 
machine interaction perspectives is reviewed in order to understand how trust can be 
applied to the domain ofFCWS. 
2. 7.1 trust between humans 
The contemporary study of trust started in the social sciences. Relationships between 
humans have been investigated and several definitions of the nature of trust have been 
proposed in the psychological literature. Barber (1985) insisted that trust between 
humans is based on expectations that involve some of ' the fundamental meanings of 
trust and has a multidimensional character. Moreover, each dimension is subject to a 
different expectation about the nature of an interaction. Three specific expectations 
have been proposed namely persistence, technical competence and fiduciary 
responsibility. Persistence is the most general expectation and represents fulfilment 
of the natural and moral social order. Our expectation that nature works in a lawful, 
predictable way reduces the complexity in our world by limiting possible outcomes. 
Our expectation of constancy in natural physical laws is expressed in statements like 
'as night follows day'. Expectation of technical competence refers to the ability of the 
other partner to produce consistent and desirable performance and can be subdivided 
to define three types of expertise: everyday routine performance, technical facility, 
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and expert knowledge. The third dimension of trust, fiduciary responsibility, refers to 
the expectations regarding moral and social obligations that people should hold the 
interests of others above their own. This dimension plays an important role when 
agents cannot be evaluated because their expertise is not understood, or in unforeseen 
situations where performance cannot be predicted. 
Rampel et al. (1985) have proposed a model for the development of trust in another 
person as a relationship progresses and identified three components according to 
increasing levels of attributional abstraction, namely predictability, reliability and 
faith. At each stage, trust is based upon the outcome of the earlier stages. Early in a 
relationship, a person's trust in another person is dominated by predictability that is 
informed by the consistency of successive actions or decisions. As relationships 
progress there is an inevitable shift in focus away from assessments related to specific 
behaviours to an evaluation of the qualities and characteristics attributed to the partner, 
that is, perceived reliability dominates trust. The final stage in the growth of 
interpersonal trust is termed faith. Faith reflects an emotional security on the part of 
individuals, which enables them to go beyond the available evidence and feel, with 
assurance, that their safety is assured despite of an uncertain future. In summary, past 
predictability and dependability are critical to the development of faith. This 
perspective suggests that interpersonal trust has three aspects related to different types 
of expectation of other people and has a dynamic nature associated with past 
experience. 
2.7.2 Trust between human and machines 
As technology has developed, human support systems with increasing degrees of 
automation have been introduced in large complex systems such as aviation or nuclear 
power plants. Satchell (1998) states that "Automation is the replacement of human 
activities by machine activities ", and one aim of introducing automated systems is to 
reduce human operators' tasks and mitigate the incidents caused by operator errors. 
However, not all of the human tasks relevant to control systems can be replaced by 
machines and human supervisory control remains. This means that operators and 
machines must share tasks in order to control a system and maintain system efficiency. 
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The importance of the concept of trust between humans and machines arises and a 
semi-intelligent machine can be proposed as an operator's partner in a control system 
(Muir 1987; Zuboff 1988). 
Zuboff (1988) has investigated operators' trust in, and use of, automation following 
its introduction into the workplace. Her studies suggested that the operators' lack of 
trust in the new technology may impair potential system efficiency. Conversely 
operators sometimes place too much trust in the new technology, resulting in a failure 
to intervene when the technology fails. According to Zuboffs account of operator 
trust in mechanical systems, trial-and-error experience may contribute to both the 
development and underdevelopment of ·trust. That is operator's trust may vary 
according to knowledge about the systems based on experience with these systems. 
In other words, operator trust never develops without experience of system usage. 
Muir (1994) proposes a theoretical model of trust between humans and machines 
(table 2-3) showing a comprehensive understanding of how human trust in machines 
is constructed. This model is based on trust between people as a starting point and 
extends it to the human-machine relationship. It is an integrated model created by 
crossing Barber's model and Rampel et al.'s model described above. Muir insists that 
"Barber's model provides the broader context and richness of meaning needed to 
characterize the myriad interactions in a complex and hierarchical supervisory control 
environment and Rempel et al.'s model provides the dynamic factor needed to predict 
how trust may change as a result of experience with a system". That is, trust in 
machines also has three different dimensions: persistence, technical competence, and 
fiduciary responsibility. Also each dimension changes its aspects according to an 
operator's experience of a system. In the first stage an operator's trust will be 
dominated by predictability, being judged by an evaluation of the consistency and 
desirability of the system's current behaviour. As the relationship between human 
and machine matures, trust will be dominated by a different aspect, dependability. 
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Table 2-3 An integrated model of trust in human-machine relationship, created by 
crossing Barber's (1983) model of the meaning of trust (row) and Rempel et al.'s (1985) 
model of the dynamics of trust (columns). Statement in the ceiIs exem pJify the nature of 
a person's expectations of a referent (j) at different levels of experience in a relationship 
(Muir, 1994) 
expectation 
Persistence of 
- Natural physical 
- Natural biological 
- Moral social 
- Technical competence 
Predictability 
(of acts) 
Event conform to 
natural laws 
Human life has 
survived 
Human and 
computers act 
'decent' 
j's behaviour is. 
predictable 
- Fiduciary responsibility j's behaviour is 
consistently 
responsible 
Dependability Faith 
(of disposition) (in motives) 
Nature is lawful Nature laws are 
constant 
Human survival is Human life will survive 
lawful 
Humans and computers Human and computers 
are 'good' and 'decent' will continue to be 
by nature 'good' and 'decent' in 
the future 
j has a dependable j will continue to be 
nature dependable in the 
future 
j has a responsible 
nature 
j will continue to be 
responsible in the 
future 
The process of attributing dependability is based on the accumulation of behavioural 
evidence that supports perceived predictability. The final stage in the growth of trust 
in machines is faith where human operators will believe past predictability and 
dependability in the face of an uncertain future beyond the behavioural evidence 
generated by the system. 
Muir and Moray (1996) estimated the nature and dynamics of human trust in 
machines using a medium-fidelity process control simulation of a milk pasteurization 
plant. The operator's task was to control the pasteurization process, maximizing 
system output within safety constraints. The plant was mostly controlled by an 
automated system but a pump sub-system was semi automated. Thus the normal 
operating mode was automatic, but operators could switch between manual and 
automatic control whenever they wished. Only the properties of the pump were 
manipulated in response to experimental conditions and all other subsystems were 
consistently exact. Three different kinds of pump, each with a different error mode 
(exact, constant proportional error and a variable error) were prepared for this study. 
Operators' subjective ratings of trust, measured by way of rating scales, were used to 
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evaluate the nature of trust in machines. In the analysis, simple linear regression 
analyses were conducted to identify important contributing factors to describe trust in 
machines. One regression model showing the relationship between technical 
competence and fiduciary responsibility for describing development of trust in 
automated systems found that technical competence of the automated system was 
more important than fiduciary responsibility to describe trust in the automated system. 
This result indicates that technical competence depending on system performance and 
system reliability may represent operators' subjective ratings of trust in the 
automation. 
Lee and Moray (1992) also investigated the dynamics of operators' trust in an 
automated system using a semi-automatic pasteUrisation plant. A medium-fidelity, 
simulated, orange juice, pasteurisation plant was created. The simulated plant 
included provisions for both automatic and manual control. The operators could 
control feedstock pump rate, steam pump rate, and heater setting either manually or 
by engaging the automatic control. The operator's task was to control this plant and 
create orange juice as much as possible by using automatic control, manual control, or 
any combination of the two. With respect to system fault conditions, the feedback 
pump was programmed to perform with a variable level of performance. Four 
different magnitudes of fault (15%, 20%, 30%, and 35%) were prepared. The 
magnitudes of the fault corresponded to the difference between the actual and the 
target pump rate. In order to measure operators' subjective ratings of trust in the 
automated system, a 10 point rating was used in this study. In a time series analysis 
of the dynamics of trust, it was shown that the system fault led to decreased trust and 
as the magnitude of the fault increased, trust decreased. Furthermore Lee and Moray 
(1994) focused on the operators' allocation strategy between automatic and manual 
control and found that both trust in automated controllers and self-confidence in 
manual control abilities may dramatically influence the operators' allocation strategy. 
Specifically they found that automation was used when trust exceeded self-confidence, 
and manual control when the opposite was true. 
Parasuraman and Riley (1997) focused on human use, misuse, disuse and abuse of 
automation in order to explore how humans behave with automated systems and how 
abuse of automation impairs system efficiency. In this study they found that trust 
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determines automation usage, that is, operators may not use an automated system 
which they believe to be untrustworthy. Conversely they may continue to use an 
automated system even when it malfunctions. Riley (1996) indicated that system 
accuracy impacts on trust in automation and trust in automation influences reliance on 
automation. 
Though it can be reasonably concluded that trust in automated systems has a dynamic 
nature, varying according to system faults or system reliability, the following research 
evidence provides interesting suggestions. Abe et al. (2000) and !toh et al. (1999) 
conducted an experiment using a mixed-juice, pasteurisation plant simulation and 
found that the dynamics of trust in automated systems depends on not only system 
reliability but also malfunction occurrence patterns. Specifically, discrete 
malfunctions do not influence decreasing trust but continuous malfunctions 
significantly decrease operators' trust even if the malfunction rate is the same. !toh et 
al. (1999) and Moray et al. (2000) suggest that trust declines when a human disagrees 
with a control strategy that an automated system performs even if this strategy is 
required to maintain system efficiency. This result suggests that a conflict of 
"opinion" between human and machine may cause decreased trust in automated 
systems even if automated systems are reliable. 
Dzindolet et al. (2003) interestingly concluded that when an automated support 
system made errors and operators' trust was impaired, knowing why the system might 
fail increased trust in the automated system and increased operator reliance. These 
results indicate that enhancing the operators' mental model of the automated system 
(i.e. how does the automated system work?) allowed the operators to accommodate 
poor performance and increased their trust in the system. 
Meyer (2001) provided an interesting perspective on alarm type and its influence on 
operator trust, indicating that a simple notion of trust in warning systems may need to 
be refined. This study distinguished between two types of operator trust in relation to 
warning systems that are subtly but significantly different; one he termed compliance 
and the other reliance. In compliance the operator responds to alarms promptly, 
assuming that they reliably indicate a hazard or fault condition. However, in the 
absence of an alarm ('green light' condition) the operator will assume that there is 
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probably no hazard and proceeds with caution. In reliance the operator assumes that 
there will be no hazard unless the alarm is given; the green light condition reliably 
indicating a lack of hazard. 
2. 7.3 Driver trust in FCWS 
In-vehicle driver support systems are intended to help drivers implement tasks more 
efficiently or safely. In other words the appropriate co-operation between drivers and 
driver support systems enables increased system effectiveness. This implies that 
driver trust may play an important role in optimising collision warning system 
performance. Hancock and Parasuraman (1992) stated that neglecting the human 
component in driver support systems can lead to the failure of system efficiency and 
emphasized the importance of driver trust in predicting subsequent driver behaviour 
towards such systems. Lee and Kantowitz (1998) insisted that trust plays an 
important role when developing a functional description of the driver's interaction 
with ITS technology and Stanton and Young (1998) argue that trust should be 
considered an important psychological factor in the development of successful vehicle 
automation. Driver acceptance of FCWS is also an important factor to consider in the 
design of FCWS according to Groeger et al. (1993). Driver acceptance may be 
strongly influenced by driver trust since if drivers distrust a collision warning system 
then it is impossible for drivers to accept that system. 
Although the importance of driver trust has been widely recognized, specific research 
evidence regarding how driver trust may influence driver behaviour towards FCWS, 
or what factors may affect driver trust, has been inadequate. Furthermore the 
importance of driver trust in FCWS is unclear. 
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2.8 Automation-induced complacency and situation 
awareness 
In order to understand driver interactions with FCWS which may impact on system 
efficiency in more detail it is necessary to identify the contributory factors. Wick ens 
et al. (1998) provide a suggestive general framework for examining the human 
performance issues discussed in this section (figure 2-10). Two elements of human 
interaction with automated systems; situation awareness and complacency, which may 
apply to FCWS will now be discussed. 
2.8.1 Situation awareness 
Researchers have yet to fully agree on a definition for situation awareness. The 
concept of situation awareness has been regarded as both a product, involving 
knowledge, and as a process, involving perception (Satchell, 1998). The most 
complete definition of situation awareness is "the perception of the elements in the 
environment with a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning 
and the projection of their status in the near future" (Endsley 1988). 
The requirement for situation awareness has become obvious in the process of task 
allocation between humans and machines during automation. In aviation, for example, 
state of the art technology, such as avionics has changed the pilot's task dramatically. 
The pilot does not directly control the aeroplane but supervises the automated flight 
control systems. When the automated systems fail or in the presence of conditions 
that the automated system is not designed to handle, the pilot must intervene and 
control the system manually and good situation awareness is critical. 
It is very important for the pilot to understand what the system is doing in order to 
take an appropriate action when required.· Endsley (1995) presented a theoretical 
model of situation awareness based on its role in dynamic human decision making in 
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a variety of domains. In this model she insists that situation awareness (SA) has three 
hierarchical phases. 
Level 1 SA refers to perception of the elements in the environment. The first step in 
gaining SA is to perceive the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in 
the environment. An automobile driver needs knowledge of where other vehicles and 
obstacles are, their dynamics, and the status and dynamics of their own vehicle. Level 
. 2 SA refers to comprehension of the current situation. In the second step human 
operators must comprehend situations where what is going on is based on a synthesis 
of disjointed level 1 elements in order to determine how well different system 
components are functioning. Level 3 SA is concerned with projection of future status. 
In this final stage of development of SA operators may gain the ability to project the 
future action of the elements in the environment. This ability is based on SA of level 
1 and level 2, being achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the 
elements and comprehension of the situation. With respect to the driving domain, a 
driver needs to detect possible future collision threats in order to act effectively. 
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Figure 2-10 Framework for examining human performance issues (Wickens et aI., 1998) 
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A number of studies, which are associated with situation awareness, have been 
conducted in addition to the definitive research mentioned above (Endsley et at., 
1995; Sarter and Woods, 1995; Smith and Hancock, 1995). For example, Endsley et 
al. (1995) indicates that low SA corresponds with out-of-the-Ioop performance 
decrements. This means that as an operator's task shifts from active to passive 
processing, the operator's SA may decrease under automated conditions. This result 
suggests that in order to maintain operator's SA in control systems it is necessary to 
keep the operator involved in the decision loop even when the operator does not 
directly control the system. Sarter and Woods (1995) suggest that in situations where 
a large number of functions and options are available for carrying out a given task 
under different circumstance, new types of mode-related problems may happen. This 
means that as the strategy for control systems become more flexible, operators may 
fail to choose the appropriate mode for the situation. 
In contrast to the aviation sector the introduction of FCWS does not provide a 
dramatic change in driver task or a mode change in driving, however the introduction 
of FCWS may influence the driver's need to attend to forward vision, resulting in 
changes in situation awareness. For example, in level 3 SA; how drivers detect 
possible collision situations may be affected by the introduction of FCWS. 
Furthermore, according to the framework, situation awareness may also be affected by 
the driver's mental model of how the collision warning system works. That is, drivers 
understanding of how collision warnings are provided may play an important role in 
developing situation awareness which subsequently determines driver behaviour 
towards the collision warning system. 
2.B.2 Complacency 
Wiener (1981) defined complacency as "a psychological state characterised by a low 
index of suspicion". Pilot "complacency" has long been implicated as a possible 
contributor to aviation accidents. The issue has been investigated by a number of 
authors (Farrell and Lewandowsky, 2000; Molloy and Panisuraman, 1996; Moray, 
1990; Moray, 2000; Ockerman and Pritchett, 2000; Parasuraman et aI., 1996; Sarter et 
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aI., 1997; Singh et aI., 1993; Skitka et aI., 1999). For example, Singh et al. (1993) 
state that automation-induced complacency is a function of operator trust in, and 
reliance on, automation. Molloy and Parasuraman (1996) found that compared with 
manual control, monitoring for a single failure of system control is poorer under 
automated control. Skitka et al. (1999) compared error rates in a simulated flight task 
with and without a computer that monitored system states and made decision 
recommendations. The results showed that when the computer worked correctly, 
operators in the automated system condition made fewer errors than those in the non-
automated conditions. However when the computer did not work correctly 'much 
higher error rates were observed in the automated condition than the non-automated 
condition. Parasuraman et al. (1996) showed that temporary return of the automated 
task to the operator was a possible countermeasure to monitoring inefficiency. This 
result suggests that dynamic task allocation between human and machine may help to 
enhance the monitoring of automated systems. 
Briefly summarizing these results indicates the following issues regarding operator 
complacency in automated systems: (1) poor task monitoring may occur in highly 
automated control systems, (2) over-confidence and over-reliance on automation may 
lead to decreased vigilance performance and as a result, operators may fail to 
recognise automation failures and (3) dynamic task allocation may be a possible 
countermeasure to vigilance performance inefficiency under highly automated 
systems. 
However, Moray (2000) disagrees with previous research related to complacency and 
suggests that current research does not provide evidence for complacency in 
monitoring rare events because a failure to detect a signal is not in itself a sign of 
complacency. His research suggests that even a 'perfect' observer who is well trained 
and fully vigilant may fail to detect a warning signal. Moray defined complacency as 
follows. "The behaviour of an observer is complacent if a source is sampled 
(monitored) less frequently than is warranted by the statistics of occurrence of the 
signals to be detected". This statement means that "complacency is about monitoring, 
not about detection." 
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Satchell (1998) argues that complacency and situation awareness are linked. 
Excessive trust generates complacency, which can interfere with sustained attention 
and hence situation awareness. In order to enhance efficiency of FCWS it is 
necessary to consider possible factors that may impair driver performance in 
imminent collision situations due to the introduction of FCWS. The problems 
associated with in-vehicle collision warning system induced complacency are possibly 
linked to driver detection or recognition performance. Although it is likely that 
FCWS can help reduce driver error caused by inattention, if drivers become over 
reliant and start to believe that critical situations will never happen if a warning is not 
presented, then driver response to alarm failure may be undermined. 
2.9 Chapter. conclusion 
The literature relevant to the driver characteristics and their interactions with FCWS 
has been reviewed in this chapter. Evidence has been presented of the need for driver 
support to increase safe driving. For rear-end collision situations in particular there is 
a possibility that even slightly reduced driver inattention to forward vision may induce 
serious accidents due to limited driver performance in car following situations. Thus 
FCWS have the potential to decrease accidents caused by driver error. 
However system effectiveness is highly dependent on alarm modality and its relation 
to driver behaviour; the type and timing of alarms may induce more efficient driver 
behaviour. It must also be stressed here that driver interaction with FCWS plays an 
important role in determining system effectiveness. Furthermore, driver interactions 
with warning systems are influenced by multiple factors; situation awareness, 
complacency, trust, etc. Although a large number of researches have been carried out, 
the question of relationships between these factors and driver behaviour is still open. 
In particular, one of the most important issues requiring further investigation in alarm 
timing and its relation to driver trust for the design ofFCWS. Moreover, with respect 
to driver interactions with FCWS, it is necessary to consider driver response to alarm 
failures and establish an approach for mitigating the impact on system effectiveness 
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caused by false and missing alarms from the viewpoint of driver trust. The empirical 
work considered in the subsequent chapters addresses these issues. 
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forward collision warning systems 
3.1 Introduction 
How can we assess driver response to forward collision warning systems (FCWS) and 
the contribution to safe driving for the systems? The successful assessment of any 
active driver support system must overcome significant difficulties. Driver behaviour, 
supported or un-assisted, is the product of a complex set of interacting factors (driver 
characteristics, physical road environment, regulation, dynamic traffic situation etc.) 
which are generally not open to control or manipulation in on-road trials. Any 
methodology must be assessed in terms of its safety, validity, reliability, practicality 
and resource requirements. Behavioural simulation with driving simulators has been 
identified as very powerful tools for estimating driver response to new technologies. 
However this method has benefits and limitations which largely derive from technical 
characteristic. Comprehensive understanding of driving simulators would be required. 
3.2 The aim of this chapter 
The primary aim of this chapter was to evaluate driving simulator methodologies that 
might have the potential to assess the effect of introducing FCWS on driver behaviour 
in order to justify the current research. Furthermore specific facilities and 
measurement procedures used in the thesis are described. 
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3.3 Driving simulation: benefit and limitations 
The driving simulator study is an alternative to field studies in real traffic and has 
been used as a powerful method for assessing driver behaviour with respect to driver 
support systems (Janssen and Kuiken, 1993). Compared to a field study, a driving 
simulator can reproduce the same experimental conditions for all subjects and critical 
driving conditions can be investigated without physical danger for subjects thus 
overcoming some of the disadvantages of a field study. Simulation not only provides 
controlled experimental conditions with subjects but also enables secure manipulation 
of driving conditions including headway time, deceleration of a leading vehicle and so 
on in order to deliver data which can cover a wide variety of driving situations. 
There are different levels of simulator sophistication with different characteristics and 
capabilities; very simple static mock-ups, video game solutions, somewhat more 
advanced equipment with some control possibilities and very high fidelity simulators. 
Nilsson (1993) argues that an advanced simulator is preferable for estimating the 
complete driving task, particularly when the driver's reactions and manoeuvring play 
a crucial role. She also proposed several requirements to be fulfilled as design criteria. 
• "The simulation must run in real time." 
• "The model describing the vehicle must be complete in the sense that all the 
subsystems such as engine, brakes, transmission, steering system, suspension 
etc. must be modelled." 
• "The model describing the vehicle characteristics must be able to represent 
front/rear wheel drive, and different levels of under steer and oversteer." 
• "The vehicle model must also be able to reproduce the effects of the interface 
between vehicle and road, for example slippery surfaces and gravel roads. 
• "The simulator must have a wide angle visual system, preferably in colour. 
The picture should contain enough detail to give a realistic driving 
impression." 
• "The simulator must have a moving base system for the simulation of inertia 
forces." 
• "It is crucial that the time delay introduced by the simulator is short compared 
to the lags of real vehicles (100-250 ms). That is, the driver must not 
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experience a delay between a certain manoeuvre (for example a steering wheel 
turn) and the corresponding changes in the visual scene." 
However Nilsson (1993) also identifies two important limitations regarding driving 
simulator studies. One is that there are situations where physical laws limit the use of 
a driving simulator, even if it is advanced. It is impossible for a fixed based simulator 
to provide some types of vehicle motion i.e. roll, pitch and so on. Furthermore, the 
driver experiences a lack of correspondence between visual and motion sensations, 
which can induce uncertainty and abnormal behaviour, even with a moving base 
system. The other major constraint is that it is impossible to fully reproduce the real 
traffic environment, with all its complexity and huge variability, resulting in a limited 
simulation of the real world driving context and consequently a driver response that is 
not exactly equivalent to real world driving. 
It is also assumed that the absence of risk of a real accident may affect driver attitude 
in experiments, and it is necessary to engage driver motivation to the levels found in 
'real' driving. 
These three limitations have a major impact on the validity of data obtained in driving 
simulator trials. That is, it is impossible to fully generalize from simulator driving to 
real vehicle driving. Nilsson (1993) says the question of validity is not satisfactorily 
answered yet. Any interpretation of absolute values themselves must be treated with 
caution, however it is reasonable to estimate relative differences in driver behaviour in 
response to experimental conditions. That is we can anticipate how FCWS may 
influence driver behaviour by comparing driver performance data supported by 
warning systems with driver performance for normal driving situations in the 
controlled experimental scenarios. 
The behaviour of individual drivers with respect to the human factors of FCWS will 
be considered in this thesis in order to identify the problems which might impair the 
potential contribution of such systems to safe driving. Accordingly a driving 
simulator is entirely appropriate for achieving the aims of this study despite its 
inherent limitations. 
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3.4 Performance of Driving Simulators Used in this thesis 
Two driving simulators were employed in this research. In this section, the 
perfonnance capability of each simulator is summarised in order to clarify the validity 
of the experimental studies completed. 
3.4.1. Leeds Advanced Driving Simulator 
Data were collected using the Leeds Advanced Driving Simulator (LADS; further 
details can be seen at http://www.its.leeds.ac.ukJfaciiities/lads/ as of September 2004), 
which uses complex computer graphics to provide a highly realistic automobile 
operating environment. The total horizontal field of view is 230°. The vertical field of 
view is 39°. A rear view (60°) is back projected onto a screen behind the car to 
provide an image seen through the vehicle's rear view and wing mirrors. The car used 
in the studies reported here was a Rover 216GTi four-door sedan modified for use in 
the simulator. Although the simulator had a fixed base, physical and functional 
fidelity were reasonably high and drivers were provided with realistic driving 
conditions. Drivers received feedback regarding vehicle control from the steering 
wheel, brakes, accelerator, and gearshift controls in a similar way to a real car. 
Moreover, visual and auditory stimuli accurately represented environmental changes 
in response to driver action. The simulated driving environment was created using a 
Multi-Gen Creator with Road Tools option. The frame rate was fixed to a constant 
30Hz. 
Several studies have investigated and confirmed the validity of the LADS (for 
example, Carsten et aI, 1997) 
3.4.2. Driving simulator owned by Japan Automobile Research Institute 
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Figure 3-1 JAR! driving simulator 
The driving simulator owned by the Japan Automobile Research Institute (JAR!) also 
uses complex computer graphics to provide a highly realistic automobile operating 
environment created by the MultiGen Creator. The frame rate is fixed to a constant 
60Hz. The cab and screens are mounted on a six-degree-of-freedom motion base to 
provide motion cues to the drivers. The cab is 2.3m wide, 3.95m long and 2.3m high 
and is also equipped with a screen which gives a total horizontal field of view of 50° 
and a vertical field of view of 35° (Figure 3-1). Drivers receive feedback regarding 
vehicle control from the steering wheel, brakes, accelerator, and gearshift controls in 
exactly the same way as in a real car. Moreover, visual and auditory stimuli 
accurately represent environmental changes in response to driver action. The validity 
ofthis simulator has been established in research studies (Soma et aI., 1997). 
3.5 Algorithm for triggering alarms 
Both simulators were used for experiments involving car following situations in 
which the following vehicle was equipped with a simulated FCWS. Several 
algorithms have been developed for alarm trigger logic in the design of FCWS. 
Although this research does not focus on the differences in driver behaviour according 
to variations in alarm trigger logic, it was necessary to select an algorithm for use in 
the simulator studies. In this section the differences between three widely used 
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algorithms are described in order to justify the algorithm used in the research reported 
here. 
3.5.1 Time to collision (lTC) 
This is a simple alarm trigger logic where the time until a collision between leading 
and following vehicle determines the generation of warnings. A specific TTC trigger 
value is typically selected on the basis of assumptions regarding driver braking 
reaction time. The equation is as follows (Farber, 1991): 
1TC = 1vf -Vr (1) 
Where: 
TTC is the time to collision 
Vjis following vehicle speed 
VI is leading vehicle speed, and 
D is current headway. 
Farber also suggests that a threshold of 4 sec may be suitable for triggering alarm 
timing. As can be seen in this equation, there is no consideration regarding the 
deceleration of the leading vehicle, thus it is possible that TTC based triggers are less 
effective when there is a sudden deceleration of a leading vehicle, resulting in an 
increased possibility of collision accidents. 
3.5.2 Closing rate algorithm (CRA) 
The closing rate algorithm (CRA) is based on decreased rates of relative speed 
between leading and following vehicle and the equation is as follows (Farber 1994): 
D = (V _ ~ )RT + {Vf - VI )2 / (2) 
w f I /2Df 
Where: 
Dw is the warning distance 
Djis deceleration of the following vehicle 
Vjis following vehicle speed 
"VI is leading vehicle speed, and 
RT is a response time of following driver. 
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As can be seen in this equation, CRA has two free parameters RT and DJ detennining 
alann sensitivity. It should be noted that the CRA establishes no minimum following 
distance, that is, no warning is provided unless the following vehicle is closing on the 
lead vehicle, i.e., Vr- VI >0. Thus it is possible for two vehicles to be driven at high 
speed with short headways without triggering the alann. 
3.5.3 Stop distance algorithm 
The Stop-Distance-Algorithm (SDA) has been recognised by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISOITC204IWG14). The SDA is so tenned 
because a warning distance is defined based on the difference between the stopping 
distances of the leading and following vehicle and it is expected that the SDA will be 
introduced as the main alann trigger logic in the design of future production FCWS 
(Wilson et aI., 1997). 
(3) 
Where: 
Dw is the warning distance 
DJ is the deceleration of the following vehicle 
DI is the deceleration ofthe leading vehicle 
Viis following vehicle speed 
VI is leading vehicle speed, and 
RT is a response time of following driver. 
This algorithm has three free parameters: RT is the assumed reaction time of the 
driver of the following vehicle and DI and DJ are the assumed deceleration of the 
leading and following vehicle respectively. Warning distance (Dw) is dependent on 
the values of these free parameters. 
Faber (1994) indicates that the warning distances produced by the SDA are more 
sensitive to the difference in speed between the two vehicles than the CRA. This is 
because with the SDA, the warning distance increases with the difference between the 
squares of the speed (Vj2_VI2), while with the CRA, the warning distance increases 
58 
Chapter 3: Methods for accessing driver response to forward collision warning systems 
Table 3-1 Warning distances with eRA and SDA algorithms for the two cases 
CRT (Of =0.31g, 
RT=2.5s) 
SDA (0 f =0.6g, 
o f=0.35g,RT=2:05g) 
V f =Vf =55 mph Vf =65mph, V f =55 mph 
no warning 14m 
14m 44m 
with the square of the difference (Vj-VIi. Accordingly there is a possibility that the 
SDA provides alarms more often that the eRA. 
A study showed the difference in the warning distance produced by eRA and SDA 
(Farber 1994). Table 3-1 illustrates the difference in warning distances produced by 
CRA and SDA algorithms for two cases. 
The SDA was used in all of the experiments in this research because it is the alarm 
logic which probably has the greatest potential to improve safe driving. 
3.6 Measures 
3.6.1 Measuring of driver trust in FCWS 
The contribution of different aspects of FCWS performance is important when 
measuring driver ratings of trust. As already argued above trust in automated systems 
is a multidimensional phenomenon defined by three types of expectation (persistence 
of natural laws, technically competent performance, and fiduciary responsibility). 
Furthermore each expectation also dynamically varies in three dimensions 
(predictability, dependability and faith) in response to driver experience. In this 
research consideration of subjective ratings of trust was related to alarm timings and 
alarm malfunction. Alarm timing is strongly linked to technical system capability and 
alarm malfunction depends on technical system reliability. Thus driver trust in Fews 
largely reflects one aspect of trust; technical competence. This study focused on 
relatively short term effects of alarm timings and alarm malfunction on trust. It was 
assumed that trust ratings would not be influenced by different levels of experience. 
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In this study Lee's method (Lee and Moray, 1992), originally modelled on those used 
by Muir (1989), was used to estimate driver specific subjective ratings of trust in 
FCWS. This method of measuring ratings of trust is relatively simple and is very 
appropriate for use in simulator based experimentation. Lee and Moray (1992) used a 
simple 10-point rating scale (Figure 3-2). The' l' extreme of the scale was marked 
with 'NOT AT ALL. At the other extreme, the '10' was marked with 
'COMPLETEL Y'. The same technique to estimate driver trust in FCWS was used in 
this thesis. All subjects gave a verbal judgement of their trust for the following 
question; how much do you trust the warning system? 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 
Figure 3.,.2 to-point rating scale of trust 
In addition to being easily understood by the subjects the method can be used quickly 
after each driver response (using a loudspeaker and microphone in the simulator) 
without disturbing the subject's ability to concentrate on the driving task. 
In chapter 5 an estimate of driver perception of alarm timing is reported using a 
simple three level estimation; early, correct, or late. All subjects gave a verbal 
judgement of their perception of alarm timing for the following question; how would 
you rate the alarm timing? 
3.6.2 Driver performance measures 
In order to investigate driver performance in imminent collision situations a number 
of measures were used. Three measures characterising the response process were 
used to observe how the collision warnings influenced driving performance in 
imminent collision situations: Braking event to brake onset time, Braking event to 
accelerator release time and Accelerator release to brake onset time. Two measures 
were implemented to assess the relationship between the presentation of alarms and 
driver behaviour more directly: Alarm to brake onset time and Alarm to accelerator 
release time. Finally one variable of braking profile describing driver braking 
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response was measured: Maximum deceleration. Figure 3-3 shows typical concepts 
of each transition time. The definition of each variable was as follows. 
i) Braking event to brake onset time: This is the time period between the braking event 
and application of the brakes. This transition time represents the time period between 
the occurrence of a critical event and the driver's final action i.e. application of the 
brakes. It is assumed that this variable is influenced by every factor including alarm 
timing. This variable comprises the following two reaction times. 
ii) Braking event to accelerator release time: This is the time period between the 
braking event and driver's release of the accelerator. It provides an indication of the 
driver's recognition ofthe imminent collision event. 
iii) Accelerator release to brake onset time: This describes the time between the 
driver's release of the accelerator and application of the brakes. It provides an 
indication of the driver's speed of decision making of the need to brake after 
recognising the potential threat. 
ivY Alarm to brake onset time: This is the time period between alarm onset and 
application of the brakes. It represents the relative relationship between the timing of 
the alarm and the timing of application of the brakes. 
v) Alarm to accelerator release time: This is the time period between alarm onset and 
the driver's release of the accelerator. It represents the relative relationship between 
the timing of the alarm and the timing of release of the accelerator .. 
vi) Maximum deceleration: This is defined as the peak braking effort for avoiding 
imminent collisions. It provides an indication of the strength of the drivers' braking 
response, i.e. their sense of urgency. 
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Figure 3-3 Measurements procedure 
In the subsequent chapter, the effect of alarm presentation on driver behaviour will be 
discussed using the measures proposed above. It is argued that these dependent 
measures adequately describe driver response to imminent collision situations and the 
relationship between the presentation of alarms and driver braking reaction. 
3.7 Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter several methods for exploring driver behaviour have been described 
and their particular benefit and inherent limitations have been identified. Accordingly, 
driving simulators were selected to undertake the research. Furthermore it was argued 
that the two driving simulators which were used in this study had sufficiently high 
fidelity to be able to reproduce driving conditions in a realistic manner. Consequently 
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it is reasonable to expect· that data obtained from the simulator studies have the 
potential to estimate driver behaviour towards FCWS. Finally the objective driver 
performance measures and subjective measures of driver response used in the 
simulator studies were described and justified. 
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driver trust and car following behaviour 
4.1 Introduction 
As already mentioned, substantial safety benefits have been associated with the 
introduction of FCWS, however it is necessary to identify and optimise the human 
factors issues which determine alarm effectiveness in order for the potential benefits 
to be achieved. 
Hirst and Graham (1997) found that an auditory tone is the most effective output 
mode to enable drivers to respond quickly to critical situations. Another important 
factor that needs to be considered is the timing of the alarms. The timing of the 
alarms may not only influence alarm effectiveness but also affect driver acceptance. 
Different levels of acceptance are likely to be associated with alarms that are 
perceived to be early or late because of a mismatch between the driver's 
understanding of the traffic situation and the system's output. If the discrepancy is 
large then the alarm may be perceived as inappropriate. Furthermore, driver trust in 
alarms reflects driver perception of alarm timing and subsequently influences driver 
response to alarms. 
Knowledge of the influence of alarm timing on driver trust is therefore crucial when 
considering the design of FCWS. However, little is known about the actual 
relationship between alarm timing and driver trust. Accordingly, this chapter focuses 
on how different alarm timings may affect driver trust and also how driver response to 
different alarm timings influences system effectiveness in order to determine the 
alarm timings that can maximise the alarm effect. 
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4.2 The aim of this study 
The fundamental purpose of this study was to determine the effect of different alarm 
timings on driver trust and to create a model of the dynamics of trust for anticipating 
how driver trust may vary according to alarm timing. The study also investigated how 
driver braking strategies can be affected by different alarm timings in imminent 
collision situations. 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Apparatus 
The research was completed using The Leeds Advanced Driving Simulator (see 
chapter 3). The visual scene was a computer generated environment which included 
other vehicles, buildings and pedestrians. The road environment comprised an urban 
street with a single-carriageway road. 
The following vehicle, 'driven' by the subjects, was equipped with a simulated FCWS. 
Although several algorithms have been used for alarm trigger logics, a Stop-Distance-
Algorithm (SDA) was used in this experiment. This algorithm has three free 
parameters: reaction time (RI), deceleration of the leading vehicle (DI) and 
deceleration of the following vehicle (DJ). Warning distance (Dw) is found on the 
basis of these parameters and velocity of the leading (VI) and following (Vf) vehicle 
(see chapter 3). 
This study examined driver response to three different values of alarm timing 
(late/early/middle) and one fixed value of alarm timing (middle) in two conditions: a 
condition in which alarms were produced with variable timing (non-consistent) and a 
condition in which the timing of all alarms was consistent. More specifically, three DJ 
levels, namely O.75g O.55g and 0.35g were used for the late middle and early timings 
of the alarm respectively. The other parameters had the same value in all conditions; 
RT=1.25s and DFO.5g. The values of these parameters were chosen to reflect 
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realistic values for the deceleration level of the following vehicle and driver braking 
response time. A pilot trial was undertaken in order to confirm that there was 
sufficient difference in alarm timing between conditions based on absolute values and 
driver perception. 
The warning system provided drivers with a simple auditory buzzer alarm. The 
auditory tone comprised 7 peaks in the entire wavelength and lasted approximately 
2.0 s. The prominent frequency of the auditory tone was 4000 Hz. 
4.3.2 Subjects and experimental design 
The experiment involved 24 drivers (12 women and 12 men) aged between 20 and 60 
years (M=31.5, SD=8.9). All were licensed to drive and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Each driver was paid £10 for the time taken to complete the 
experiment. 
The participants were randomly assigned to the two experimental conditions defined 
above, with 12 in each condition. In the non-consistent alarm condition alarms were 
provided with variable timing (early/middle/late). The purpose of this condition was 
to investigate the effect of alarm timing on driver braking response and driver trust. 
The order of presentation for different timings of the alarm in this condition was 
counterbalanced across the drivers. In the consistent alarm condition alarms were 
always provided with the same timing (middle). The purpose of this condition was to 
estimate the potential benefit of middle alarm timing for improving driver braking 
behaviour. 
Each condition comprised two sessions; session I and session H. Session I involved 
five braking events without the FCWS activated. Session H involved six braking 
events with the support of the warning system. The sequence of events of this study 
can be seen in Figure 4-1. 
As the aim of this study was to investigate the effect of introducing a warning system 
on driver behaviour the unassisted driver performance data obtained in session I were 
regarded as normal driver performance before the introduction of the FCWS. 
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Training 
Session I: no alarms 
(baseline) 
Braking events 
~_~A,-_~ 
Figure 4-1 The sequence of events 
Session 11: consistent/non-consistent 
alarm timing 
Braking events 
___ ~A,-__ ~ 
Session I data were therefore collected first for all subjects and there was no 
counterbalancing of session orders. 
In each braking event the leading vehicle suddenly decreased its speed with 0.9g-
deceleration with illumination of the stoplights until the vehicle came to a stop. The 
braking events occurred irregularly depending on whether the driving speed was 45 
mph (72.0 kph) with a tolerance of ±5% or not in order to prevent drivers from 
predicting their occurrence. Furthermore in situations where the collision event 
occurred, the time headway between the leading and following vehicle was fixed at 
2.0s by manipulating the leading vehicle's speed in response to the following 
vehicle's speed. Accordingly the time headway was nearly the same for all drivers 
immediately before the occurrence of potential collision events. 
The timing of each alarm was dependent on the pre-determined parameters and on a 
common start point: the onset of deceleration of the leading vehicle. In Table 4-1 the 
parameters for each of the experimental conditions is summarised. Alarm time in 
Table 4-1 is defined as the elapsed time from when the leading vehicle begins to brake 
to when the alarm is presented. As can be seen in the table, early, middle, and late 
alarms are provided at 0.05sec, O.64sec, and O.99sec after the leading vehicle brakes 
(mean values). 
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. Table 4-1 The summary of experimental conditions 
Condition Initial velocity Lead vehicle Initial Algorithm Mean value of 
(kmlh) deceleration (g) headway (s) parameter alarm time (s) 
RT=1.25s 
Early alarm DFO.50g 
timing 72.4 0.9 2.0 Dr°.35g 0.05 
RT=1.25s 
Middle DFO.50g 
alarm timing 72.4 0.9 2.0 Dr°.55g 0.64 
RT=1.25s 
Late alarm DFO.50g 
timing 72.4 0.9 2.0 Dc..0.75g 0.99 
4.3.3 Procedure 
Upon arriving at the simulator facility, participants completed an informed consent 
form and were briefed on the operation of the simulator. All participants were given 
two tasks. One was to keep their own speed at 4Smph. The other was to follow a 
leading vehicle but avoid rear-end collisions by taking appropriate action when the 
leading vehicle decelerated. However, the drivers were directed to only use the 
brakes rather than implement lane changes to avoid a collision. About 8 second after 
each braking event, the leading vehicle gradually began accelerating again. Subjects 
were instructed to gradually accelerate until they reached the target speed. In order to 
familiarize themselves with the simulator' and to eliminate learning effects each 
participant was given a 10 minute practice drive with braking events where prompt 
braking responses were needed to prevent collisions. This was followed by session I 
and session H. After session I each participant took a five-minute break. 
The subjects experienced repeated alarms in a relatively short driving session which is 
unlikely to be representative of realistic driving conditions, however the purpose of 
this study was to investigate relative differences in driver behaviour with respect to 
alarm timings rather than absolute capability. 
4.3.4 Dependent measures 
Five dependent measures describing the driver's braking response and one dependent 
measure describing driver trust in the system were recorded: 
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• Braking event to brake onset time 
• Braking event to accelerator release time 
• Accelerator release to brake onset time 
• Alarm to brake onset time; This variable was only calculated in session lI. 
• Alarm to accelerator release time; This variable was only calculated in session 
lI. 
• Driver subjective rating of trust 
The definition of each variable is given in chapter 3. 
4.4 Results and discussion 
One driver in each condition did not manage the speed maintenance task adequately 
and one driver who was allocated to the non-consistent warning condition rated the 
alarm from the viewpoint of sound quality and sound volume. Consequently these 
three drivers were omitted from the following data analyses. The statistical analysis 
including the subsequent chapters was conducted using the Statsoft STATISTICA 
(Windows Version, Ver.6). 
In this experiment none of the subjects suffered collisions and so the effect of 
collision events on driver behaviour could be ignored. 
4.4.1 Driver trust according to alarm timing and its consistency 
First of all, the influence of alarm timing on driver trust in alarms was considered. 
Figure 4-2 illustrates the mean values of trust for late, middle and early alarm timings 
in the non-consistent condition. A one-way ANOV A on driver trust showed a 
significant effect for alarm timing (F (2,48)=9.68, p<O.OI). This result indicates that, 
compared with the early or middle timing of the alarm, driver trust in the late timing 
of the alarm was lower. 
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Next, the differences in variation of trust ratings between the consistent and the non-
consistent alarm were considered. Figure 4-3 illustrates mean trust values ~th 
standard deviations for the consistent (M=5.2, SD=1.87) and non-consistent alarm 
timing (M=6.1, SD=2.l8). The consistency of alarm timing might reasonably 
influence ratings of trust and so the variation in trust scores for the consistent and non-
consistent alarm timing were then compared. The Levene-test showed that the 
difference in the variation in trust ratings between the consistent and the non-
consistent conditions was not statistically significant (F (1,124)=2,50, p>0.10). 
It is not surprising that ratings of trust vary according to alarm timing in the non-
consistent condition. However, it is interesting to note that ratings of trust in the 
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Figure 4-3 The effect of alarm timing consistency on trust 
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consistent condition also varied at the same level as the non-consistent condition. In 
this experiment driving speed and headway time in the vehicle-following situation 
were almost the same in each braking event thus it was expected that variation in the 
alarm time for the consistent condition (M=O.681s, SD=O.097s) would be relatively 
small, compared with the non-consistent condition (M=0.552s, SD=0.399s). However 
the variation in ratings of trust for the consistent condition was not small. 
A possible explanation of this phenomenon is the sensitivity of trust estimation by 
drivers. It is possible that driver perception of the 'same' alarm timing varied for two 
reasons. One possibly derives from driver sensitivity to small variations in alarm 
timing. Actual alarm timing can vary a little in response to driver braking effort or 
small variations in driving speed affecting the timing to achieve the warning distance, 
possibly resulting in relatively wide variation in ratings of trust. This is a 
characteristic of the SDA. The other may derive from driver attention to the driving 
task which changes from moment to moment. That is difference in driver attention 
may affect ratings of trust. 
4.4.2 Driver braking process in response to alarm timing 
First, in order to understand the net effect of different alarm timings, the time delay to 
the driver's application of the brakes following an alarm was considered. Figure 4-4 
illustrates the braking event to brake onset time for each alarm timing and for the 
baseline measurements in the non-consistent alarm condition. The results show that, 
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Figure 4-4 The effect of alarm timing on braking event to brake onset time 
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compared with the other conditions, early timing of the alarm contributed to a 
reduction in the transition time, (F (3,70)=3.71, p<0.05). For the other conditions, the 
mean transition time was almost the same as that achieved by drivers before the 
introduction of the warning system. 
Two driver performance variables that might have contributed to an improved braking 
response to collision situations were also considered: the timing of the driver's release 
of the accelerator and the period of time between accelerator release and application 
of the brakes. Figure 4-5 illustrates mean values for braking event to accelerator 
release time for all alarm conditions. The graph shows that drivers released the 
accelerator quicker with the early alarm timing compared with the other conditions. 
Furthermore, the timing of the drivers' release of the accelerator for the late and 
middle alarm timing were similar to their performance before the introduction of the 
warning system (F (3,70)=1.93, p=O.13). Figure 4-6 illustrates the mean values of 
accelerator release to brake onset time for all alarm conditions. There are no 
differences between conditions. 
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Figure 4-5 The effect of alarm timing on braking event to accelerator release time 
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Figure 4-6 The effect of alarm timing on accelerator release to brake onset time 
These results indicate that the early alarm timing helped drivers to release the 
accelerator quickly rather than decrease the period of time between releasing the 
accelerator and application of the brakes. Thus an early alarm enables drivers to 
recognise an imminent collision situation more quickly then apply the brakes if 
appropriate. 
4.4.3 Driver response to alarms according to their timing 
Up to this point in the analysis, the results suggest that driver braking strategies with a 
late alarm timing were not significantly different to those without the warning system. 
However, this conclusion was based on a consideration of the onset time of braking 
events i.e. the onset of deceleration of the leading vehicle. In order to understand 
their response to imminent collision situations in more detail, the relationship between 
the timing of the alarm's onset and the drivers' operation of the accelerator was 
considered. 
Figure 4-7 illustrates mean values of alarm onset to accelerator release time for all 
alarm conditions. This transition time represents the delay following an alarm before 
drivers release the·accelerator. The results show that, compared with late and middle 
alarm timing, there was an appreciable time gap before drivers released the 
accelerator following an early alarm. For the middle alarm timing, drivers released 
the accelerator immediately after the alarm onset. Interestingly, for the late alarm 
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timing, drivers began to release the accelerator before the alarm onset. These results 
indicate that (i) the early alarm timing may provide drivers with more time before 
drivers decide to release the accelerator and (ii) that for late alarms, drivers may begin 
to implement an action for avoiding an imminent collision before the alarm onset. 
If these results can be interpreted phenomenologically then the following explanation 
can be provided. For early or middle alarms, alarms were provided before drivers 
released the accelerator. In particular, early alarms helped the drivers to recognize 
imminent collision situations more efficiently, compared with other alarm timings. 
Accordingly it is possible that. early alarms play a role in triggering driver action for 
collision avoidance. On the other hand, for late alarms the drivers heard the alarm 
after they had released the accelerator and it is arguable that late alarms no longer 
function as alerts for avoiding collision accidents. 
4.4.4 Relationship between alarm timing and trust 
Up to now driver subjective rating oftmst and driver objective performance data were 
considered separately. The analysis now integrates the objective data and the 
subjective data in order to explore the relationship between driver trust and alarm 
actual driver performance with alarms in response to their timings. 
Figure 4-7 The prelateship between alarm timing and alarm to accelerator release time 
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4.4.4.1 Static relationship between driver behaviour and trust 
In this analysis, the time reference point changed to the onset of braking by the drivers 
and the time period between alarm onset and the application ofthe brakes was used as 
an objective indicator. From this perspective the presentation of alarms will have a 
negative time value if they occur after driver braking starts and a positive value if they 
occur before. 
Z-scores were used as a measure of subjective driver response. A distribution value x 
being determined by its mean J1 and standard deviation u is converted into its value z 
by the formula below. 
x-p 
z=--
a 
The use of this transformation minimises differences in judgement of trust between 
individuals and emphasizes variation in judgements of trust. Accordingly, the Z-
scores represent how far each subject's trust estimation is different from the centre of 
distribution of ratings of trust. 
Figure 4-8 comprises a scatter plot showing alarm to brake onset time and Z-scores of 
trust. The results show that alarms that are provided after the driver has initiated 
braking (negative values of alarm to brake onset time) are associated with low ratings 
of trust. Trust ratings get higher as the time gap between alarm onset and brake 
application increases because the earlier the alarm, the more time the driver has before 
needing to brake and the greater the safety benefit. A positive correlation between 
objective data and subjective data was found (r=O.50, p<O.05). This not only supports 
the previous results i.e. trust in early alarm timings is higher than trust in late alarm 
timings but also suggests that "unhelpful alarms" that are provided after drivers have 
started to brake may lead to decreased trust. 
75 
Chapter 4: The timing of alarms and their influence on driver trust and car following behaviour 
Figure 4-8 The relationship between trust and alarm to brake onset time 
4.4.4.2 Dynamics of trust in FeWS 
In the last analysis, a static model of driver trust in the warning system was identified 
using the objective data related to driver response to alarms. A trust model will now 
be proposed that incorporates possible factors driving the dynamics of trust using 
. 
multiple regression analysis. 
The analyses discussed earlier suggest that alarm timing has the potential to affect 
ratings of trust. Moreover it was found that the presentation of early alarms may lead 
to more prompt accelerator release compared with unassisted driver performance. 
These results indicate that the improved performance in the timing of accelerator 
release caused by the presentation of alarms may have the potential to influence trust 
dynamics. Accordingly, the difference between braking event to accelerator release 
time without the aid of alarms and alarm time (i.e. the elapsed time between the 
leading vehicle beginning to brake and when the alarm is presented) was used as a 
causal variable. We termed it (RAT-AT). 
Moray et al. (2000) found that when investigating the dynamics of trust in automated 
systems in a time series, the value of subjective ratings of trust for the previous trial 
may contribute to increases in the validity of trust models. Following this earlier 
research, the subjects' trust ratings which were measured on the immediately 
preceding trial were used as a causal variable. The occurrence of an alarm 
presentation after drivers had started to brake was proposed as another factor driving 
driver trust. The previous analysis showed that drivers may brake before the 
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presentation of alarms depending on alarm timing, but given the aims of FCWS, it is 
arguable that alarms which are presented after drivers have started to brake may be 
viewed as unhelpful alarms, depressing ratings of trust. This variable was termed 
Discouragement. To sum up, three potentially exploratory variables were used in 
total for the multiple regression analysis. The results were as follows. 
Tn=0.32(RAT-AT)n-0.44(Discouragement)n+0.576Tn_l (r2=0.62), where T is the rating 
of trust, (RAT-AT) is the remainder of the mean value of braking event to accelerator 
release time before the introduction of the warning system for each subject and alarm 
time for each braking event, and Discouragement is the occurrence of alarm 
presentations after drivers have started to brake. Discouragement is treated as a 
discrete (0,1) variable (Discouragement=l if there is discouragement, otherwise 
Discouragement=O). The subscripts (n and n-l) indicate the current trial and the 
previous trial. The resulting regression model was reasonably reliable, F(4,43)=17.7l, 
p<O.Ol. 
The results suggest that ratings of trust for the previous trial may have an impact on 
present level of trust, which is consistent with previous research on dynamic models 
of trust. Furthermore, a causal factor driving the dynamic of trust, "RAT-AT", has a 
positive coefficient, consequently, as the time period between alarm onset and 
accelerator release without the warning system increases trust becomes greater. Thus, 
if the timing of the presentation of alarms is later than the timing of the driver's own 
performance in accelerator release, trust may be decreased. This indicates a driver 
expectation that alarms should be provided earlier than a driver's own performance in 
releasing the accelerator without the aid of alarms. An interesting property of the 
equation is that the Discouragement factor decreases trust, that is, if drivers hear the 
alarm signal after they have already implemented the brakes then their rating of trust 
in the alarms is lowered. The discouragement is analogous to a conflict situation in 
which the system's decision to trigger alarms and the driver's decisions regarding 
actions for avoiding critical events are different. It might be necessary for alarm 
systems to prevent this kind of conflict in order to maintain driver acceptance of the 
alarm system. 
77 
Chapter 4: The timing of alarms and their influence on driver trust and car following behaviour 
4.4.5 Potential benefit of middle alarm timing 
As mentioned above, trust in alarms with a middle alarm timing was relatively high 
compared with that for late alarms. If this phenomenon is considered from the 
perspective of driver acceptance of the warning system then there is a possibility that 
driver braking performance might be improved by middle alarms. In order to estimate 
the potential benefit of middle alarm timings, driver behaviour in the consistent alarm 
condition where all alarm timings were middle in now considered. 
Figure 4-9 represents braking event to brake onset time across all trials in the 
consistent alarm condition with the histogram to the left representing the data for the 
five braking events without the collision avoidance system, (M=1.16s and SD=0.29). 
The histogram on the right side represents the data for the six braking events with the 
middle timing ofthe alarm (M=1.09s and SD=0.22). 
The results indicate a shift in the frequency of transition times towards lower values 
with the introduction of the warning system. More specifically, the values of 
transition time for the period time between 1.8s and 2.2s in the baseline condition 
disappear in the middle timing of the alarm condition. In contrast there are 
observations in the 0.6s to 0.8s category in the middle timing of the alarm condition. 
The Levene test was used to investigate differences in variance in transition time 
values with and without the FeWS. A significant difference in variance was found (F 
(1,118)=3.03, p=0.084). With respect to mean values, there were also significant 
differences between the two conditions (F (1,108)=3.19, p=0.077). 
Although any interpretation of these results must be treated with caution, the data 
suggest a potentially valuable finding for the design of alarm timing. That is, middle 
alarms have the potential to encourage prompt braking reaction to imminent collision 
situations. Furthermore it. should be stressed here that the middle alarm timing may 
decrease variation in braking reaction, resulting in more stable collision avoidance 
behaviour. It might be expected that the difference in braking reaction time before 
and after the introduction of warning systems would be small for the middle alarm 
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Figure 4-9 The comparison of braking event to brake onset time between middle alarm 
timing and before introducing the warning system 
timing, because middle alarms are not presented early enough to significantly 
decrease braking reaction time. 
Drivers show considerable variation in braking response when driving without the aid 
of alarms, and a delayed braking response in some situations has the potential to 
induce collisions. Therefore decreased variation in braking response to imminent 
collision situations has the potential to reduce accidents. 
To sum up, these results suggest that the middle alarm timing may have contributed to 
decreased variation in driver braking response time compared with the baseline 
condition. The larger standard deviation indicates that drivers did not always 
implement a timely response to imminent collisions. Thus a middle alarm timing may 
be able to improve driver response by encouraging more consistent braking behaviour. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The present study investigated how the timing of an alarm can influence driver trust in 
FCWS and addressed the effects of three different alarm timings on driver braking 
strategies. Furthermore, driver response time to imminent collisions was compared 
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with, and without, a FCWS with a middle alann timing. The results support 
important conclusions for this chapter. 
First, for the different alarm timings and their influence on trust, it is concluded that 
late alarms lead to decreased trust compared with early or middle alarms. This result 
indicates that the timing of the alarm itself may have an influence on subjective 
ratings of trust in FCWS and drivers may judge whether an alann is trustworthy or not 
according to its timing independent of its validity. The variation in ratings of driver 
trust in consistent alann timings is similar to that in variable timings with a relatively 
wide range in judgments of trust. This result indicates that driver trust may be 
sensitive enough to vary in response to driving conditions. 
Second, with regard to driver braking strategies in relation to alann timing, an early 
alarm timing may contribute to a faster driver response to the brakes. This 
improvement in driver performance in imminent collision situations comes from a 
more timely release of the accelerator, compared with middle or late alarm timing. 
Interestingly, driver braking strategies with late alarms were similar to those 
undertaken without warning devices; drivers tended not to wait for late alarms and 
started to brake before an alarm was provided. Thus a relatively early alarm timing 
may help drivers to avoid an imminent collision by eliciting rapid braking but if 
drivers recognize hazardous situations before an alann is presented then this alarm 
may be of no value to the driver, resulting in no contribution to improved performance. 
Third, from the analyses of driver trust and its relation to driver response to imminent 
collision situations, it is concluded that trust ratings get higher as the time gap 
between alarm onset and brake application increases because the earlier alarm 
provides the driver with more time before needing to brake and the additional 
'decision time' induces greater the trust. As for the dynamics of driver trust in alarm 
timing, it can be said that the relationship between the timing of driver release of the 
accelerator and the timing of alarm presentation is an important factor which 
determines decreased or increased trust and it is important that alarms should be 
presented before drivers release the accelerator. If alarms are presented after drivers 
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have started to brake then these alarms may be viewed as unhelpful alarms, resulting 
in decreased trust in alarms. 
It follows from the above conclusions that further consideration is required regarding 
perceived false alarms and their influence on driver trust and braking strategy. In this 
experiment it was assumed that all alarms given to the drivers were true alarms. 
However the results obtained from the experiment show that drivers respond to 
different timings of the alarm in different ways and judge trust in alarms accordingly. 
Alarms that are provided after drivers initiate actions for avoiding imminent collisions 
may be viewed as unhelpful even though they are valid alarms. Although the subjects 
were not asked to say if they thought that late alarms were false alarms, the results 
indicate that late alarms have a greater potential to be viewed as unhelpful and may be 
judged as perceived false alarms with an associated reduction in trust. 
Finally, it was found that middle alarm timing has the potential to improve driver 
performance in imminent collision situations by reducing variation in braking 
response. Interestingly, driver trust in middle alarms was similar to trust found with 
early alarms. System acceptance is crucial to widespread adoption of warning devices 
(Groeger et aI., 1993) and the results of the current study indicate that drivers may 
accept warning systems with middle alarm timing more readily. Designers should 
consider this result when determining alarm timing if the purpose of FCWS alarms is 
not simply to decrease response time to imminent collisions. Certainly early alarms 
can· help drivers achieve a quick response time to imminent collisions, but there is a 
possibility that the provision of early alarms will also increase the proportion of 
nuisance alarms. This study provided evidence that middle alarm timing may 
contribute to safe driving through consistent driver braking response to imminent 
collision situations and has the potential to help solve the trade-off problem between 
early alarms and nuisance alarms. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4, the effect of three different alarm timings on driver behaviour and trust 
in common driving conditions was considered. Differences in alarm effectiveness and 
driver subjective ratings of trust according to alarm timings were also identified. 
However in order to provide human factors guidance on the design of forward 
collision warning systems (FCWS) appropriate to more generalised conditions, it is 
necessary to gain knowledge about the effect of the presentation of alarms on driver 
behaviour in a wider range of driving conditions. 
5.2 The aim of this study 
The primary aim of this study was to understand how the presentation of alarms might 
influence driver behaviour and trust toward alarms in more depth by considering a 
wider range of driving conditions; three kinds of driving speeds and two kinds of time 
headways. 
5.3 Methods 
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5.3.1 Apparatus 
The research was completed using The Leeds Advanced Driving Simulator (see 
chapter 3). The visual scene was a computer generated environment which included 
other vehicles, buil(jings and pedestrians. In this study a simulated rural road 
environment was created with a single carriageway, a leading vehicle, and the 
occasional appearance of oncoming vehicles. 
The following vehicle, 'driven' by the subjects, was equipped with a simulated FCWS. 
Although several algorithms have been used for alarm trigger logics, a Stop-Distance-
Algorithm (SDA) was used in this experiment. Details of the SDA are given in 
chapter 3. 
Two different timing characteristics of the alarm timing (late/early) were prepared by 
manipulating DJ (0.60g for late, 0.45g for early). The other parameters had the same 
value in all conditions (RT=1.25sec, DFO.5g). These parameters were chosen by 
considering three issues. The first was correspondence with 'real-world' values; The 
values were representative of those that would be experienced in on-road driving and 
should therefore appear rationality to the participants. The second was the relative 
difference in perceived alarm promptness between the· alarm timings. It was 
important that the participants perceived clear differences between the parameter 
values used. The third was with respect to the experiment designed in chapter 4; 
different parameters were chosen in order to explore a broader range of values. The 
parameter values chosen were confirmed in pilot trials using the experimental 
scenarios. The warning system provided drivers with a simple auditory alarm which 
lasted approximately 2.0 s and the prominent frequency of the tone was 4000 Hz. 
5.3.2 Subjects and experimental design 
Twenty two participants (11 women and 11 men) ranging in age from 23 to 61 years 
(M=31.9, SD=9.3) took part in the experiment. All were licensed drivers with driving 
experience of two years or more. Each received a financial compensation of £ 1 0 for 
their participation. 
83 
Chapter 5: The influence of alarm timing on driver trust and car following behaviour under different 
levels of driving demand 
11 subjects were assigned to each of the early and late alarm timing conditions. Each 
condition comprised two sessions; a session without alarms and a session with alarms. 
Each session included six potential collision events with 0.8g deceleration of the 
leading vehicle with illumination of the stoplights until the vehicle came to a stop. 
Three different driving speeds (40, 60, 70 mile/h) and two different time headways 
(1.7 and 2.2 s) were implemented as driving conditions. Accordingly, in combination 
these gave 6 treatment conditions (1.7 si 40 mile/h; 2.2 s/40 mile/h; 1.7 s/60 mile/h; 
2.2 s/60 mile/h; 1.7 s170 mile/h; 2.2 s170 mile/h). The order of driving conditions was 
counterbalanced (Figure 5-1) and the order of trials within each session were also 
counterbalanced across the subjects. 
The braking events occurred irregularly to prevent drivers from predicting their 
occurrence. Furthermore, in situations where a collision event occurred, one of the 
driving conditions discussed above was obtained. The required conditions were 
achieved by (1) ensuring that subjects drove at the target speed with a tolerance of 
A session without alarms 
Order was counterbalanced 
~ 
,- ~ 
40mph 60mph 70mph 40mph 60mph 70mph 
1.75 1.75 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
A session with alarms: 
early or late alarms were provided 
Session order was counterbalanced 
according to experimental 
conditions 
r 
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1.75 1.75 
1 1 
Order was counterbalanced 
~ 
70mph 40mph 
1.75 2.25 
1 1 
Figure 5-1 Driving conditions for each session 
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±5% and (2) by adjusting the speed of the leading vehicle to provide the correct 
headway. The time headway between the leading and following vehicle was fixed by 
manipulating the leading vehicle's speed in response t9 the following vehicle's speed. 
Accordingly the time headway was nearly the same for all drivers immediately before 
the occurrence of potential collision events. 
5.3.3 Procedure 
All participants were required to complete an informed consent form and were briefed 
on task requirements by the experimenter. Each participant was then given a 10-min 
practice drive to familiarise themselves with the simulator and to experience the lead 
vehicle decelerations that would be involved in the experimental trials. After a 5-
minute break, the regular trials were started. All participants were given two 
objectives in the regular trials. One was to keep their own speed at a target speed as 
directed by the experimenter (40, 60, or 70 mph) and the other was to follow the 
leading vehicle but to avoid rear-end collisions. The drivers were directed to only use 
the brakes to avoid an imminent collision with the lead vehicle, rather than to change 
lanes. About 8 second after each braking event, the leading vehicle gradually began 
accelerating again. Subjects were instructed to gradually accelerate until they reached 
the target speed. The participants had a 5-minute break between sessions. 
5.3.4 Dependent measures 
Five dependent measures describing the driver's braking response and one dependent 
measure describing driver trust in the system were recorded: 
• Braking event to brake onset time 
• Braking event to accelerator release time 
• Accelerator release to brake onset time 
• Maximum deceleration 
• Driver subjective rating of trust 
The definition of each variable is given in chapter 3. 
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5.4 Results and discussion 
In the subsequent statistical analyses an ANOVA was used in order to investigate 
differences between factors, however several nonparametric tests were used in 
response to experimental conditions when homogeneity of variance was not present. 
In this experiment none of the subjects suffered collisions and so the effect of 
collision events on driver behaviour could be ignored. 
5.4.1 Driver performance without alarms in response to driving conditions 
This analysis focuses on driver behaviour without the aid of alarms in order to clarify 
inherent driver reaction to imminent collision situations in different driving 
conditions; three levels of driving speed and two levels of time headways. 
Table 5-1 presents braking event to brake onset time in response to different driving 
conditions. A two-way ANOV A with the driving speed and the headway time as 
within-subjects independent variables showed no significant main effects and no 
significant interactions between factors. 
Table 5-2 presents braking event to accelerator release time in response to different 
driving conditions. A two-way ANOV A of driving speed and time headway found no 
significant main effects and no significant interactions between factors. 
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Table 5-1 Summary of brakiug event to brake onset time in response to driving 
conditions 
Velocity 
40 miIelh 60 miIelh 70 miIelh 
Time headway Long (2.2 s) 1.06 (0.41) 1.06 (0.34) 1.06 (0.37) 
Short {1.7 s} 1.02 {0.41} 0.99 {0.28} 1.1 0 {0.44} 
Table 5-2 Summary of braking event to accelerator release time according to driving 
conditions 
Time headway Long (2.2 s) 
Short (1.7 s} 
40 miIelh 
0.74 (0.38) 
0.71 {0.43} 
Velocity 
60 miIelh 
0.70 (0.28) 
0.68 {0.27} 
70 miIelh 
0.70 (0.36) 
0.81 {0.43} 
Driver braking effort was considered 'next. Figure 5-2 illustrates mean values of 
maximum deceleration for avoiding imminent collision situations in response to 
different driving conditions. Generally speaking, short headways seem to induce 
greater braking effort than longer headways. A two-way ANOV A of driving speed 
and headway time showed no significant interaction between factors but a significant 
main effect on headway time, F (1, 126)=11.01, p<O.OI, (long: M=7.61, SD=1.18, 
short: M=8.24, SD=0.94). The results suggest that drivers may adjust braking effort 
according to time headways. 
To sum up, driver braking reaction time was not influenced by driving conditions but 
was consistent. This result may derive from consistent accelerator release timing in 
collision situations as a consequence of the illumination of the brake lights of a 
leading vehicle. When drivers give full attention to the forward view, it is likely that 
the brake lights of a leading vehicle may help trigger the braking response. In this 
study, driver reaction to the onset of the lead vehicle's brake lights triggered release of 
the accelerator in a consistent manner. This is predictable because brake light 
illumination does not indicate the rate of deceleration of a leading vehicle and to 
avoid a potential collision, drivers would have to assume that all brake illuminations 
were associated with maximum deceleration. However braking effort may vary 
according to headway with longer time headways leading to more gentle braking 
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Figure 5-2 Maximum decelerations in response to time beadways 
effort than shorter time headways. It can also be concluded that in this experiment the 
drivers were well motivated to complete the driving task and responded to the 
imminent collision situations according to the driving conditions. 
5.4.2 Driver braking performance in imminent collision situations with alarms 
Here . the effect of the presentation of alarms on driver braking performance was 
considered in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of alarm impact on 
imminent collision situations. 
In this study two different alarm timings (relatively early alarm timing and relatively 
late alarm timing) were achieved by manipulating the alarm trigger parameters. In the 
following analysis of driver behaviour, alarm time (i.e. the elapsed time from when 
the leading vehicle begins to brake to when the alarm is presented) was also 
considered as a contributing factor in determining driver behaviour. Table 5-3 
presents mean alarm times (and standard deviations) for the actual values achieved in 
the different experimental conditions. It can be clearly seen that vehicle speed has a 
much smaller influence on alarm time compared with headway values. 
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Table 5-3 Summary of alarm time for each driving condition 
Velocity 
40 milelh 60 milelh 70 milelh 
long (2.2 s) Early: 0.641 Early: 0.533 Early: 0.498 
(0.071) (0.105) (0.103) 
Late: 1.104 Late: 1.442 Late: 1.484 
Time headway (0.126) (0.262) (0.439) 
Short (1.7 s) Early: 0.190 Early: 0.182 Early: 0.074 
(0.078) (0.081) (0.056) 
Late: 0.661 Late: 0.782 Late: 0.859 
(0.081} {0.080) {0.110} 
5.4.2.1 Braking event to brake onset time 
Braking event to brake onset time was analysed in order to estimate the effect of the 
presentation of alarms on net reaction to imminent collision situations. 
First, the effect of early alarm timing with respect to time headways was investigated. 
Figure 5-3 illustrates mean values for braking event to brake onset time for the 'early 
alarm' and 'no alarm' conditions when driving with short time headways. It appears 
that braking event to brake onset time tends to decrease when an alarm is provided. 
The standard deviation for the early alarm timing condition is also smaller than that 
for the no alarm condition. There was a significant difference in variance between the 
two conditions, F(l, 64)=8.42, p<O.Ol. With respect to the mean values, a signed 
rank sum test showed that there was a significant difference between the two 
conditions (Z=2.09, p<O.05). 
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brake onset time for long time beadways 
Figure 5-4 illustrates the difference in mean values between the two conditions when 
driving with the longer time headways. There was no significant difference between 
the conditions. However it appeared that compared to the late alarm timing condition, 
the transition time for the no alarm condition varied widely. In fact, there was a 
significant difference in deviation among two conditions, F (1, 64)=4.72, p<0.05. 
With respect to interactions between driving speed and the presentation of alarms, no 
statistically significant interactions were observed. 
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Figure 5-5 illustrates a frequency distribution of braking event to brake onset time for 
the no alarm and early alarm timing conditions. It appeared that, compared to the 
early alarm timing condition, the transition time for the no alarm condition varied 
widely. There was a significant difference in standard deviation among two 
conditions (No alarm: Mean=0.32, early alarms: Mean=0.19), F (1, 10)=7.39, p<0.05. 
To sum up, the results suggest that the effect of the presentation of alarms may vary 
according to driving conditions even if the same alarm trigger logic is used. The 
explanation for this phenomenon may derive from the timing of the alarm 
presentation in response to driving conditions. In other words, if alarms are presented 
at the mean vale of alarm time for relatively early alarms in short time headways 
driving (i.e. 0.149s) then these alarms may slow braking reaction compared to the no 
alarm condition. However if alarms are presented at the mean value of alarm time for . 
relatively early alarms in long time headways driving (i.e. 0.557s) these alarms have 
no potential to decrease braking reaction. Furthermore with respect to the overall 
effects of alarms on driver behaviour, the presentation of alarms at the mean value of 
alarm time for relatively early alarms for all driving conditions (i.e. 0.353 s) may lead 
to more consistent braking reaction to imminent collision situations than no 
presentation of alarms. 
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The effect of late alarm timing is considered next. Figure 5-6 illustrates braking event 
to brake onset time for relatively late and no alarm conditions when driving with short 
time headways. There is no significant difference between the two conditions. Figure 
5-7 illustrates the difference in the transition time when driving with long time 
headways. A statistically significant difference was observed, F (1, 53) =5.32, 
p<O.05). With respect to interactions between driving speed and the presentation of 
alarms, no statistically significant interactions were observed. 
The results suggest that the presentation of late alarms has no potential to improve 
driver braking reaction time to imminent collision situations and with longer time 
headways, a later alarm timing may actually lead to an increase in braking event to 
brake onset time. 
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Figure 5-7 The impact of the late timing of the alarms on braking event to brake onset 
time for the long time headways 
5.4.2.2 The timing of accelerator release 
Changes in the timing of release of the accelerator in response to the timing of the 
alarms are considered next. First the effect of early alarm timing with respect to 
different time headways was investigated. Figure 5-8 illustrates braking event to 
accelerator release time for 'early alarms' and 'no alarm' conditions when driving 
with short time headways. A signed rank sum test showed that there was a significant 
difference between the two conditions (Z=2.09, p<0.05). With respect to long time 
headways, the presentation of alarms did not affect the timing of release of the 
accelerator (early: Mean=0.81 s, SD=0.23 s, no alarm: Mean=0.81 s, SD=0.42 s). No 
statistically significant interactions between driving speed and the presentation of 
alarms were observed. 
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Figure 5-9 The impact of the late timing of the alarms on braking event to accelerator 
release time for long time headways 
Figure 5-9 presents the effect of the presentation of late alarms on braking event to 
accelerator release time when driving with long time headways. It appeared that, 
compared with the no alarm condition, the transition time for the late alarms condition 
varied widely. A Levene's test revealed that there was a significant difference in 
variance between the two conditions F(1, 36)=8.1O,p<O.Ol. However there was no 
significant difference in mean values among two conditions. With respect to the 
effect of late alarms with short time headways, no statistically significant differences 
were observed (late alarms for short time headways: Mean=O.65 s, SD=O.25 s, no 
94 
Chapter 5: The influence of alarm timing on driver trust and car following behaviour under different 
levels of driving demand 
alarm for short time headways; Mean=O.65 s, SD=0.26 s). No statistically significant 
interactions between driving speed and the presentation of alarms were observed. 
These results are partly consistent with the earlier results related to driver braking 
response. That is, decreased braking event to brake onset time may derive from 
prompt release of the accelerator, depending on the timing of the alarms. Furthermore 
it is possible that the increased variation in accelerator release timing associated with 
late alarms when driving with long time headways may be linked to delayed driver 
braking response. 
How should driver performance with late alarms when driving with relatively long 
time headways be interpreted? In relatively low severity car-following situations, for 
example with long time headways, drivers have more time to decide when to start 
braking compared with short time headways driving. Furthermore, drivers who know 
alarms will be provided in imminent collision situations, may expect to respond on the 
presentation of alarms. Late alarms may therefore induce increased variation in 
accelerator release timing, resulting in longer braking reaction time. 
5.4.2.3 Accelerator release to brake onset time 
Table 5-4 and table 5-5 present results for the effect of early and late alarms on 
accelerator release to brake onset time with different time headways respectively. No 
statistically significant differences were observed between the two alarm conditions 
and time headways. It can be said that the presentation of alarms may have no 
particular potential to impact on driver braking response after release of the 
accelerator. 
Table 5-4 Summary of mean (SD) values of accelerator release to brake onset time for 
early alarm timing 
Short time headways 
Long time headways 
No alarm 
0.32 (0.09) 
0.40 (0.23) 
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Table 5-5 Summary of mean (SD) values of accelerator release to brake onset time for 
late alarm timing 
Short time headways 
Long time headways 
No alarm 
0.30 (0.11) 
0.30 (0.14) 
5.4.3 Driver trust according to driving conditions 
Late alarms 
0.30 (0.17) 
0.34 (0.17) 
Figure 5-10 shows the effect of time headways on driver trust for early and late alarm 
timings. It appeared that ratings of trust for early alarm timing were similar for both 
short and long time headways. However with respect to late alarm timing, it seemed 
that trust ratings for long time headways was lower than those for short time 
headways. A one-way ANOV A found a significant main effect for time headways 
with respect to late alarm timing, F(1, 50)=4.67, p<0.05. 
The results suggest that trust in early alarms was higher irrespective of time headways. 
Furthermore, time headways may affect driver judgement of trust with late alarms. 
Driving speed did not affect ratings of trust. 
An explanation of these results can be provided by consideration of the timing of the 
presentation of alarms. Specifically, with respect to early alarms, when driving at 
short time headways, the timing of the presentation of alarm was 0.14s from the 
beginning of deceleration of the leading vehicle. On the other hand, when driving 
with long time headways, alarm timing was 0.56s. With respect to relatively late 
alarms, the timings of the presentation of alarms for the long and short headway time 
conditions were 1.34s ~md 0.76s respectively. Consequently there is a possibility that 
driver subjective ratings of trust may be influenced by perceived differences in alarm 
timing. That is, there is a possibility that trust towards alarms presented with a 0.76s 
alarm time is maintained at a relatively high level (over 5.0) but trust towards alarms 
with a 1.34s timing is reduced. 
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Figure 5-10 The effect of time headways on trust according to alarm timing 
5.4.4 Driver perceived alarm timing and its relation to trust and alarm time 
The relationship between driver perceived alarm timing and subjective ratings of trust 
will now be considered. First the relationship between pre-determined alarm timing 
(early and late alarm timing) and perceived alarm timing (Table 5-6) is confirmed. As 
can be see in this table, early alarm timing had a tendency to be perceived as correct 
timing while late alarm timing was perceived as late in the driving conditions used in 
this study. 
Figure 5-11 illustrates ratings of trust in alarms which were estimated as having 
correct or late timing. In this trial, one alarm viewed as a perceived early timing by 
one subject was omitted from this statistical analysis. There was a significant 
difference between the two trust values, F(I,115)=118.32, p<O.Ol. The result 
suggests that driver perception of alarm timing reflects ratings of trust and , more 
specifically, trust in alarms which were judged as late was lower that trust in alarms 
judged as having correct timing. 
Table 5-6 Summary of perceived alarm timing and pre-determined alarm timing 
Early (perceived) Correct (perceived) Late (perceived) 
Early alarm timing 1 (2%) 43 (65%) 22 (33%) 
Late alarm timing 
- 18 (34%) 35 (66%) 
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Figure 5-11 Trust ratings for perceived late and correct timing 
Figure 5-12 presents the relationship between perceived alarm timing and actual alarm 
time. In this figure the dotted line represents the mean value of time for the release of 
the accelerator when no alarms were given. Interestingly there is a possibility that if 
alarms are presented later, compared with a driver's own performance in releasing the 
accelerator without the aid of alarms, then alarms will be viewed as being late. Given 
driver subjective ratings of trust for perceived alarm timing then it should be expected 
that alarms which are provided later than the timing of driver release of the 
accelerator without the aid of alarms may affect driver ratings of trust. 
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Figure 5-12 The relationship between perceived alarm timing and actual alarm time 
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5.4.5 The relationship between driver trust and alarm timing 
Driver trust and its relation to alann time will now be considered in more detail. With 
respect to ratings of trust, a transformation was implemented using Z-scores in order 
to minimise differences in judgement of trust between individuals and emphasize 
variation in judgement of trust. Z-scores were used as a measure of subjective driver 
response. A distribution value x being determined by its mean J1 and standard 
deviation (J is converted into its value z by the formula below. 
X-J.! 
z=--
er 
The use of this transformation minimises differences in judgement of trust between 
individuals and emphasizes variation in judgements of trust. Accordingly, the Z-
scores represent how far each subject's trust estimation is different from the centre of 
distribution of ratings of trust. 
Figure 5-13 compnses a scatter plot showing alarm time and trust Z-scores. A 
negative correlation was found (R=-0.47, p<O.01). The result suggests that as an 
overall trend, as alanns are provided earlier driver trust is higher. 
Next data which were not consistent with the overall trend (i.e. as alanns are provided 
earlier driver trust is higher) were considered in order to understand the relationship 
between alann time and trust in more detail. The horizontal dotted line represents the 
mean trust value in terms of Z-score (i.e. zero). The vertical dotted line indicates 
mean value of braking event to brake onset time without the aid of alarms. As can be 
seen in this figure, all plotted points are assigned to the 4 zones which are created by 
the two dotted lines. For the plotted points which are involved in Zone A and Zone C, 
alarm time and its relation to trust is reasonably understandable as these data can be 
interpreted using the last analysis of correlation. That is, the earlier the alarm true the 
higher the trust rating. 
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Figure 5-13 The relationship between alarm time and trust 
However the data in Zones B and D requires further consideration since it appears to 
fall outside the overall trend. Some data showed relatively late alarms associated with 
relatively high trust values and the opposite was also true. The three data points 
which are enclosed by a solid circle and 10 data which are enclosed by a dotted circle 
are relatively big error data compared with the overall trend. Table 5-7 classifies the 
error data in terms of their speed! headway conditions. In Zone B, 3 data points were 
all associated with long time headways. In Zone D, 8 data points (80 %) were 
associated with short time headways. 
These data suggest that in situations where driving demand is relatively low (i.e. when 
driving with long time headways) driver subjective ratings of trust may exhibit 
'tolerance' i.e. trust is relatively high even though alarms are relatively late. 
Conversely in situations where driving demand is relatively high i.e. when driving at 
high speed with short time headways, driver ratings of trust may be 'intolerant' i.e. 
trust is relatively low even though alarms are relatively early. 
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Table 5-7 Summary of characteristics for error data 
ZoneB 
Driving condition 
(Speed/headway time) 
70/10ng 
40/10ng 
Number oftimes 
observed data 
2 
I 
5.4.6 The dynamics of trust in alarms 
ZoneD 
Driving condition 
(Speed/headway time) 
70/short 
6O/short 
40/short 
70/long 
60/10ng 
Number oftimes of 
observed data 
5 
2 
I 
I 
I 
In the previous analysis a static relationship was proposed among the timing of alarms, 
driver trust and perceived alarm timing. Now the dynamic nature of trust in alarms is 
considered. In chapter 4 a trust model using multiple regression analysis was 
proposed and this method of analysis will now be used again. The difference between 
braking event to accelerator release time without the aid of alarms and alarm time (i.e. 
the elapsed time between the leading vehicle begins to brake and when the alarm is 
presented) was used as a causal variable, (termed (RAT-AT». Furthermore, the 
subjects' trust ratings which were measured immediately before the present ratings of . 
trust were used as a causal variable. A multiple regression analysis using both causal 
variables gives the following trust model. 
Tn=O.231(RAT-AT)n+O.534Tn-l (r2=0.43), where T is the rating of trust, (RAT-AT) is 
the remainder of the mean value of braking event to accelerator release time before 
the introduction of the warning system for each subject and alarm time for each 
braking event. The subscripts (n and n-1) indicate the current trial and the previous 
trial. The resulting regression model was reasonably reliable, F (2, 93)=36.79, p<O.Ol. 
The result corresponds reasonably with the previous model (section 4.4.4.2 in chapter 
4), indicating that the relationship between alarm time and the timing of release of the 
accelerator for the no alarm condition may play an important role in the determination 
of driver trust. Furthermore, in this study driver objective data were obtained under a 
variety of driving conditions, therefore this model of the dynamics of trust not only 
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validates the previous model but is also relevant to a broader range of driving 
situations. 
5.4. 7 Alarm time, driver performance, and trust 
In this section, the analyses of alarm time, driver braking performance, trust and their 
interactions will be integrated in order to provide a human factors perspective on the 
design of FCWS. Although many factors influence the occurrence of collision events 
in real traffic only the sudden deceleration of the leading vehicle was used to create 
potential collision events in the scenarios employed in this study. Accordingly the 
following argument can only be applied to these limited collision situations. 
It was found that the timing of alarms (i.e. when alarms are activated) is an important 
contributing factor in determining driver performance, trust and the perception of 
alarm timing. In this study two predetermined alarm timings were generated by 
manipulating parameters of the alarm trigger logic (SDA), however the actual alarm 
timing varied according to driving conditions (3 driving speeds and 2 time headways). 
Accordingly, the variation in alarm timing may impact on driver object and subjective 
data. In other words, even when the same predetermined alarm timings were used the 
transition time from a braking event's onset to arriving at the warning distance varied 
in response to the driving conditions. In particular it was found that time headways 
may have more potential to influence alarm timing than driving speeds. That is, 
compared with the differences in driving speeds, the differences in time headways 
may lead to greater variation in alarm time with the same alarm trigger logic. 
When driving with short time headways the presentation of early alarms (mean alarm 
time 0.149s) reduces driver braking response time as well as leading to a more 
consistent braking response. Furthermore, trust in these alarms is relatively high. 
When driving with long time headways, however, early alarms generated by the same 
trigger logic with the same parameter exhibit a different effect on driver behaviour; 
there is no improved driver braking response. Interestingly trust in these alarms 
. (mean alarm time 0.557s) is also relatively high. 
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The research evidence suggests that improved driver performance with alarms is not 
always necessary in order to gain relatively high trust ratings and alarm timing may be 
a more important factor in determining driver trust. As to the overall trend of trust, if 
alarms are presented earlier trust is higher. However some data may exhibit 
'tolerance', that is trust is high even when alarms are late when driving with long time 
headways. Moreover some data may exhibit 'intolerance' that is trust is low even 
when alarms are early when driving with short time headways. 
Another result from this study indicates that it is possible that the timing of release of 
the accelerator without alarms i.e. driver baseline performance (mean value 0.72 s), 
may have the potential to determine driver perception of alarm timing i.e. correct 
timing or late timing, and their relation to driver ratings of trust. That is whether 
alarms are actuated before this timing is an important determinant of driver ratings of 
trust. 
An explanation of this phenomenon was obtained from the post trial free discussion 
about FCWS with participants. Some participants commented that FCWS should be 
used as a backup alert or confirmation alert to encourage drivers to start braking. This 
may mean that these drivers are satisfied with alarms which simply act to confirm 
driver decisions. These alarms could be called 'confirmation alarms'. It is expected 
that for 'confirmation alarms' the presentation of alarms should be consistent with the 
driver's own decision to implement action to avoid an imminent collision. 
However, other participants commented that alarms should be provided as early as 
possible in order to give drivers more time to respond to critical situations. This may 
mean that these drivers are satisfied with alarms which are provided in anticipation of 
potential collision events (before the driver is aware of them). These alarms could be 
called 'collision anticipation alarms'. Defining an alarm timing that always precedes 
a driver's awareness of an imminent collision situation is difficult due to variation in 
driver attention to the road environment. For drivers who are distracted or not 
attending alarms may function as collision anticipation alarms even when these are 
presented relatively late. In this study a sudden deceleration of a leading vehicle was 
used as a potential collision event with relatively high attention. Accordingly only 
relatively early alarms function to prompt earlier braking response times and the 
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timing of accelerator release may be a threshold for the determination of driver 
perception of alarm timing. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This study considered six different driving conditions according to speed and time 
headways and investigated their effect on driver behaviour and trust in the 
presentation of alarms. The results support the following conclusions: 
1. With respect to driver baseline performance without the aid of alarms, differences 
in driving speed and time headway do not affect driver braking response time when a 
leading vehicle decreases its speed suddenly. 
2. Differences in driving conditions induce variation in alarm time; the elapsed time 
from when the leading vehicle begins to brake to when the alarm is presented. This 
results in different alarm effectiveness and driver perception of alarm timing even if 
the same pre-determined parameters for triggering alarms are employed. 
3. Variation in alarm time mainly derives from differences in time headway rather 
than from driving speed. Accordingly time headways have a greater influence on the 
effect of the alarm's presentation on driver performance and perception of alarms. 
4. The relationship between trust in alarms and improved performance is not always 
correlated but alarm timing is an important factor in maintaining ratings of trust. In 
this study it can be concluded that an alarm time of about 0.56s may have the potential 
to maintain relatively high ratings of trust even though these alarms exhibit no 
improvement in driver performance compared with a 'no alarm' condition. 
5. In particular, when driving with long time headways, drivers' adaptation to late 
alarms may induce a longer response to the brakes compared to the 'no alarm' 
condition, possibly resulting in impaired driver behaviour. 
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5. Driver perception of alarm timing reflects driver subjective rating of trust in these 
alarms relatively well. Accordingly, trust in perceived late alarms is lower than trust 
in perceived correct alarms. There is a possibility that a threshold between perceived 
late and correct alarm timings derives from the timing of release of the accelerator for 
avoiding collisions without the aid of a warning system. That is, when alarms are 
provided after this timing they may be perceived as late alarms. 
6. Overall a positive correlation between alarm promptness and driver ratings of trust 
was found. However some data may exhibit another trend describing driver trust and 
alarm timing and their interactions with driving conditions. Specifically when driving 
with long time headways, driver trust in a relatively late timing was not decreased. 
On the other hand, when driving with short time headways, driver trust in relatively 
early timing was decreased. 
7. The development of trust in alarms can be described as a function of the difference 
between braking event to accelerator release time without the aid of alarms and alarm 
time and the subjects' trust ratings which were measured immediately before the 
present ratings of trust. 
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when driving at low speed 
6.1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters the timing of alarms and their influence on driver trust and 
driver performance in imminent collision situations were investigated. Although a 
number of important recommendations related to the design of forward collision 
warning systems (FCWS) were provided, these studies were implemented III 
conditions where drivers drove at relatively high speed (>40 mile/h). 
Previous research suggests that approach velocity may affect accuracy of collision 
estimation (Sidaway et aI., 1996). This finding indicates that driving speed may 
influence driver response to imminent collisions and driver performance with alarms 
may vary according to driving speed. Driving speed may affect driving demand or 
motivation to respond to critical events. Compared with high speed driving, there is a 
possibility that drivers compensate in their response to critical situations during low 
speed driving, resulting in different driver performance in imminent collision 
situations. 
Although the urgency of response required may be different, it does not mean that the 
frequency of occurrence of potential collision events themselves will be decreased 
when driving at relatively low speed. Previous studies suggest that braking reaction 
time may be modulated by perceived urgency due to the degree of deceleration of a 
leading vehicle (Green, 2000, Summala, 1990). It is not surprising that driver 
performance in imminent collision situations varies in response to the deceleration of 
the leading vehicle since the rate of lead vehicle deceleration provides a strong 
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indication of the required urgency of driver response. In contrast, a relatively low 
deceleration of the leading vehicle has a reduced potential to induce serious accidents 
in low speed driving and, as a consequence, driver motivation to respond to alarms 
may be relatively low. 
The study reported in this chapter focused on low speed driving conditions and also 
the difference in driving demand resulting from variable deceleration of a leading 
vehicle. These factors were not covered in the previous study and their consideration 
allows recommendations regarding system design to be made for a more broad range 
of driving conditions. 
6.2 The aim of this study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate driver response to alarms according to the 
degree of the deceleration of the leading vehicle and alarm timing when driving at 
relatively low speed. The study also considered the impact of these factors on driver 
trust. 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Subjects and experimental design 
Twenty four participants (12 women and 12 men) ranging in age from 21 to 55 took 
part in the experiment. Each received a financial compensation of £10 for their 
participation. 
The experiment comprised a 3 x 2 factorial withinlbetween-subjects design. 
Deceleration of the leading vehicle (high/low) was the between-subjects variable and 
alarm timing (early/late/no alarms) was the within-subjects variable. The participants 
were randomly assigned to two groups, with 12 in each group. 
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High deceleration group 
Baseline: 
no alarm 
Earlyllate alarms (balanced order) 
! 1 1 1 1 1 
Low deceleration group 
Baseline: 
no alarm 
Earlyllate alarms (balanced order) 
! 1 1 1 1 1 
Figure 6-1 The procedure of experiment 
Baseline: 
no alarm 
! ! 
Baseline: 
no alarm 
! 1 
In one group the leading vehicle decreased its speed quickly with 0.8g deceleration 
(high deceleration) and in the other group the leading vehicle decreased its speed 
gently with OAg deceleration (low deceleration). Each group experienced 8 potential 
collision events. Each potential collision event, with deceleration of the leading 
vehicle according to the two conditions discussed above, required a driver response to 
the brakes to avoid collision. In the first and last two events no alanns were provided, 
allowing driver baseline perfonnance in response to be measured. In the other four 
events, late or early alanns were provided. The order of presentation of alann timing 
was counterbalanced across the participants. The entire flow of the experiment can be 
seen in Figure 6-1. 
6.3.2 Apparatus 
Data were collected using the Leeds Advanced Driving Simulator (see chapter 3). In 
this study a simulated urban road environment with single carriageway was created. 
The urban road environment included buildings beside the road, pedestrians, the 
occasional appearance of oncoming vehicles, and a leading vehicle. 
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The following vehicle, 'driven' by the subjects, was equipped with a simulated FeWS 
incorporation a Stop-Distance-Algorithm (SDA). The detail of the SDA is given in 
chapter 3. 
This study examined driver response to two different values of alarm timing 
(late/early) produced by manipulating one of parameters which was involved in the 
SDA. Specifically two Dj levels, O.75g and 0.35g were prepared for the late and early 
timing of the alarm respectively. The other parameters had the same value in all 
conditions; RT=1.25s and DFO.5g. The same parameters as used in the study 
described in chapter 4 were chosen where relatively high driving speed (45 mph) was 
implemented in order to gain knowledge about the effect of the difference in driving 
speeds on alarm effectiveness. A pilot trial was undertaken to determine parameter 
values that would be sufficiently different in promptness to be reliably discriminated 
by participants in the two conditions. 
Potential collisions occurred at intervals that varied between one and two minutes. 
The occurrence of critical events was also dependent on whether the driving speed 
was 30 mph (48.3 kph) with a tolerance of ±5% of 30 mph or not. Thus alarm onset 
could not be predicted from time passage. In situations where potential collision 
occurred a stoplight of the leading vehicle was turned on, followed by deceleration 
(depending on experimental condition) until the leading vehicle came to stop. The 
time headway between the leading and following vehicle was fixed at 2.0s by 
manipulating the leading vehicle's speed in response to the following vehicle's speed. 
Accordingly the time headway was nearly the same for all drivers immediately before 
the occurrence of potential collision events. 
The warning system provided drivers with a simple auditory buzzer alarm when the 
distance headway reached the pre-determined warning distance. The auditory tone 
lasted approximately 2.0 s and the prominent frequency was 4000 Hz. 
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Table 6-1 Summary of the experimental conditions 
Initial Lead Vehicle Initial Algorithm Mean Value Condition Velocity Deceleration Headway of Alarm Time 
(km/h) (g) (5) Parameter (5) 
RT=1.25g 
0/=0.5g 
48.3 0.8 2.0 0,=O.35g 0.13 
Early Alarm RT=1.25g 
Timing 0,=0.5g 
48.3 0.4 2.0 OFO.359 0.21 
RT=1.25g 
0/=0.5g 
48.3 0.8 2.0 0,=O.75g 0.85 
Late Alarm RT=1.25g 
Timing 0,=0.5g 48.3 0.4 2.0 OFO.759 1.35 
The timing of each alarm was dependent on the pre-detennined parameters and on a 
common start point: the onset of deceleration of the leading vehicle. In Table 6-1 the 
parameters for each of the experimental conditions are summarised. Alarm time in 
Table 6-1 is defined as the elapsed time from when the leading vehicle began to brake 
to when the alarm was presented. 
6.3.3 Procedure 
All participants were required to complete an infonned consent fonn and were briefed 
on task requirements by the experimenter. Each participant was then given a 10-
minute practice drive to familiarise themselves with the simulator and to experience 
the lead vehicle decelerations that would be involved in the experimental trials with 
the test road used in the experimental trial. After a 5-minute break, the experimental 
trials were started. All participants were given two objectives in the regular trial. One 
was to keep their own speed at 30 mph (48.3 km/h). The other objective was to 
follow the leading vehicle but to avoid rear-end collisions. Drivers had to take 
appropriate action when the leading vehicle decelerated. However, the drivers were 
directed to only use the brakes to avoid an imminent collision with the lead vehicle, 
. rather than implement lane changes. About 8 seconds after each braking event, the 
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leading vehicle gradually began accelerating agam. Subjects were instructed to 
gradually accelerate until they reached the target speed. 
6.3.4 Dependent variables 
Five dependent variables describing the driver's braking perfonnance and one 
dependent variable describing driver trust in the system were recorded. 
• Braking event to brake onset time 
• Braking event to accelerator release time 
• Accelerator release to brake onset time 
• Alarm to brake onset time 
• Maximum deceleration 
• Driver subjective rating of trust 
The definition of each variable is given in chapter 3. 
6.4 Results and discussion 
In this experiment none of the subjects suffered collisions and so the effect of 
collision events on driver behaviour could be ignored. 
In the subsequent statistical analyses an ANOVA was used in order to confinn 
significant differences between factors, however several nonparametric tests were 
used in response to experimental conditions when homogeneity of variance was not 
guaranteed. 
6.4.1 Driver baseline braking performance in response to imminent collisions 
Driver braking perfonnance without the aid of alanns was considered in order to 
identify differences in driver behaviour only attributable to the degree of deceleration 
of the leading vehicle. Figure 6-2 illustrates mean values of braking event to brake 
onset time for low and high decelerations of the leading vehicle. There were no 
significant differences among conditions. Next, Figure 6-3 illustrates mean values of 
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maXImum deceleration of the following vehicle associated with high and low 
decelerations of the leading vehicle. It appeared that the mean value in the high 
deceleration condition was greater than that in the low deceleration condition. 
Furthermore it seemed that variance in the low deceleration condition was greater 
than that for high decelerations. A Levene' s test showed a significant difference 
among deceleration conditions, F(1, 94)=24.93, p<O.Ol. As for mean values, a Mann-
Whitney test revealed a significant difference among deceleration conditions, z=5.82, 
p<O.Ol. 
These results suggest that although there is no difference in the timing of driver 
braking response according to deceleration of the leading vehicle, drivers do adjust 
the strength of their braking efforts. More specifically, drivers brake harder in the 
high deceleration condition but in the low deceleration condition the variation in 
values for each driver tends to be higher. 
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6.4.2 Driver braking process with alarms 
In this experiment, the provision of alarms was based on predetermined parameters. 
In other words, there were no intended missed or false alarms caused by system 
malfunction. However as alarm generation was dependent on driver behaviour and 
drivers were given a degree of discretion in their vehicle control i.e. their speed 
adjustment and braking force, it was not possible to ensure that every subject 
experienced all the intended alarms. Thus, some intended alarms were not triggered 
by some subjects. These alarms were termed "untriggered alarms". 
Phenomenologically, untriggered alarms are similar to missed alarms for the driver. 
In both cases alarms are not provided in response to potential collision situations. 
Missed alarms are generally the results of a mechanical or electrical fault even when 
alarm trigger conditions are achieved. However, with untriggered alarms drivers 
anticipate a potential collision event and adjust their behaviour accordingly; as a result 
the headway does not achieve the warning distance. For drivers, missed alarms will 
be viewed as alarms which were not provided when necessary, but for untriggered 
alarms this perception may not always apply. A more detailed investigation will be 
giv~n later (in section 6.4.3.). 
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Table 6-2 Number of un triggered alarm events according to driving condition 
The degree of deceleration Early timing Late timing 
High o o 
Low o 14(58%) 
Table 6-1 shows the frequency of untriggered alarms across the potential collision 
events. All the untriggered alarms occurred under the same treatment condition (low 
deceleration and late alarm timing). When driving at relatively low speed drivers 
were less likely to achieve the speed and headway conditions necessary to trigger a 
deceleration event. 
In the subsequent analyses the driver objective performance data for untriggered 
alarm events were also included as the effect oflate alarm timing on driver behaviour. 
However driver subjective trust ratings for untriggered alarms and triggered late 
alarms probably have different meanings, therefore trust data for each situation were 
treated separately in the analysis of driver trust. 
6.4.2.1 Braking event to brake onset time 
Braking event to brake onset time was analysed in order to explore net driver 
performance in collision situations according to alarm timing and deceleration of the 
leading vehicle. 
Figure 6-4 illustrates mean values of braking event to brake onset time for early and 
late alarm timings and baseline performance according to the deceleration of the 
leading vehicle. The left and right sides of this figure represent driver braking 
response for high and low deceleration conditions respectively. In the low 
deceleration condition, the presentation of alarms did not influence the transition time, 
furthermore the variance in the transition time for each alarm timing was almost the 
same. However, in the high deceleration condition, it appeared that the mean values 
varied according to alarm timing. Interestingly, the variance in early and late alarm 
timing data was smaller than that for the baseline performance. A Levene's test 
showed a significant difference in variance values, F(2, 93)=3.08, p=O.OS. A 
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Friedman test revealed that there was a difference in mean values among conditions, 
i(2)=4.66, p=0.096. A post-hoc Sing test revealed a significant difference between 
the early timing and the baseline condition, (p<O.05). 
These results indicate that when driving at low speed, even if the same trigger logic is 
used, the effect of alarm timing on driver braking reaction time may vary in response 
to the degree of deceleration of the leading vehicle. More specifically, if the leading 
vehicle decelerates rapidly, an early alarm may tend to lead to a decreased braking 
response time and the presentation of early alarms may contribute to decreased 
variation in driver response. This is not the case in the low deceleration condition. 
6.4.2.2 Braking event to accelerator release time 
In order to investigate driver performance in imminent collision situations in more 
detail, braking strategies were divided into two groups according to the time elapsed. 
Braking event to accelerator release time was considered first. Figure 6-5 illustrates 
mean values of this transition time according to alarm timing. The left and right sides 
of this figure represent high and low decelerations of the leading vehicle respectively. 
For the low deceleration condition there is no significant difference in values of the 
transition time. However, in the high deceleration condition it appeared that the 
transition time varied according to alarm timing and variances for early and late 
alarms were short, compared with variance for the baseline performance. Although a 
Levene's test failed to show a significant difference among conditions for mean 
values, F(2, 76)=2.04, p=O.13, a Friedman test showed a difference in mean values 
among conditions, i(2)=3.45, p=O.072. A post-hoc Sing test revealed significant 
difference between the early alarm and the baseline conditions, p=0.07. 
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Figure 6-5 The effect of deceleration of the leading vehicle and alarm timing on braking 
event to accelerator release time 
These results indicate that for the high deceleration condition, an early alarm timing 
tends to induce more rapid release of the accelerator. As for the low deceleration 
condition, the presentation of alarms has no particular contribution to driver 
performance in releasing the accelerator when collision events occur. 
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6.4.2.3 Accelerator release to brake onset time 
Accelerator release to brake onset time was considered next. This variable 
corresponds to the time between the driver's release of the accelerator and application 
of the brakes. Figure 6-6 illustrates mean values of accelerator release to brake onset 
time for the early timing, late timing and the baseline condition. The left and right 
sides of this figure represent high and low decelerations of the leading vehicle 
respectively. Interestingly, for high deceleration events, the mean values of the 
transition time were almost the same across conditions. However, for the low 
deceleration condition, it appeared that the variance in the late alarm data was 
relatively high, compared with the other conditions. A Levene's test was conducted 
but the difference in variance among conditions did not achieve a traditional 
significant value, F(2, 69)=2.02, p=0.14. There was also no statistically significant 
difference between the mean values of the transition time for the low deceleration 
condition. 
These results suggest that for low speed driving, the presentation of alarms may not 
affect accelerator release to brake onset time when the leading vehicle decreases its 
speed rapidly. For the low deceleration condition, however, careful consideration is 
required when attempting to assist driver behaviour through the use of alarms. As can 
been seen in the right side of this figure, compared with the values of standard 
deviation of the transition time for the late alarm timing and baseline conditions, the 
value for the early alarm timing condition is reduced. 
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Figure 6-6 The effect of deceleration of the leading vehicle and alarm timing on 
accelerator release to brake onset time 
This phenomenon might derive from driving demand and alarm timing. That is, when 
driving at rellitively slow speed and when deceleration of a leading vehicle is 
relatively gentle, prompt braking reaction is not necessary, allowing the driver a 
relatively long period in which to decide to start to brake. Furthermore, some drivers 
may brake quickly after releasing the accelerator and others may brake relatively 
slowly due to individual differences in performance. Accordingly drivers exhibit a 
relatively wide variation of braking response after releasing the accelerator. 
The data suggest that an early alarm might tend to encourage a faster braking response 
after accelerator release in low demanding driving conditions, inducing more stable 
braking strategies. Certainly these results are not strongly supported by statistically 
significant results but this phenomenon has potentially important implications for the 
design of alarm timing and such trends were not observed in the high deceleration 
condition. 
6.4.2.4 Alarm to brake onset time 
In order to investigate driver behaviour before and after the presentation of alarms in 
more detail, alarm to brake onset time was considered. As mentioned earlier, in this 
trial there were some untriggered alarms associated with low deceleration of the 
leading vehicle and alarm to brake onset time could not be measured in these cases. 
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The data associated with untriggered alarms was omitted from the analysis. Figure 6-
7 illustrates mean values of alarm to brake onset time for the early and late alarm 
timing conditions. The solid and dotted lines refer to high and low decelerations of 
the leading vehicle respectively. A negative mean value indicates that drivers 
implemented the brakes before the presentation of alarms A two-way ANOVA 
showed a significant interaction between alarm timing and deceleration of the leading 
vehicle, F(1, 39)=6.47, p<0.05. A Newman-Keuls post-hoc test revealed a significant 
difference in mean values for late alarm timings between the two deceleration 
conditions (p<0.01). 
The results indicate that driver response to alarm presentation may vary according to 
alarm timing and the degree of deceleration of the leading vehicle. That is, drivers 
may respond to early alarms with a similar timing regardless of the degree of 
deceleration of the leading vehicle. It is likely that driver braking strategy is 
coincident with the presentation of alarms, that is early alarm timings for the high and 
low deceleration of the leading vehicle (mean value of each alarm time was 0.13 sand 
0.21 s respectively) are consistent with driver braking action or have the potential to 
encourage driver braking action in order to avoid imminent collisions. However, for 
the late alarm timing condition, it can not be safely concluded that driver braking 
strategy is coincident with the presentation of alarms (mean values of alarm time for 
the high and low deceleration conditions were 0.85 sand 1.35 s respectively). This is 
because, with respect to the low deceleration c~ndition, some drivers tended to start 
braking before the presentation of alarms. In such situations the alarm provided no 
obvious warning benefit to the driver. 
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6.4.2_5 Maximum deceleration 
The effect of alarm presentation on maximum deceleration was considered here. 
Figure 6-8 presents maximum deceleration for the early, late and no alarm conditions 
in response to deceleration of the leading vehicle. There was a trend that maximum 
deceleration for the condition of high deceleration of the leading vehicle was greater 
than that for the low deceleration condition. However the presentation of alarms did 
not affect maximum deceleration. 
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Figure 6-8 The effect of deceleration of the leading vehicle and alarm timing on braking 
effort 
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These results suggest that driver braking effort is not influenced by the occurrence of 
alarms or their timing. 
6.4.3 Driver trust in alarms 
Here, differences in driver trust arising from early and late alarm timings and different 
rates of deceleration of the leading vehicle are considered. Figure 6-9 illustrates 
mean values of subjective ratings of trust for early and late alarm timings with high 
deceleration of the leading vehicle. There was a significant difference between alarm 
timings, F(1, 35)=45.72, p<O.Ol. Figure 6-10 illustrates mean values of trust with low 
deceleration of the leading vehicle. The trust data for the untriggered alarm trials 
were omitted as these alarms may have a different meaning for drivers compared with 
trust in triggered alarms. A detailed analysis of this data was implemented separately. 
A statistically significant difference between late and early alarms was found F(1, 
21)=7.13, p<0.05. These results suggest that trust in early alarms is higher than in late 
alarms regardless of the degree of deceleration of the leading vehicle. 
As mentioned above, with respect to the low deceleration condition, some trials 
r~sulted in untriggered alarms. The effect of untriggered alarms on driver subjective 
ratings of trust was considered in order to understand differences in trust ratings 
associated with triggered late alarms and untriggered alarms. Figure 6-11 illustrates 
mean values of trust in triggered late alarms and untriggered alarms. The results 
showed that trust in untriggered alarms was lower than trust in triggered late alarms, 
F(1, 11)=27.00, p<O.Ol. 
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This result may indicate an important characteristic of driver trust. If trust in triggered 
alarms is interpreted as the driver's estimation of alarm effectiveness for avoiding 
imminent collision situations then trust in untriggered alarms may represent the 
degree to which drivers expect that FCWS should be reliable or, more specifically, 
should have provided an alarm in an untriggered alarm condition, both being relevant 
to system reliability. Although the drivers were able to avoid collisions without the 
assistance of an alarm in the untriggered alarm condition, drivers might reasonably 
expect that alarms should be activated when they are needed. It is crucial for the 
design of alarm timing that the presentation of alarms is consistent with driver 
expectation. The result provides a possibility that untriggered alarms also have the 
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potential to decrease trust due to inconsistency between the presentation of alarms and 
driver expectation in some situations. 
The above statement also suggests that the nature of trust in FCWS might vary 
according to alarm performance. That is, it is possible that driver trust in FCWS may 
have different aspects which can be influenced by different components of system 
behaviour i.e. alarm timing and alarm reliability. From the drivers' perspective some 
alarms may be perceived as late alarms and drivers who experience a late alarm may 
start braking before the presentation of the alarm. Accordingly late alarms are 
consistent with the concept of the 'perceived false alarm' proposed by Wheeler et aI., 
(1998). On the other hand, some drivers who are exposed to an untriggered alarm 
may regard these alarms as missed alarms if alarm performance is not consistent with 
a driver's expectation. 
If this driver perspective on trust in triggered and untriggered alarms is correct then it 
is possible that decreased trust in triggered late alarms may be interpreted as reduced 
'trust in alarm performance' and deceased trust in untriggered alarms may be 
interpreted as reduced 'trust in alarm systems', implying that driver trust in FCWS 
comprises two different components. Although any interpretation of the above 
arguments must be treated with caution due to the assumptions involved it suggests 
that there may be a case for considering the nature of driver trust in more detail. More 
specific arguments regarding nature of trust in FCWS will be developed in the 
following chapters. 
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6.5 The relationship between trust and driver behaviour 
In this section driver objective performance data is integrated with driver subjective 
ratings of trust in order to interpret driver trust from the viewpoint of driver 
performance. 
With respect to early alarm timing, it has been established that the effect of alarm 
presentation on driver performance may depend on the degree of deceleration of the 
leading vehicle. However driver trust in early alarms is higher than that in late alarms 
despite differences in deceleration of the leading vehicle. On the other hand with 
respect to late alarm timing, it was established that the presentation of alarms may not 
help drivers to avoid collision situations because some drivers may start braking 
before the presentation of alarms, resulting in decreased trust. Taking all these results 
into consideration, it can be said that the presentation of alarms with a relatively early 
timing may play an important role in maintaining driver trust at appropriate levels 
despite the fact that these alarms do not always lead to improved driver performance . 
. 6.6 Concluding remarks 
This study focused on driver behaviour when driving at relatively low speed (30 mph) 
and investigated the effect of alarm timing and driving demand on driver braking 
strategies in collision situations. Three kinds of alarm timing condition (early, late 
alarm timings, and no alarms) and two kinds of driving demand (high and low 
decelerations of the leading vehicle) were considered. The results support the 
following conclusions which have considerable significance for alarm system design. 
1. First, in the case of driver baseline performance in imminent collision situations 
without the aid of alarms, we can conclude that driving demand does not affect driver 
response time. However, drivers do adjust the strength of their braking efforts 
according to driving demand. Specifically, drivers brake more gently when the 
deceleration of the leading vehicle is relatively low. 
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2. Trust in late alarms is lower than trust in early alarms. 
3. Late alarm timing may have the potential to decrease trust in system reliability 
caused by untriggered alarms associated with inconsistency between driver 
expectation to alarm systems and actual presentation of alarms. 
4. In situations where the deceleration of the leading vehicle is low, the presentation 
of alarms does not affect braking reaction time. However, in situations where the 
leading vehicle decelerates rapidly, early alarm timing has the potential to reduce 
braking reaction. time and also to reduce variation in braking reaction time, resulting 
in a more stable response, compared with baseline performance. 
5. From the subsequent analyses of driver braking strategies from the braking event to 
the application of the brakes, we can conclude that for the condition where the 
deceleration of the leading vehicle is high, there is a trend that early alarms may 
induce quicker release of the accelerator as a collision avoidance action, compared 
with the baseline condition (no alarms given). However for the condition involving 
low deceleration of the leading vehicle, the presentation of alarms does not affect the 
timing of the release of the accelerator. 
Furthermore, when driving with relatively low demand, for the conditions involving 
low deceleration of a leading vehicle, early alarms may have the potential to lead to 
more consistent braking than late alarms (or no alarms) after accelerator release. 
6. Finally, from the analysis of driver behaviour before and after the presentation of 
alarms, it can be concluded that for the condition involving high deceleration of the 
leading vehicle, early alarms may encourage or be coincident with driver action to 
avoid collisions, resulting in high trust ratings. However, for the condition of low 
deceleration of the leading vehicle, late alarms may not always encourage driver 
action to avoid collisions and it is likely that drivers may tend to implement braking 
earlier, compared with the presentation oflate alarms, resulting in low trust ratings. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In the last three chapters, we focused on alarm timing and its influence on driver trust 
and performance with alarms. As mentioned earlier, another important issue in the 
design of forward collision warning systems (FCWS) is driver response to alarm 
failure. 
In a failure mode analysis, alarm failure, i.e. the generation of false alarms or missing 
alarms, is a common problem in the domain of warning systems. The fundamental 
issue in setting the alarm trigger threshold is a trade-off between the cost of a missing 
and a false alarm. Parasuraman et al. (1997) insisted that if a system is designed to 
minimise the rate of missed alarms, then an increase in the number of false alarms 
becomes almost inevitable. Furthermore, the possibility of occurrence of false and 
missed alarms does not simply result from theoretical considerations but from system 
failures related to mechanical or electrical problems (i.e. sensor failure or data 
processing under-performance). Therefore, it is necessary to consider the effect of 
both missing alarms and false alarms on driver behaviour if system effectiveness is to 
be maximised. 
In chapter 6, initial evidence was presented that trust in FCWS may have different 
aspects and may be influenced by alarm failure in different ways. This chapter will 
focus on the nature of driver trust and explore how false and missing alarms can affect 
driver trust. 
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7.2 The aim of this study 
The' primary aim of this study was to understand the nature of driver trust in warning 
systems and to address its relation to driver behaviour with respect to false and 
missing alarms. A model of driver trust in warning systems is proposed that supports 
the generation of several hypothesises relating to driver trust and performance. 
Finally the trust model will be validated using driving simulator experiments to test 
the hypotheses. 
7.3 A model of trust in warning systems and its relation to 
driver behaviour 
Figure 7-1 depicts a schematic model for driver trust in warning systems and its 
relation to driver behaviour, how alarm malfunction affects driver trust and how 
impaired trust influences driver behaviour. The model is divided into three 
conceptual factors, namely "system behaviour", "trust in warning systems" and 
"driver behaviour". Moreover it is assumed that an upper hierarchical stage may 
influence a lower hierarchical stage (i.e. system behaviour influences trust in warning 
systems). 
Several authors have observed that operator trust in automated systems is not a simple 
construct but has several dimensions (Muir, 1987; Muir, 1994; Zuboff, 1988). Meyer 
(2001) distinguished between two types of operator trust in relation to warning 
systems that are subtly but significantly different; one he termed compliance and the 
other reliance. In compliance the operator responds to alarms promptly, assuming 
that they reliably indicate a hazard or fault condition. However, in the absence of an 
alarm ('green light' condition) the operator assumes that there is probably no hazard 
and proceeds with caution. In reliance the operator assumes that there will be no 
hazard unless the alarm is given; the green light condition reliably indicating a lack of 
hazard. 
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system behaviour 
Trust in warning systems · · 
· ~ 
trust in individual alarms <:::::~=:~> trust in system integrity 
(TIA) (TSI) 
I driver behaviour 
T 
Driver braking response 
to alarms 
Driver braking response 
to critical situations 
Figure 7-1 Conceptual model showing among system behaviour, trust, and driver 
behaviour 
In the current study, the proposed trust model for warning systems also involves two 
different aspects of trust; "trust in individual alarms (TIA)" and "trust in system 
integrity (TSI)". TIA is defined as driver trust which is determined by individual 
alarm performance and TIA strongly influences a driver's judgement as to whether 
specific alarms are valid or not, whether alarm timing is appropriate or not and so on. 
TSI is defined as driver trust which is determined by system reliability and TSI has a 
strong influence on driver judgement as to whether or not a system is reliable and 
consistent with past performance. 
TIA is therefore influenced by individual episodes while !,SI is influenced by 
relatively longer term experience than TIA. The relative strengths of TIA and TSI in 
overall trust are a consequence of a driver's cumulative experience of alarms. In a 
driver's early experience with a warning system each individual alarm (and hence 
TIA) can be expected to have a greater influence on driver behaviour than TSI. The 
driver has simply had insufficient experience to enable the development of TSI. 
128 
Chapter 7: Driver response to false and missing alarms: The role of driver trust 
However, as experience increases, and providing the alarm system operates efficiently 
and consistently, it is likely that TSI will become more influential, possibly at the 
expense of TIA. 
Consequently, it can be argued that trust in warning systems may represent the 
combined influence of TIA and TSI and it is necessary to interpret driver behaviour as 
a response to both factors to achieve a comprehensive understanding of driver 
response to alarm failures. The influence of system failure on driver trust in warning 
systems will now be considered. 
In this study, system behaviour (top stage in Figure 7-1) is limited to situations in 
which system malfunction occurs. Two types of alarm malfunction, "false alarms" 
and "missing alarms", were considered as factors that have the potential to impair 
system effectiveness. Alarm malfunction may lead to decreased trust in warning 
systems as it is well established that faults in automated systems .contribute to 
decreased trust. However, false and missing alarms are distinctly different 
phenomena with very different consequences for driver safety and it is possible that 
the two types of alarm malfunction may influence driver trust in warning systems in 
different ways. It is suggested that false alarms may decrease TIA and missing alarms 
decrease TSI. The experience of false alarms is likely to reduce driver perception of 
alarm performance, resulting in impaired TIA. However the experience of missing 
alarms may inevitably reduce an expectation of system reliability (i.e. that warning 
systems will always produce an alarm in critical situations) resulting in impaired TSI. 
The proposed trust model also takes account of decreased trust and its influence on 
driver performance. This is represented in the bottom of figure 7-1. First, with 
respect to driver response to false alarms, if false alarms decrease TIA then drivers 
could reasonably believe that any given alarm might be invalid. Consequently drivers 
may be reluctant to respond promptly to alarms presented after experiencing false 
alarms. 
A different viewpoint must be taken with respect to driver response to missing alarms 
where the level of TSI is an important factor in understanding driver performance. If 
TSI is high ~hen drivers would reasonably expect alarms to be presented when 
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hazardous situations occur. As a result, driver response to imminent collision 
situations may be delayed when a missing alarm occurs. However, if missing alarms 
decrease TSI then drivers may have reduced expectations of warning systems in 
critical situations. Consequently, any delayed response to critical situations caused by 
the experience of a missing alarm, would be improved in subsequent missing alarms 
conditions. Furthermore if trust in warning systems has two different aspects then 
impaired TSI caused by missing alarms would not affect driver response to a true 
alarm after the presentation of missing alarms. 
Accordingly it is possible that TIA and TSI may conceptually correspond to 
compliance and reliance respectively as proposed by Meyer (2001). That is, TIA may 
play an important role in determining compliance with presented alarms, particularly 
with respect to false alarms. When TIA is high drivers will tend to respond positively 
to a false alarm. On the other hand, TSI may be strongly relevant to reliance and 
drivers may assume that there will be no hazard unless an alarm is given ifTSI is high. 
The discussion above suggests four hypotheses describing the impact on driver 
behaviour caused by false and missing alarms. 
(i) The experience of false alarms will impair TIA and this will reduce the speed of 
driver response to subsequent true alarms. 
(ii) If TSI is high, following the experience of valid alarms, then missing alarms will 
lead to delayed response to critical situations. 
(iii) If TSI is impaired, following the experience of a first missing alarm, then the 
response to subsequent missing alarms will be quicker. 
(iv) After missing alarms have been experienced driver response to a true alarm will 
not be delayed because missing alarms will not directly affect TIA. 
As a way of testing these hypotheses, two experiments were completed using a 
driving simulator with a forward collision warning system. The details of these 
experiments are given in the following sections. 
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7.4 Experiment I 
The purpose of experiment I was to investigate the effect of alarm malfunction on 
driver behaviour and trust. In this study a false alarm was defined as an alarm issued 
in the absence of an imminent collision situation. 
7.4.1 Apparatus 
The experiments were undertaken using a Driving Simulator owned by the Japan 
Automobile Research Institute (JARI). The detail of this simulator can be seen in 
chapter 3. The road conditions comprised a straight, two-lane freeway. There were 
no other vehicles or pedestrians in the simulated environment except for a leading 
vehicle. 
The following vehicle, 'driven' by the subjects, was equipped with a simulated Fews. 
Although several algorithms have been used for alarm trigger logics, a Stop-Distance-
Algorithm (SDA) was used in this experiment. The detailed description of the SDA is 
given in chapter 3. 
The warning system provided drivers with a simple auditory tone alarm. The alarm 
was activated when the headway distance. between the lead and following vehicle 
corresponded with the warning distance. In this experiment the parameter values 
were defined as LOs, 0.6 g and 0.6 g for RT, DJ and D/ respectively. The values of 
these parameters were chosen to reflect realistic values for the deceleration level of 
the following vehicle and driver braking response time. Moreover a pilot trial was 
undertaken in order to confirm that alarms were reasonably effective for drivers to 
avoid collisions. 
7.4.2 Subject and experimental design 
Eight JAR! volunteer employees (5 males and 3 females) participated in this study. 
The experiment comprised 15 trials with 12 normal alarms events and 3 false alarm 
events. Itoh et al. (1999) found that while discrete system failures may not impede 
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human interactions with automated systems, continuous malfunctions significantly 
influence human behaviour and ratings of trust in the systems. The primary aim of 
this experiment was to investigate changes in driver behaviour and trust when false 
alarms occur and so false alarms were provided for the ih, Sth, and 9th "events" when 
the leading vehicle did not decelerate. In the other braking events, the system worked 
correctly (Figure 7-2). A potential collision event involving a sudden 0.6g 
deceleration occurred about once every three minutes, however, the exact timing of 
the speed reduction was always at random in order to prevent drivers from 
anticipating the need to brake. In situations where the braking event occurred the 
headway distance between the leading and the following vehicle was always fixed at 
2.0s. 
7.4.3 Procedure 
After being given complete verbal instructions and having any questions answered, 
each subject completed a practice session lasting eight minutes in order to familiarize 
themselves with the simulator dynamics, possible system actions, the way in which 
the warning system triggered alarms, how to avoid an accident and so forth. The 
purpose of this study was to estimate the effect of alarm malfunction on driver 
behaviour and trust and as it was hypothesised that this effect could depend on the 
experience of previous false or missing alarms, the warning system operated correctly 
in the practice trial. 
All participants were given two tasks. One was to keep their own vehicle speed at 50 
milelh (SOkmlh) and to follow the leading vehicle. The other was to avoid rear-end 
collisions with the leading vehicle. In order to avoid imminent collision situations, 
the drivers were required to brake when the leading vehicle decreased its speed 
Normal alarms 
Training session ~
False alarms Normal alarms 
1111 1111 1 1 
Trial 1 6 7 8 9 10 15 
Figure 7-2 The procedure of experiment I 
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It was assumed that drivers would recognise the deceleration of the leading vehicle 
from a change in the relative distance between their own vehicle and the leading 
vehicle. The illumination of a leading vehicle's stoplights provides variable 
additional information about that vehicle's possible behaviour, but does not 
necessarily indicate prompt deceleration. The stoplights will be illuminated if the 
driver touches the brakes (no deceleration) or brakes hard. Thus the stoplight of the 
leading vehicle provides ambiguous information on the leading vehicle. However, as 
the focus of this study was driver response to prompt deceleration of the leading 
vehicle with and without a warning system, the stoplight display on the leading 
vehicle was turned off across all trials in order to reduce the influence of other factors 
on the driver braking process. The subjects were therefore required to decide whether 
braking was needed by observing changes in headway. 
After a two minute break, the subjects began the experimental session comprising 15 
potential collision events. Each participant was given a 3-minute break at the end of 
the fourth and 11 th braking events. 
7.4.4 Dependent measures 
The two following variables were recorded as measures of d~ver braking performance 
and driver trust. 
• Alarm to brake onset time 
• Driver subjective rating of trust. 
The definition of each variable is given in chapter 3. A possible interpretation for 
trust ratings will be given based on the relationship between trust ratings and driver 
response to alarms failures in the following sections. 
7.4.5 Results and discussion 
Figure 7-3 illustrates the trend in mean values of alarm to brake onset time across 
successive trials. The transition time increased following the presentation of three 
false alarms from trial 7 onwards. Interestingly, alarm to brake onset time was 
longest in trial 10 where a true alarm was presented after the presentation of three 
133 
Chapter 7: Driver response to false and missing alarms: The role of driver trust 
1.4.-------.,......,...--------.--, 
1.2 
~ 
~ 1.0 
~ 
-
Cl) 
~ 0.8 
o 
CD 
...: f 0.6 
J:I 
.s E 0.4 
.!!! 
ca 
0.2 
~falSe alarms ~ 
0.0 L-~~~~~"":""'~~"""":'-~~~~~~ 
3 7 9 
trial 
13 15 -11- Mean I.so 5 11 
Figure 7-3 The effect offalse alarms on alarm to brake onset time 
false alarms. Furthennore reaction time did not recover to the pre-malfunction level. 
A one-way ANOVA showed a significant main effect among trials, F(14, 94)=2.34, 
p<.Ol. 
Figure 7-4 illustrates mean values of subjective ratings of trust for each trial. As can 
be seen, trust gradually increased during the first 6 trials and decreased rapidly 
following the presentation of false alanns from trial 7. Following trial 9, trust 
increased gradually, however it did not immediately recover to the pre-malfunction 
level. A one-way ANOV A on the subjective rating of trust showed a significant main 
effect among trials, F(14, 98)=9.09, p<.Ol. 
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Figure 7-4 The effect of false alarms on driver trust 
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Taking our proposed trust model for warning systems into consideration, a possible 
explanation for these phenomena representing driver perfonnance in false alanns is 
proposed. Decreased TIA caused by false alanns induced a response bias, resulting in 
delayed response to the following false alanns. Furthennore, the significant delayed 
response to a true alann issued immediately after the three false alanns is consistent 
with the influence of decreased TIA. Consequently the results reasohably support the 
proposed trust model for warning systems and the hypotheses regarding driver 
response to false alanns. 
7.S Experiment 11 
The effect of false alanns on driver trust and its influence on driver behaviour towards 
alanns were investigated in experiment I. The effect of missing alanns on driver 
response to imminent collision situations was considered in experiment H. 
7.5.1 Apparatus 
Exactly the same apparatus as experiment I was used in experiment H. 
7.5.2 Subject, experimental design and procedure 
Nine JAR! employees (5 males and 4 females) participated in experiment H. They had 
not participated in experiment I. The method of this experiment was exactly the same 
as experiment I with the exception that missing alanns were 'presented' on the 
seventh to ninth braking events. After the trials with alanns all subjects completed 3 
post-session trials without the warning system in order to measure driver unassisted 
perfonnance in critical situations. The subjects took a 3-minute break after the 15th 
trial. It was assumed that the data obtained in the post-session trial represented the 
"drivers' most effective braking performance without alanns fully infonned by the 
experiencing critical situations without the support of an alann. The entire design of 
this study can be seen in Figure 7-5. 
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Figure 7-5 The procedure of experiment 11 
7.5.3 Dependent measures 
• Braking event to brake onset time 
Without alarms 
Post-test session 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • y y y 
• 
1 2 3 
• Driver subjective rating of trust. This measure was the same as in experiment I 
The definition of each variable is given in chapter 3. 
7.5.4 Result and discussion 
7.5.4.1 Dynamics of braking event to brake onset time 
Figure 7-6 illustrates the trend in mean values of braking event to brake onset time for 
each trial. The results showed that the transition times for trials 7, 8 and 9 were much 
longer than those for any other trial, furthermore, the first exposure to a missing alarm 
led to the longest braking reaction time. However, the delay in response to the 
potential collision situations for trials 8 and 9, where the subjects have already 
experienced a missing alarm, was reduce compared with trial 7 and braking event to 
brake onset time recovered to the pre-malfunction levels when the system returned to 
correct functioning from trial 10. A one-way ANOV A showed a significant main 
effect among trials, F(14,112)=9.73, p<.Ol. 
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Figure 7-6 The effect of missing alarms on braking event to brake onset time 
7.5.4.2 Delay in response to the brakes according to driver's experience of missing 
alarms 
Here braking event to brake onset time is compared with and without the aid of the 
FCWS. The braking data collected from drivers in the absence of the FCWS can be 
regarded as optimal performance since it was informed by the immediately preceding 
experience of responding to critical events. Accordingly the comparison may 
reasonably indicate the differences in driver performance caused by the introduction 
ofthe FCWS. 
Figure 7-7 illustrates mean values of the transition time for trials 7, 8, and 9 and the 
no alarm condition. A one-way ANOV A showed a significant difference among 
conditions (F (3, 24)=4.28, p<O.05). 
In conditions where a missing alarm occurs the response required to avoid a collision 
is exactly the same as the no alarm condition except that drivers have recently 
experienced a true alarm, possibly resulting in some expectation that an alarm will be 
provided in further critical situations. However, these results indicate that the first 
exposure to a missing alarm may be associated with a significant delay in braking 
response. Furthermore, the delay in braking reaction following the first exposure to a 
missing alarm is significantly longer than the no alarm condition value. Interestingly, 
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braking event to brake onset time for the subsequent missing alarms was found to 
recover to the levels found in the no alarm trials. 
7.5.4.3 Decreased trust caused by two types of malfunction 
Experiment I found that false alarms decreased driver trust and the decreased trust did 
not recover immediately when only valid alarms were presented. In order to clarify 
the differences in the dynamics of trust resulting from the two types of alarm 
malfunction a regression analysis was conducted. 
The dotted and solid lines in Figure 7-8 illustrate trends in mean values of subjective 
ratings of trust for all trials in experiments I (for false alarms) and II (for missing 
alarms) respectively. As can be seen in this figure, missing alarms led to a more 
substantial reduction in driver trust compared with false alarms. 
The occurrence of false or missing alarms appears to be the most important causal 
variable. Moray et al. (2000) found that when investigating the dynamics of trust in 
automated systems in a time series, the value of subjective ratings of trust for the 
previous trial may contribute to increased validity for the trust model. Following this 
research, the previous trust value was used as a causal variable. Trust values for trials 
I to 9 were used to create a regression model for the decreased trust caused by alarm 
malfunction. The results were as follows. For the dynamics of trust resulting from 
false missing alarm, Tn=-0.43Fn+0.755Tn_l (r2=0.89), where T is the rating of trust and 
F is the occurrence of false alarms. F is treated as a discrete (0,1) variable (F=1 if 
there is a false alarm, otherwise F=O). The subscripts (n and n-1) indicate the current 
trial and the previous trial. For the dynamics of trust resulting from missing alarms, 
Tn=-0.72Mn+0.296T n-l (r2=0.87), where T is the rating of trust and M is the 
occurrence of missing alarms. M is treated as a discrete (0,1) variable (M=1 ifthere is 
a missing alarm, otherwise M=O). Again, nand n-1 are trial subscripts. 
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difference in experience of missing alarms 
Figure 7-8 The differences in decreased trust between false and missing alarms 
These models indicate that the level of trust for the previous trial may have an impact 
on present level of trust, moreover the relative insensitivity of the dynamics of trust to 
the occurrence of false alarms is reflected in the small coefficient ofFn compared with 
Mn; the occurrence of missing alarms. 
7.5.4.4 Relationships between driver trust and response to imminent collisions 
The data regarding driver response to missing alarms showed that driver response to 
the brakes was significantly delayed following the first exposure to a missing alarm, 
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however subsequent braking reaction time with missing alarms recovered to the level 
for no alarm. A possible explanation for this phenomenon may lie in two aspects of 
trust in the warning system. 
As already mentioned, if a driver has past experience with reliable and effective 
alarms, TSI may dominate trust in warning systems. Accordingly drivers may expect 
that the warning system will always provide reliable alarms to help them avoid 
collisions in critical situations. Therefore a significant delay in response to the brakes 
becomes obvious when an alarm is missed. The data is consistent with this position 
since it showed that trust was relatively high immediately before the first exposure to 
a missing alarm. However the trust model states that missing alarms may impair TSI, 
resulting in reduced expectations of system reliability. That is, drivers realise that 
there is a possibility that the warning system might provide missing alarms through 
the experience of missing alarms. It is likely, therefore, that driver braking reaction 
performance would only recover to the no alarm condition level in the subsequent 
missing alarm trials. In fact, driver trust was significantly reduced following the first 
missing alarm. Furthermore, as for a quick recovery of driver response to the brakes 
after missing alarms, the data suggests that trust in the warning systems has two 
aspects and missing alarms do not directly affect TIA. As a result, drivers tend to 
respond to valid alarms without any delayed response. 
The results obtained from experiment 11 provide broad support for the proposed trust 
model and the hypotheses regarding driver response to missing alarms. 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
This study focused on driver trust in warning systems and proposed a model of driver 
trust in order to estimate the effect of alarm malfunction on driver behaviour. The 
proposed model was tested in two experiments using a driving simulator with a 
FCWS. The results support the following important conclusions. 
First, with respect to the nature of driver trust, the proposed interpretation of trust in 
warning systems is reasonably supported. More specifically, changes in overall trust 
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in warning systems following two types of alarm malfunction, false and missing 
alarms, can be explained by the influence of TIA and TSI. False and missing alarms 
impair TIA and TSI respectively. A regression analysis to determine the difference in 
sensitivity between TIA and TSI to alarm malfunction confirmed that TSI is more 
sensitive to alarm malfunction than TIA. 
Second, as for alarm malfunction and its influence on driver behaviour, the 
hypotheses are also reasonably validated. Impaired TIA caused by false alarms leads 
to a delayed response to alarms. In particular, a significant delay in response to a true 
alarm occurs immediately after the presentation of false alarms. On the other hand, a 
significant delay in response to the brakes occurs on the first exposure to a missing 
alarm if TSI is relatively high. However a missing alarm also affects TSI, resulting in 
reduced expectations of system reliability. Thus driver braking response is improved 
on subsequent missing alarms. Furthermore, missing alarms tend to act only on TSI, 
therefore, driver response to true alarms recovers to the pre-malfunction levels after 
the presentation of missing alarms. 
This study offers an important increase in our understanding of the nature of driver 
performance with, and trust in, warning systems that are inevitably imperfect. 
Furthermore false and missing alarms are common problems for every kind of 
warning system and the results provide insight regarding general human response to 
alarm failure. 
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response to forward collision warning systems 
following system failure 
8.1 Introduction 
In chapter 7 the effects of false and missing alarms on driver trust were considered. 
The nature of trust in forward collision warning systems and the different aspects of 
trust that influence driver response to alarm failure, resulting in impaired system 
effectiveness were identified. It was argued that false alarms may affect driver trust in 
individual alarms (TIA) and missing alarms may affect driver trust in system integrity 
(TSI) and the nature of trust can be applied to not only the design of FeWS, but also 
the design of warning systems in general. However, the study reported in chapter 7 
did not consider another factor which may play an important role in alarm 
malfunction and its influence on driver behaviour; alarm timing. 
As already mentioned, alarm timing has been recognized as an important factor that 
can affect system effectiveness, (Janssen and Nilsson 1993;Lee et al. 2002). When 
considering driver response to alarm failure, it should be stressed that alarm timing 
not only affects alarm effectiveness but also driver behaviour following alarm 
malfunction. This is because alarm timing itself may determine driver perception of 
warning systems. For example, it is possible that for drivers some alarm timings are 
associated with perception of reliability while others (e.g. late alarms) result in 
perceptions that a system is unhelpful, resulting in different driver responses to the 
warning system. The study in chapter 7 was concerned with a fixed alarm timing, 
thus the question remains as to whether or not drivers respond to alarm failure in the 
same way with different regimes of alarm timing. 
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Driver performance with alarms may also be influenced by different mental models 
for FCWS or driver trust (Wickens et aI., 1998), therefore this chapter does not simply 
explore the phenomenon of driver response to alarm failure but considers factors 
which may have the potential to determine the effect of ala~ failure on driver 
behaviour by proposing a driver mental model showing the relationship between 
driver trust and alarm timing. 
8.2 The aim of this study 
The purpose of the research reported in this chapter was to investigate the effect of 
false and missing alarms on driver behaviour in response to alarm timing from the 
viewpoint of driver trust. In this study false and missed alarms were defined 
respectively as alarms which were provided without critical events and those which 
were not provided although critical situations had occurred. 
8.3 Driver response to alarm failures according to alarm 
timing and driver trust 
8.3.1 Conceptual models for examining alarm timing and its relation to trust and 
event awareness 
Parasuraman and Riley (1997) provide a broad understanding of human use, misuse 
and disuse of automated systems and assert that trust in automated systems will affect 
how automated systems are used. Muir (1994) provides a comprehensive theory of 
human trust in automated systems which integrates two theories of trust between 
humans proposed by Barber (1983) and Rempel et al. (1985). Moreover trust in 
automated systems is a key factor in determining human reliance or dependence on 
such systems (Bliss and Acton 2003; Gupta et al. 2002; Lee and Moray 1992; Moray 
et al. 2000; Muir 1987; Muir and Moray 1996). These results indicate that driver trust 
in alarm systems may play an important role in determining driver response to alarm 
failure. 
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In order to estimate the effect of false and missing alarms on driver behaviour, a 
conceptual model is proposed describing the relationship between alarm timing and 
trust and its influence on driver response to alarm failure, followed by hypotheses 
regarding driver response to alarm failure. Figure 8-1 shows a framework for 
understanding driver event awareness for imminent collisions when alarms are 
provided and its relation to driver trust in the alarms according to alarm timing. 
In this figure the horizontal line refers to alarm timing and a possible alarm zone is 
defined as the time period between onset of potential collision events (i.e. sudden 
deceleration of a leading vehicle) and the latest alarm moment (the latest alarm 
moment can be derived from driver reaction time to alarms; L1t, and the timing of the 
latest action required to avoid a collision). Hence the period of time which is valid for 
the presentation of alarms starts at the occurrence of potential collision events and 
extends to the latest alarm moment. In this time zone early and late alarm timings are 
labels for alarms which are provided relatively close to the moment of occurrence of 
potential collision events and the latest alarm moment respectively. 
The vertical line to the left of the figure refers to the drivers' trust in an alarm. 
Research evidence shows that early and middle alarm timings may lead to increased 
trust compared with late alarm timing (Abe and Richardson 2003). Therefore it is· 
reasonable to assume that, as delay in alarm timing increases, trust may gradually 
reduce (the solid curve in Figure 8-1). The other vertical line refers to event 
awareness with respect to an imminent collision when a collision warning system is 
available to provide support. This is largely dependent on information obtained from 
system behaviour during an individual critical event rather than accumulated 
information regarding alarm performance. The diagonal dotted line represents the 
relationship between alarm timing and a driver's event awareness. The model 
assumes that event awareness is directly linked to the driver's understanding of alarm 
performance in an imminent collision situation, therefore alarm timing is crucial in 
determining event awareness. Specifically, as the timing increases, the quantity of 
information available to the driver about the developing situations grows and event 
awareness becomes sufficient for an informed decision. The reverse is also 
potentially true. While the perception of alarm timing (i.e. early or late) has an 
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important influence on driver perception of alarm quality, in this model we are more 
concerned with the impact of alarm timing on the information available to the driver. 
A late alarm may provide the driver with less time in which to react but allows the 
driver more time to perceive the critical event. 
Next, the proposed conceptual model suggests that there can be significant 
discrepancies between the degree of driver trust in alarms and the event awareness, 
except at the point where the dotted and the solid lines cross each other. In particular, 
when alarm timing is early or late, the gaps between solid and dotted lines are 
relatively large. For example when alarms are early and trust is relatively high even 
though event awareness is relatively limited. This gap is termed "blind faith" in the 
model. Previous research has suggested that human trust in automated systems may 
approach faith when operators do not have enough behavioural evidence generated by 
an automated system (Muir 1994). Furthermore Itoh (2003) notes that human 
operators may have a positive bias towards automated systems and this can lead to the 
rejection of safety critical information which is not consistent with alarm output. 
Thus driver trust can be relatively high even if event awareness is relatively limited. 
In contrast, trust may be relatively low even when event awareness is sufficient. As 
the timing of an alarm is delayed, the time available to the driver to perceive the 
developing critical event is increased and, as a result, sufficient event awareness 
becomes available to inform a rational judgement of system behaviour. However 
when alarms are provided too late, it is possible for drivers to judge them as 
unnecessary for avoiding a potential collision event. In this model this situation is 
referred to as 'rational mistrust' . 
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Figure 8-1 The conceptual model showing the relationship among alarm timing, ratings 
of trust and event awareness 
8.3.2 The proposed hypotheses 
On the basis of the proposed model, two sets of hypotheses regarding driver response 
to alarm failure are proposed. 
First, when alarm timing is relatively early, blind faith may affect system 
effectiveness when missed alarms occur. One potential consequence of blind faith is 
complacent behaviour, resulting in delayed response to imminent collisions. The term 
automation-induced complacency has been used as an accident inducing behaviour in 
the aviation domain (Sign et al. 1993), although a specific definition has not yet been 
agreed (Satchell 1998). However research evidence suggests that human operators 
who are supported by highly developed automated systems tend to experience 
decreased vigilance, resulting in failure to detect system malfunction (Molloy and 
Parasuraman 1996). This phenomenon may also occur in the vehicle domain. If 
drivers believe that a collision warning system is very reliable then trust in alarms can 
become high, resulting in an expectation that alarms will always be provided when a 
critical event occurs. Consequently there is a possibility that the introduction of 
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FCWS in road vehicles may also cause complacency when drivers experience certain 
alarm timings. 
In this study it was hypothesised that drivers who experience early alarms will exhibit 
a delayed response to an imminent collision when a missing alarm happens due to the 
influence of blind faith. However, when alarm timing is relatively late a delayed 
response to an imminent collision caused by a missing alarm will not occur and this 
may result from a rational mistrust of the alarm system. 
Second; drivers who experience early alarms will be more prone to blind faith and 
will tend to respond to all alarms including false alarms. However, drivers who 
experience late alarms will tend to respond to alarms according to their perceived 
validity. In the current study the hypotheses were tested by measuring driver 
objective performance in imminent collision situations and driver subjective ratings of 
trust in alarms. 
8.4 Method 
8.4.1 Apparatus 
The research was completed usmg The Leeds Adv~nced Driving Simulator (see 
chapter 3). The visual scene was a computer generated environment which included 
other vehicles, buildings and pedestrians. In this study a simulated rural road 
environment was created with a single carriageway, a leading vehicle, and the 
occasional appearance of oncoming vehicles. 
The following vehicle, 'driven' by the subjects, was equipped with a simulated FCWS. 
The Stop Distance Algorithm (SDA), as described in chapter 3, was also use in this 
study. 
This study examined driver response to different values of the assumed deceleration 
of the following vehicle (DJ), in order to estimate the effect of two different alarm 
timings on driver response to alarm failure. Two different timing characteristics of 
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the alarm timing (late/early) were prepared by manipulating Dj (0.75g for late, 0.35g 
for early). The other parameters had the same value in all conditions (RT=1.25sec, 
DFO.5g). The values of these parameters for early and late alarm timings were the 
same as those used in chapter 4. The warning system provided drivers with a simple 
auditory alarm. The alarm lasted approximately 2.0 s and the prominent frequency of 
the auditory tone was 4000 Hz. 
8.4.2 Subjects and experimental design 
Twenty four participants (12 women and 12 men) ranging in age from 21 to 55 years 
(M=31.4, SD=8.2) took part in the experiment. All were licensed drivers with driving 
experience of two years or more. Each received a financial compensation of £1 0 for 
their participation. 
All participants were assigned to two alarm timing conditions; early or late. Each 
condition comprised 11 potential collision events with a missing alarm event and a 
false alarm event (Figure 8-2). In the first and last two potential collision events 
braking performance without the aid of alarms was measured with the participants 
being instructed to avoid potential collision events, relying only on their driving skill. 
These data were regarded as indicators of driver baseline performance without the 
warning system. In the other trials drivers were instructed that alarms would be 
available although there would be a possibility of alarm failure. In the 6th and the 9th 
braking events false and missing alarms occurred respectively but true alarms were 
provided in all the other braking events according to the experimental conditions. 
Here a false alarm meant an alarm was presented with no potential braking event and 
a missing alarm meant that a potential braking event had occurred but no alarm was 
issued. 
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Figure 8-2 The procedure of experiment 
In each potential collision event the leading vehicle decreased its speed with 0.8g 
deceleration with illumination of the stoplights until the vehicle came to a stop. A 
potential collision event occurred once every two minutes but dependent on whether 
the driving speed was 60 mph (96.6km/h) with a tolerance of ±5%, so that alarm onset 
. could not be predicted from time passage. The time headway between the lead and 
following vehicle was maintained at 2.0 s by manipulating the leading vehicle's speed 
in response to the following vehicle's speed. Accordingly all participants had nearly 
the same headway time immediately before all braking events. Table 1 contains a 
summary of the specific experimental conditions. Alarm time in Table 8-1 was 
defined as the elapsed time between when the lead vehicle began to brake (i.e. a 
braking event occurs) and when the alarm was issued. 
Table 8-1 Summary of experimental conditions 
Initial Lead Initial Mean 
Condition Velocity Vehicle Headway Algorithm Value of Deceleration Parameter Alarm (km/h) (9) (s) Time (s) 
Early RT=1.25g 
Alarm 0/=0.5g 
Timing 96.6 0.8 2.0 0,=O.35g 0.02 
Late RT=1.25g 
Alarm OpO.5g 
Timing 96.6 0.8 2.0 OFO.75g 1.20 
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8.4.3 Procedure 
All participants were required to complete an infonned consent fonn and were briefed 
on task requirements by the experimenter. Each participant was then given a 10-min 
practice drive to familiarise themselves with the simulator and to experience the lead 
vehicle decelerations that would be involved in the experimental trials. After a 5-
minute break, the regular trials were started. All participants were given two 
objectives in the regular trials. One was to keep their own speed at 60 mph 
(96.6km/h) and the other was to follow the leading vehicle but to avoid rear-end 
collisions. The drivers were directed to only use the brakes to avoid a collision with 
the lead vehicle, rather than implement lane changes. About 8 second after each 
braking event, the leading vehicle gradually began accelerating again. Subjects were 
instructed to gradually accelerate until they reached the target speed. 
8.4.4 Dependent variables 
Two dependent variables describing the drivers' braking perfonnance in response to 
imminent collisions and one dependent variable describing driver trust in the system 
were recorded. 
• Braking event to brake onset time 
• Maximum deceleration 
• Driver subjective rating of trust 
The definition of each variable is given in chapter 3. 
8.5 Results and discussion 
The data regarding driver objective perfonnance in imminent collision situations were 
examined along with an analysis of driver ratings of trust. Driver response to false 
alanns was investigated with respect to regimes in which drivers experienced either 
early or late alarms. In this experiment none of the subjects suffered collisions and so 
the effect of collision events on driver behaviour could be ignored. 
/ 
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8.5.1 Driver performance according to alarm timing: the analysis o/braking event to 
brake onset time 
In this experiment all participants experienced a false alarm in which no potential 
collision events occurred. As the driving task in a false alarm condition was different 
to that in all the other conditions the driver braking performance data were considered 
separately. 
First, the differences in braking reaction time between early and late alarm timings 
were considered in order to estimate their effect on driver performance in imminent 
collision events. Figure 8-3 illustrates mean values of braking reaction time for early 
and late alarm timings. There was a significant effect for alarm timing, 
F(1,118)=13.48, p<O.Ol. The result suggests that alarm timing may impact on driver 
braking reaction, that is, the early alarm timing has the potential to reduce braking 
reaction to potential collision events. 
Next, in order to estimate the effects of a false alarm on driver braking reaction and to 
investigate how driver response to a missing alarm may vary according to alarm 
timing, all trials were divided into four sessions, namely: baseline trials, trials before a 
false alarm, trials after a false alarm and a trial with a missing alarm. The baseline 
trials session comprised braking reaction time with no warning systems. The trials 
before a false alarm comprised the first three trials before the presentation of a false 
alarm, the session of trials after a false alarm comprised the two trials following a 
false alarm and a missing alarm event was the last trial in the session where no alarm 
was gIven. 
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Figure 8-3 The effect of alarm timing on braking event to brake onset time 
Figure 8-4 illustrates the dynamics of braking reaction times in response to early and 
late alarm timings. For the late alarm timing, a one-way ANOV A showed that there 
were no significant main effects among sessions. For the early alarm timing, how~ver, 
a one-way ANOVA showed a significant difference among sessions F(3,105)=15.12, 
p<O.Ol. More specifically a Newman-Keuls post-hoc test revealed braking reaction 
time for trials after a false alarm was longer than that for trials before a false alarm 
(p=0.10). Furthermore, braking reaction time for the missing alarm trial was longer 
than that for the baseline trials (p<0.01). These results indicate that for drivers who 
experience early alarms, false alarms and missing alarms may affect driver braking 
reaction time. This is not the case with late alarms where false and missing alarms 
have relatively little impact on driver braking 'response. 
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Figure 8-4 Changes in braking event to brake onset time in response to trial-by-trial 
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8.5.2 Driver trust 
The purpose of this analysis was to clarify how driver trust may vary according to 
alarm timing and system failure. 
First, ratings of trust for early and late alarm timings were compared. Figure 8-5 
illustrates mean values of trust for the early and late alarm timing conditions with true 
alarms (i.e. where alarms were presented correctly). The results show that trust for 
the early alarm timing was higher than that for the late alarm timing, F(I,118)=116.33, 
p<O.OI. 
Next, in order to investigate the dynamics of trust in response to variations in alarm 
. performance, the trials were divided into five sessions, namely: trials before a false 
alarm, a false alarm trial, trials after a false alarm and a trial with a missing alarm. 
The session comprising trials before a false alarm involved the first three braking 
events with true alarms before the presentation of a false alarm. The false alarm trial 
session represented the subjects' judgments of trust with a false alarm. The session of 
trials after a false alarm involved two braking events with true alarms after the 
presentation of a false alarm. The missing alarm trial session represented subjects' 
judgements of trust with a missing alarm. The solid and dotted lines in Figure 8-6 
represent the dynamics of trust for the early and late alarm timings respectively. 
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Figure 8-5 The effect of alarm timing on driver trust 
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Figure 8-6 Changes in trust ratings in response to trial-by-trial 
For the late alarm timing condition, there were no significant differences in trust. 
ratings. As can be seen in this figure, trust in true alarms is relatively low and as a 
result, the level of trust was not depressed. by the occurrence of alarm malfunctions. 
However a one-way ANOV A on the sessions showed that the mean values of ratings 
of trust for the early alarm timing were not consistent but varied widely according to 
the experience of false and missing alarms, F (3,69)=43.78, p<O.Ol. Furthermore, 
trust values after a false alarm recovered to the pre-malfunction level. This result 
suggests that although false and missing alarms may induce decreased trust, the 
impact of the alarm on judgement of trust caused by one discrete false alarm may be 
temporary, and trust may recover quickly. 
8.5.3 The relationship between driver performance and trust in the missing alarm 
condition 
Driver response to a missing alarm was considered from the viewpoint of driver trust 
in the warning system. In conditions where a missing alarm occurs, the response 
required to avoid a collision is exactly the same as the baseline condition except that 
drivers have recently experienced a true alarm, possibly resulting in an increased 
expectation that an alarm will be provided in critical situations. However the results 
showed two different phenomena regarding driver braking reaction in the missing 
alarm condition according to alarm timing. 
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With respect to the late alarm timing, braking reaction time for a missing alarm was 
not significantly delayed compared with baseline performance. A possible reason for 
this phenomenon concerns the different level of trust associated with early and late 
alarm timings. With a late alarm timing, the drivers' judgement of trust immediately 
before a missing alarm was relative"ly low suggesting that drivers may depend less on 
the warning system. The low level of trust in late alarms can be interpreted as rational 
mistrust and consequently, the missing alarm has relatively little impact on braking 
performance. However, in the case of early alarm timing, driver trust was relatively 
high immediately before a missing alarm occurred, indicating more dependence on 
the warning system. The high level of trust in early alarms can be interpreted as blind 
faith and this may lead to a longer response to an imminent collision, compared with 
the baseline level. 
In order to identify the quantitative differences in driver performance resulting from 
missing alarms a regression analysis was conducted. Figure 8-7 is a scatter plot 
showing the delay in braking response, and level oftrust obtained, immediately before 
a missing alarm for each participant. Here the delayed response time was defined as 
the difference between braking reaction time for the missing alarm condition and 
braking reaction time for. the baseline condition. Positive values mean that braking 
.reaction time for the missing alarm condition was longer than that for the baseline 
condition. As previously mentioned, positive values indicate complacent behaviour, 
that is, a delay in response to the brakes resulting from a lack of vigilance. 
As can be seen in Figure 8-7 drivers who indicate high levels of trust tend to show 
longer delayed response times and conversely drivers whose trust is relatively low 
tend to show shorter delays or no delays. A positive correlation (r=0.37, p=O.07) was 
found between trust and driver braking performance. Although any interpretation of 
these results must be treated with caution due to the relatively small correlation, the 
result suggests that driver response to missing alarms may vary according to trust 
level. Furthermore, given the assumption regarding complacent behaviour discussed 
above, when trust is higher drivers may become complacent. 
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Figure 8-7 The relationship between driver subjective and objective data 
To sum up, driver response to system failure may vary according to system 
characteristics, such as alarm timing. The effects of false and missing alarms on 
human response to alarm systems have been identified as factors which have the 
potential to impair system efficiency and it is necessary to minimize their impact. Our 
results indicate that manipulating alarm timing might be a possible countermeasure to 
minimize the deceased driver performance caused by missing alarms. 
8.5.4 Driver behaviour andfalse alarms 
8.5.4.1 Driver response to false alarm and its relation to trust 
The analysis discussed above focused on the effect of a missing on driver behaviour 
and explored its impacts on braking reaction time and driver trust. 
Here driver response to a false alarm will be considered according to previous driver 
experience with early and late alarm timings. First, the number of participants 
responding to a false alarm was summarised, see Table 8-2 with "braking" or "no 
braking" meaning that participants responded to, or did not respond to, a false alarm 
respectively. The results show that almost all the participants (11) who were assigned 
to the early alarm timing condition responded to a false alarm. On the other hand, half 
the participants (6) who were assigned to the late alarm timing condition did not brake 
on a false alarm. This indicates that driver behaviour towards false alarms may vary 
in response to alarm timing. More specifically, early alarms may lead to an 
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"automated response" to all presented alarms regardless of alarm validity. Conversely 
drivers who experience late alarms may tend to decide whether presented alarms are 
trustworthy or not and brake accordingly. 
Next, the influence of ratings of trust on driver response to a false alarm was 
investigated. Figure 8-8 illustrates mean values of trust for participants who 
responded to a false alarm (braking) and those who did not (no braking). Here each 
trust rating represents the value which was obtained immediately before a false alarm 
event (at the 3rd braking event). There was a significant difference between mean 
trust values, F(l, 22)=3.95, p=O.059. The result suggests that there is a tendency for 
drivers who respond to a false alarm to have relatively high trust and drivers who do 
not brake to have relatively low trust. 
Table 8-2 The difference in response to a false alarm according to alarm timing 
Alarm timing Early timing Late timing 
"Braking" or "No braking" Braking No braking Braking 
Number 11 (92%) 1 (8%) 6 (50%) 
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8.5.4.2 Driver braking effort for false alanns 
The previous analysis explored the possibility that low levels of trust may lead to a 
decision not to brake when false alanns occur. However it is possible that there could 
be other differences in driver perfonnance influenced by alann timing. Here 
maximum deceleration in the false alann condition was investigated in order to 
explore differences in driver behaviour toward a false alann with respect to early and 
late alann timings. 
Figure 8-9 illustrates the dynamics of max.imum deceleration according to trial 
conditions. It was expected that maximum deceleration can be indicative of the 
strength of the drivers' braking response, i.e. their sense of urgency. All trials were 
divided into five sessions on the basis of the s.ame rule which was used in the analysis 
of the dynamics of trust. For participants who did not brake, values of deceleration 
achieved by engine braking were used in this analysis. The solid and dotted lines 
represent the trends of mean values of maximum deceleration for the early and late 
alann timings respectively. It appears that, with the exception of the false alarm 
condition, all values of maximum deceleration were similar. A two-way ANOV A 
showed a significant interaction between alarm timing and trail conditions, F( 4, 
88)=2.36, p=O.059. Post-hoc analysis, using a Newman-Keuls test showed a 
significant. difference between early and late alarm timings in the false alarm 
condition (p<O.Ol). This result indicates that false alarms may lead to deceased 
maximum deceleration, that is, alann timing may affect braking efforts for a false 
alann. 
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Figure 8-9 The effect of a false alarm on braking effort 
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8.6 Validity of the proposed model 
The validity of the proposed model is now assessed by considering the relationship 
between driver overall trust and alarm timing based on the driver's mental model of 
the collision warning system. 
With respect to driver trust, trust in early alarms was higher than that in late alarms. 
On the other hand, driver performance data representing responses to alarm failure 
showed that drivers who experienced early alarms had a delayed braking response 
when missing alarms occurred and tended to respond to false alarms. However 
drivers who experienced late alarms exhibited robust behaviour in response to alarm 
failure. There was no delayed response to imminent collision situations when missing 
alarms occurred and they tended to only respond to valid alarms. 
Taking driver subjective and objective data regarding driver response to alarm timing 
together, it can be said that the proposed model and following hypotheses are 
reasonably validated. That is, driver trust in early alarms is relatively high even 
though event awareness is inherently limited, i.e. when alarms are provided early, the 
amount of information available to the driver about the reason for an alarm being 
generated is limited. Accordingly it is possible that the driver's perception of alarm 
timing might be a crucial factor in inducing increased trust. However this type of 
trust may lead to blind faith due to the gap between event awareness and the degree of 
trust in alarms, resulting in delayed response to imminent collisions when missing 
alarms occur. Moreover it is likely that blind faith may lead to an "automated 
response" to alarms, including false alarms. These phenomena result in impaired 
system effectiveness. 
On the other hand, trust in late alarms, where drivers have more adequate information 
about alarm behaviour, is relatively low, resulting in rational mistrust. Consequently, 
this kind of limited trust enabled drivers to respond to alarms according to their 
validity. Drivers may tend to respond only to valid alarms, even when false alarms 
occur, and their response to missing alarm is consistent with their response to valid 
alarms. 
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The issue of alarm timing and its influence on driver response to alarm failure may be 
linked to the trade-off between driver subjective trust ratings and the quantity of 
information available to the driver about system behaviour. Certainly low trust in 
alarms may have the potential to lead to disuse of alarm systems. On the other hand, 
appropriate driver reaction to alarm failure may play an important role in maintaining 
safe driving. The proposed model can predict that some alarm timings possibly 
provide appropriate event awareness with reasonable ratings of trust and drivers who 
experience these alarms may show a robust response to alarm failure. 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
This study focused on driver response to system failures comprising false and missing 
alarms and investigated how false and missing alarms can influence driver behaviour 
in response to alarm timing. Furthermore driver behaviour was investigated in terms 
of the relationship between alarm timing and the level of driver trust in the warning 
systems. The results support the following conclusions. 
1. Early alarms lead to a quicker response to the brakes than late alarms. 
2. For drivers who experience late alarms, alarm failure does not affect braking 
reaction time. 
3. Drivers who experience early alarms tend to exhibit longer braking reaction time to 
a true alarm immediately after a false alarms. A missing alarm leads to a delayed 
braking response. 
4. Trust in early alarms is higher than trust in late alarms. 
5. The dynamics oftrust in late alarms is not influenced by alarm failure. 
6. The dynamics of trust in early alarms vary in response to alarm failure. 
Specifically, a false alarm and a missing alarm lead to deceased trust. However the 
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decreased trust caused by a false alann recovers to the pre-malfunction level when 
true alarms are restored. 
7. With respect to the relationship between trust and delayed response to imminent 
collisions, drivers whose judgement of trust is relatively high, may exhibit a delayed 
braking response, compared with drivers who estimate their trust at low levels when 
missing alarms occur. 
8. Drivers who experience late alarms tend not to respond to false alarms. On the 
other hand, drivers who experience early alarms tend to respond to false alarms. 
9. Due to the differences in driver braking response to false alarms with respect to 
alarm timing, maximum vehicle deceleration for the late alarm timing is smaller than 
that for the early alarm timing. 
To sum up, the following final suggestions are made. An early alarm timing has the 
potential to lead to timely braking response to imminent collisions, however drivers 
who always experience early alarms may respond inappropriately if the system fails. 
If it is accepted that the occurrence of false and missing alarms is inevitable, the . 
delayed response to imminent collisions following a missed alarm may result in 
decreased system efficiency. Furthermore unnecessary braking caused by a braking 
response to false alarms may provide another potential collision event for following 
vehicles. The late alarm timing, on the other hand, does not contribute to a quick 
response to imminent collisions but drivers who experience late alarms still adjust 
their performance to alarm failure, resulting in compensation for system malfunction. 
Although late alarms decrease trust, resulting in less dependence on warning systems, 
these results suggest that sufficient information regarding the sequence of potential 
collision events including alarm generation gained through the time period between a 
occurrence of a potential collision event and alarm onset, is crucial in order to 
maintain event awareness, resulting in appropriate behaviour following system failure. 
If a swift response to a potential collision event is not required for alarm design then 
manipulating alarm timing with reasonable ratings of trust is a possible strategy to 
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keep the balance between maximization of alarm effectiveness for true alarms and 
minimisation of system impairment caused by alarm failure. 
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9.1 Introduction· 
The previous chapters have described and discussed the results of a series of empirical 
studies. In particular, driver trust has been investigated experimentally in order to 
understand the nature of driver trust in FCWS and to clarify the relationship between 
driver trust and alarm timing and their influence on driver behaviour. This chapter 
aims to synthesise the research findings in order to gain knowledge about the nature 
of driver trust for alarm system design. Accordingly· this chapter will consider the 
alarm benefits associated with different alarm timings and the trade-off problems. 
between alarm timing and driver response to alarm failure from the viewpoint of 
driver trust. Finally, recommendations for alarm timing in the design of FCWS will 
be given. 
In this thesis, two descriptions of alarm timing were employed. One represents 
relative differences in alarm timing; early, middle, or late alarms, in order to discuss 
the relative differences in driver behaviour in response to alarm timing. The other 
represents absolute values of the alarm time; the elapsed time from when a leading 
vehicle begins to brake to when the alarm is presented. In this chapter these two 
terms will be used depending on the context of the discussion. 
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9.2 alarm contribution to safe driving 
In chapters 4, 5 and 6, several benefits for safe driving were found when an alarm 
indicates that a leading vehicle has suddenly decreased its speed. A relatively early 
alarm timing may lead to prompt driver response to the brakes. This benefit of alarm 
presentation may reduce collision accidents by providing enough time for the driver to 
implement appropriate actions to avoid collisions. Moreover the presentation of 
alarms may have the potential to decrease variation in driver braking response, 
resulting in a reduction in delayed braking response. A middle alarm timing also 
reduced variation in braking response time. 
It was also found that a decreased braking response following the presentation of an 
alarm may derive from the prompt release of the accelerator. This means that the 
presentation of alarms may help drivers recognise imminent collision situations earlier 
than unassisted drivers. 
If we describe driver behaviour at the most basic level, it can be said that drivers 
implement three tasks continuously, namely recognition, decision, and control 
(Dingus et aI., 1998). Recognition refers to the first stage for driving safely, where 
drivers need to identify threats which have the potential to affect their safe driving. 
Decision refers to the second stage, where drivers need to decide what they should do 
in response to the threats which they have recognized. Finally, control refers to 
specific vehicle control based on driver decision. 
Considering these three tasks based in situations where drivers must avoid imminent 
collisions, the following interpretation can be given. Drivers must recognize the 
deceleration of a leading vehicle and then decide whether they need to implement an 
action to avoid a collision. Finally drivers implement an action i.e. steering, 
accelerator release, braking, or a combination of all three. Viewing the current results 
from this perspective it can be argued that appropriate alarms may improve 
recognition of imminent collision situations and lead to a more prompt release of the 
accelerator, resulting in a decreased braking response time (Figure 9-1). In other 
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words, following the introduction of alarms, drivers can implement collision 
avoidance actions with longer headway times (Figure 9-2). 
Dingus et al. (1998) note that recognition error is the dominant factor il1 accidents 
where driver failure results in a crashes and it is expected that the introduction of 
FCWS may achieve their intended effort by the reduction of recognition errors. 
It should be stressed here that the effect of SDA determined alarm presentation on 
driver behaviour may vary according to driving conditions, driving speeds, time 
headway, or degree of deceleration of a leading vehicle even if the same pre-
determined alarm trigger logic is used. That is, even if the pre-determined alarm 
trigger logic is the same in different driving conditions, the timing to achieve the 
warning distance for triggering alarms from the beginning of the potential collision 
events may vary. 
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Figure 9-1 The conceptual figure showing changes in driver performance in collision 
situations due to the introduction of alarms 
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Figure 9-2 The impact of introducing alarms on headway 
The results of chapters 4, 5 and 6 established that the timing of alarm presentation 
strongly impacts on alarm effectiveness for safe driving in a variety of driving 
conditions. Moreover time headways and deceleration of the leading vehicle affect 
alarm timing more importantly than driving speed. Specifically alarm times of up to 
0.15 s for sudden deceleration of the leading vehicle lead to prompt response to the 
brakes. Alarm times with a range of 0.35 sand 0.64 s may have the potential to 
decrease variation in response to the brakes in some situations. Alarm times of over 
1.00 s do not influence driver response to the brakes. 
However, in the experiments the collision events and alarms were presented in the 
absence of driver distraction and it must be assumed that the drivers had a high 
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expectation for both. As a result the above arguments regarding driver performance 
with alarms will be reliable in this limited situation. 
It is obvious that prompt recognition of critical events due to the introduction of 
warning systems may be helpful for drivers by providing sufficient time for them to 
brake, resulting in accident avoidance. ~owever consistent response time resulting 
from the presentation of alarms may also contribute to safe driving. This is because 
some delayed responses to imminent collision events which are included in the wide 
range of variation in braking response times may be associated with greater risk of 
collisions. Thus, if drivers respond to imminent collision situations in a consistent 
way, every time, this may also result in a decrease in the number of collision accidents. 
The results of chapter 5 raised an important human factors perspective for late alarms. 
As an overall trend of the effect of late alarm timing of driver behaviour, driver 
braking response is not influenced by late alarms. It does not seem that late alarms 
impair safe driving but careful attention is needed when driving with long time 
headways. This is because a late alarm timing induces longer braking response time, 
compared with driving without the aid of alarms when driving with long time 
headways. This phenomenon might drive from changes in driver attitude due to the 
introduction ofFCWS. 
These studies indicate that it is possible that the introduction of FCWS may induce 
less cautious driving. Furthermore, relatively long time headways may allow drivers 
to take longer to decide to implement a collision avoidance action, compared with 
short headways. Accordingly late alarms may induce delayed braking response time, 
compound these effects. The results of this thesis show that a late alarm timing may 
lead to a delay in releasing the accelerator in some situations. 
9.3 The timing of the alarms and trust 
The primary aim of this thesis was to understand the nature of driver trust in FCWS 
and to apply the concept of trust dynamics to alarm system design. As mentioned 
earlier driver trust may play an important role in determining driver acceptance of 
167 
Chapter 9: Overview results: Towards the integration trust into alarm design 
FCWS and also influence driver perfonnance with alarms. It is necessary to consider 
not only alarm benefit related to safe driving but also how the timing of the alarms 
may influence driver trust. Accordingly this section will discuss alarm timing and its 
influence on driver trust. 
9.3.1 A static relationship between alarm timing and driver trust 
First, the overall trends for alarm timing and trust indicates that, compared with 
relatively late alanns, trust in relatively early alarms is high. This result applied to 
relatively low (30 mile/h) and high (70 mile/h) driving speeds. 
In chapter 5, alann time and its relation to driver trust was generalized using a 
regression analysis and the results indicated that as alarms are provided earlier, trust 
in alarms increases. However, some data exhibit a different trend to the overall trend. 
That is, when driving with relatively long time headways i.e. when driving demand is 
relatively low, trust may not be decreased even if alarms are triggered relatively late. 
This effect was tenned the 'tolerance'. On the contrary, when driving with relatively 
short time headways i.e. when driving demand is high, drivers may give relatively low 
trust ratings even when alarms are provided early. This effect was termed 
'intolerance'. This result might suggest that with respect to relatively high demand 
driving (e.g. high speed and short time headways) it is necessary to provide alarms as 
early as possible in order not to decrease driver trust. 
9.3.2 Driver expectation and alarm performance 
The static analyses regarding driver trust successfully indicate that there are relative 
differences in driver subjective ratings of trust associated with different alarm timings 
but there is still uncertainty over what aspects alarm timing can influence variability 
in trust. One possible factor will now be considered. 
Takahashi and Kuroda (2000) state that driver expectation of system behaviour and 
actual system behaviour plays an important role in deterinining driver trust in such 
systems. If driver expectation is not consistent with system performance then driver 
trust will be impaired. They focused on automated braking assistance systems and 
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demonstrated that the automated controller's timing for starting the braking action 
could influence driver trust. They found that drivers tended to prefer systems which 
began to brake before their own manual operation of the brakes, compared to systems 
which implemented the brakes after the driver's own timing. 
Their results are relevant to the development of arguments regarding alarm timing and 
its relation to driver trust in this thesis. It is possible that driver expectation and alarm 
performance will play an important role in determining driver trust when taking driver 
trust into the design of alarm timing. It is necessary to consider alarm timings which 
are consistent with driver expectation of alarm timing rather that alarm timings which 
can induce prompt braking response. If this argument is accepted then a question 
immediately arises; what is the driver expectation of alarm timing. 
9.3.3 Perceived alarm timing 
In chapter five, driver perceived alarm timing, i.e. early, correct, or late, was 
considered. The timing of release of the accelerator in imminent collision situations 
without the aid of alarms (RAT) may play an important role in determining driver 
perception of alarm timing. It was found that alarms which were triggered before 
RAT were viewed as perceived correct alarms. In contrast, alarms which were 
triggered after RAT were viewed as perceived late alarms. The results are consistent 
with the interpretation that alarms act to improve accelerator release. That is, it is 
likely that drivers may expect that alarms should be triggered before, or at least at the 
same timing as, they recognize a critical situation and decide to release the accelerator. 
Thus alarms which are provided after RAT may be regarded as late alarms. 
Interestingly, with respect to the relationship between driver behaviour and trust, the 
results suggest that improved driver performance due to the presentation of alarms is 
not directly connected to driver trust. That is, even though alarms may not directly 
improve driver performance in imminent collision situations, there is a possibility that 
trust in these alarms may be maintained at relatively high levels if driver expectation 
is not impaired. 
169 
Chapter 9: Overview results: Towards the integration trust into alarm design 
9.3.4 The dynamics of driver trust in FCWS 
In chapters 4 and 5 two models describing the dynamics of trust in alarms i~ response 
to alarm timings were proposed. These models suggest that driver trust has a dynamic 
nature which can be described as a function of several causal variables. 
It should be remembered that the difference between braking event to accelerator 
transition time without the aid of alarms and alarm time (RAT-AT) has a positive 
coefficient. Consequently, as the time period between alarm onset and accelerator 
release without the warning system increases trust increases. Moreover, the 
occurrence of alarm presentations after drivers have started to brake 
(Discouragement) has a negative coefficient. These results indicate that gaining 
knowledge about the nature of driver's baseline performance in releasing accelerator 
in response to a variety of driving conditions and considering those data in the design 
of alarm timing are important in maintaining appropriate levels of trust. Moreover, if 
drivers have already responded to the brakes then it might be necessary to inhibit the 
presentation of alarms in order to prevent driver trust from decreasing. This result 
supports the arguments regarding inconsistency between driver expectation of alarm 
performance and actual alarm timing. This inconsistency corresponds to 
Discouragement and has the potential to impaired trust. 
In chapter 7 another model of trust describing the impact of false and missing alarms 
on driver trust was proposed. The model indicates that missing alarms have more 
potential to decrease driver trust than false alarms. This phenomenon may derive 
from differences in fault consequence. Missing alarms have the potential to induce 
more serious results than false alarms. 
As already described in chapter 2, Lee and Moray (1992) and Moray et aI., (2000) 
have proposed multiple regression models of trust dynamics and found several 
important contributing factors including system reliability,' fault size, and conflict 
between operator's and automated system's fault diagnosis. In general trust was 
found to increase with system reliability. In their model Fault size, which referred to 
the magnitude of the fault and corresponded to the difference between the system's 
potential performance and the actual performance, affected trust. Greater magnitudes 
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of fault in system components may result in more serious problems in system control, 
resulting in reduced trust. Furthennore the disagreement between the operator and the 
automation as to the diagnosis also impairs trust. That is, with respect to fault 
diagnosis, if the decision making of automated systems is not consistent with the view 
of the operator then trust decreases. 
The model proposed in this thesis, which accounts for subjective ratings of trust may 
also be able to integrate past results to identify the characteristics of driver trust in 
FCWS. For example the current research found that driver trust towards FCWS 
varies in response to alann timing, an original finding when describing trust 
development. On the other hand, some similarities with existing models can be found. 
One is relevant to the kinds of fault found with mechanical systems. 
Past studies have established that quantitative differences in the magnitude of faults 
affect trust and the research reported in this thesis established that differences in 
system failure mode, i.e. false and missed alanns affect the dynamics of trust. It is 
possible that perceived fault seriousness can affect human trust in mechanical systems. 
The other similarity is relevant to human conflict with mechanical systems. 
Synthesising the current trust models with previous trust models, it can be said that in' 
order to gain human trust in machines it is crucial to avoid conflict between human 
expectations of systems perfonnance regarding how fast alanns should be triggered or 
fault diagnosis perfonnance and actual system behaviour, even when systems work 
correctly or provide correct infonnation. It is necessary to incorporate operator 
expectations regarding system perfonnance into the design. 
As already mentioned earlier several different aspects dominate trust. Although 
identifying which aspects may influence driver, trust in FCWS was not the purpose of 
this study, it is possible to interpret driver subjective ratings as a measure of the 
technical competence of a FCWS. This is because alarm timings and alann failure 
derive from technical capability and reliability points of view. A fundamental goal 
was to assess the feasibility of studying the construct of relationships between trust 
and alann timing. Importantly the quantitative analyses indicate that alann timing 
plays an important role in detennining trust ratings and differences in ratings are 
related to driver response to alanns. 
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9.4 The . trade-off between alarm timing and system 
robustness against alarm failure: An assessment from the 
viewpoint of driver trust 
In chapters 7 and 8, driver response to alarm failure was considered and a model for 
driver trust in FCWS with particular relevance to the differences in the effect of false 
and missing alarms on trust, was proposed. Furthermore, another trust model relating 
to alarm timing and its influence on trust from the viewpoint of event" awareness was 
proposed. In this section alarm timing and its relation to driver response to alarm 
failure is discussed based on the two proposed trust models in order to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of alarm timing, trust, and driver response to alarm 
failure. 
9.4.1 The effect of alarm failure on driver trust 
First we found that driver overall trust in FCWS has two different aspects and alarm 
failures (i.e. false and missing alarms) affect these different aspects. In this thesis two 
aspects of trust were proposed; trust in individual alarms (TIA) and trust in system 
integrity (TSI). Both aspects of trust are important components of overall trust. 
However our model suggests that the relative strengths ofTIA and TSI in overall trust 
are a consequence of a driver's cumulative experience of alarms. In a driver's early 
experience with a warning system each individual alarm (and hence TIA) can be 
expected to have a greater influence on driver behaviour than TSI. The driver has 
simply had insufficient experience to enable the development of TSI. However, as 
experience increases, and providing the alarm system operates efficiently and 
consistently, it is likely that TSI will become more influential, possibly at the expense 
of TIA. Furthermore false alarms affect TIA and missing alarms affect TSI. 
As already described in chapter 2, the issue of dIjver response to alarm failures (such 
as false and missing alarms) is well established as a factor that may impair system 
effectiveness. Furthermore, although specific phenomena of driver response to alarm 
failure have been investigated, we need to incorporate appropriate alarm presentation 
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strategies into the design of alarm systems in order to optimise alarm capability in all 
alarm conditions. 
The concept of driver trust proposed here is useful in understanding driver response to 
alarm failure and driver response to FCWS. That is, the current trust model provides 
new interpretations of the effect of false and missing alarms on driver behaviour that 
have been investigated in previous research. As more specific aspects of trust are 
considered, more specific countermeasure for alarm failure can be proposed. 
Specifically, if false alarms occur then it is necessary for TIA to be restored in order 
to prevent drivers from making delayed responses to subsequent true alarms. On the 
other hand, if missing alarms occur then it is crucial to restore impaired TSI in order 
to maintain driver's use of alarm systems. 
9.4.2 Alarm timings and their influence on driver response to alarm failure 
Integrating the results of chapter 8 suggests that manipulating alarm timing is one 
countermeasure that can minimize the negative impact of alarm malfunction on driver 
behaviour. In chapter 8 it was established that driver response to alarm failure may 
vary in response to alarm timing. The differences in driver response to alarm failure 
derived from the alarm timing and its relation to driver trust and event awareness. 
Here event awareness is directly linked to the driver's understanding of alarm 
performance in an imminent collision situation,. therefore alarm timing has a major 
influence on event awareness. Specifically, as the alarm timing increases, the quantity 
of information available to the driver about the developing situation grows and event 
awareness becomes sufficient for an informed decision. The reverse is also 
potentially true. 
The conceptual model showing how alarm timing may influence trust and event 
awareness proposed in this chapter suggests that early alarm timing leads to higher 
subjective ratings of trust but, at the same time, may induce blind faith due to a lack of 
event awareness. Consequently when missing alarms occur, driver response to 
imminent collisions is delayed. On the other hand late alarm timing leads to lower 
subjective ratings of trust, however event awareness is sufficient, resulting in rational 
niistrust. Consequently drivers who experience late alarm timing exhibit robust 
173 
Chapter 9: Overview results: Towards the integration trust into alarm design 
behaviour in the face of alarm failure, that is, driver response to imminent collision 
situations is not delayed even if missing alarms occur. These results indicate that it is 
necessary for drivers to experience alarm behaviour for some period of time in order 
to gain appropriate event awareness. 
9.4.3 Synthesising the two models regarding driver trust 
Here a conceptual model showing the nature of trust proposed in chapter 7 and 
another conceptual model showing the relationship between driver trust and alarm 
timing proposed in chapter 8 will be integrated in order to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between the two models. 
The differences in ratings of trust according to alarm timings shown in chapter 8 can 
be interpreted in terms of the differences in levels of TIA that were proposed in 
chapter 7. That is, TIA may vary according to driver judgements as to whether 
specific alarms are valid or not for avoiding imminent collision situations. Typically 
TIA for a late alarm timing is lower than TIA for an early alarm timing. Moreover, 
low subjective trust ratings resulting in rational mistrust and high subjective ratings 
resulting in blind faith can be interpreted as differential development ofTSI according 
to alarm timing. As already mentioned in chapter 7, TSI is dominated by perceived 
system reliability. Thus it can be said that blind faith may derive from excessive TSI 
and rational mistrust may result from underdeveloped TSI. 
This interpretation suggests an important conclusion which must be emphasised. TSI 
is developed based on driver experiences with alarms depending on levels of TIA. It 
is impossible for TSI to develop individually without the existence of appropriately 
high levels of TIA. In other words, low TIA does not have the potential to develop 
TSI. On the other hand, high TIA does have sufficient potential to develop TSI. 
Given that a late alarm timing does not affect driver behaviour and an early alarm 
timing contributes to safe driving, it should be emphasised that alarm timing can play 
an important role in the development ofTSI. 
174 
Chapter 9: Overview results: Towards the integration trust into alarm design 
9.4.4 Trade offbetween safe and unsafe behaviour resulting in alarm timings 
The argument up to now includes a trade-off between alarm benefit for safe driving 
depending on alarm timing and driver response to alarm malfunction. That is, early 
alarms have great potential to lead to prompt responses to the brakes but also result in 
impaired response to the brakes following alarm failure. With respect to late alarms, 
the effect of alarm failure on driver performance may be very limited, however the 
results of chapters 4, 5, and 6 indicate that late alarms do not have the potential to 
improve driver performance in braking response. 
When considering the design of FCWS, it is very important to optimise alarm timing 
from the viewpoint of system performance including alarm failure. Accordingly it is 
necessary to consider TIA, TSI and event awareness with respect to alarm timing in 
order to design appropriate alarm timing for overcoming the trade off issues. 
Furthermore, given that trust has a multidimensional aspect that varies in response to 
levels of experience it is likely that, even though the same alarm timing is used, the 
differences in short and long term experience may influence the development of trust 
aspects such as predictability, dependability and faith, resulting in different response 
to alarm failure. This study showed relatively short term effects of alarm failure and 
further research is required to assess the long terms effects. 
Human factors research has indicated that new technology can contribute to solving 
problems and simultaneously create new problems (for example Kantowitz, 2000; 
Hancock and Parasuraman, 1992; Hancock and Verwey, 1997). The results of the 
research reported in this thesis include situations where the promise of increased 
safety offered by FCWS would be undeimined if the system design was inadequate. 
9.5 What is the most appropriate alarm timing? 
While this question is possibly the most interesting one for every reader it is the most 
challenging one to provide with a specific answer because 'appropriate' alarm timing 
is influenced by multiple factors; driving conditions, driver distraction, and s6 on. It 
is very difficult to argue this issue in a generalised manner that would be relevant to 
all driving contexts, including the more hazardous situations. Furthermore, in the 
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experiments reported in this thesis the sudden deceleration of a leading vehicle was 
implemented with little possibility of the driver being distracted and thus application 
of the results requires caution. However this section will try to explore possible 
recommendations for the design of alarm timings which may have the potential to 
optimise driver performance by integrating the findings from the experiments. Figure 
9-3 illustrates a full integration of the factors undertaken in the experiments and their 
influences on driver objective and subjective data. The following conclusions will be 
offered based on the results regarding alarm timing and its relation to trust and 
braking performance, the effects of false and missing alarms on trust and braking 
performance, and behavioural robustness for alarm failure in response to alarm timing. 
I System performance I 
I 
I I I Alarm failure I 
Alarm timing I 
Early-=: -..J Late I 
False alarms I I Missing alarms I 
r ~ 
Trust and Braking performance Trust and response to Behavioural robustness false and missing alarms in response to alarm failure 
I} I} I} , , 
Braking Trust 
resppnse time -A delayed response 
-Early alarms lead to 
high /./ I"OW 
to alarms caused by 
more serious effects of 
/' decreased trust alarm failure than late 
..... - (false alarms) /" alarms I low .....- -A delayed response !fast 
to imminent collision 
Early Late situations resulting in 
Alarm timing decreased trust (missing alarms) 
Figure 9-3 An integration of findings from the experiments 
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9.5.1 The driver's mental model 
People develop mental models of complex systems to predict future performance, thus 
mental models significantly influence interaction with complex systems (Lee and 
Kantowitz, 1998; Moray, 1988). This strongly suggests that, mental models may play 
an important role in the driver's response to FCWS and in determining alarm 
effectiveness. 
First, driver's mental models of FCWS and their relation to driver behaviour are 
considered by integrating the results of the thesis. Figure 9-4 illustrates four possible 
types of interactions between driver's mental models and alarm systems. 
Type I interaction refers to a 'basic' driver mental model in which drivers are 
responsible for implementing all three tasks for avoiding collisions with assistance 
themselves. Type 11 shows a change in the driver mental model caused by the 
introduction of alarms. Here the presentation of alarms replaces recognition and 
decision tasks. In this situation it is possible that alarms themselves may function as a 
trigger for the implementation of a control task. However such a replacement has the 
potential to lead to impaired driver performance when alarms are missed in critical 
situations. Evidence that the above explanation is plausible can be seen in the results 
of chapter 8 and 9. There it was shown that drivers who experience early alarms may 
show a delayed response to imminent collision events when missing alarms occur. In 
other words early alarms may tend to replace driver recognition and decision tasks 
and, as a result, the presentation of alarms may directly influence control actions. 
This effect might not be obvious while alarm systems work correctly but has a 
potential to decrease system effectiveness. 
Type III refers to the situation where alarms are 'out of the loop' with respect to the 
driver's mental model. In this situation alarms influence none of the driver's tasks. 
Thus changes in driver performance with alarms are not observed. Evidence that the 
above explanation is acceptable can be seen in the results of chapters 4, 5, and 6. Late 
alarms have no potential to improve driver performance and these alarms do not 
function as useful facilities. 
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Figure 9-4 The differences in driver mental model according to alarm timing 
Finally Type IV interaction possibly refers to an ideal driver response towards FCWS. 
In this context drivers have a mental model that requires them to be ready to 
implement all driver tasks with assistance with alarms functioning as a support or 
encouragement to the driver's recognition task. de Waard et al. (1999); Wickens 
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(1992); Ward (1996) argue that shifting the driver out of the control loop may lead to 
reduced responsiveness to critical events. That is, in general drivers are poor "process 
monitors" (e.g. Molloy and Parasuraman, 1996) an4 if parts of the driver task are 
replaced or affected by driver support systems (e.g. FCWS), there is a possibility that 
safe driving might be impaired due to decreased situation awareness. It is necessary 
for drivers to remain in the loop all the time, even if FCWS are introduced. Thus, this 
ideal type of mental model may exhibit a robust behaviour against all system 
conditions and contribute to the achievement of the intended alarm effect. 
The arguments regarding driver mental models discussed in this section are relevant 
to task allocation between drivers and automated systems. As technology advances, 
the issues of function allocation to humans or machines are more crucial for system 
design (Hancock and Scallen, 1996,) in order to optimise total system safety. In the 
vehicle domain the introduction of in-vehicle control systems such adaptive cruise 
control systems also necessitates consideration of which functions to allocate to the 
driver and to the system (Stanton and Marsden, 1996). The allocation of functions to 
person or machine should be determined by considering task efficiency and 
responsibility for action. 
With respect to in-vehicle information systems such a FCWS, Janssen and Nilsson 
(1993) suggest that before collision avoidance systems can be safely implemented it is 
necessary to satisfactorily answer the following question; 'how is the responsibility 
for action to be divided between the system and the driver?' It might reasonably be 
expected that warnings would only function as aids to driving when necessary and 
that the introduction of a FCWS would not directly replace driver tasks. However, the 
current research suggests that it is necessary to induce an appropriate mental model 
for driver tasks and alarm roles when determining alarm timing. 
9.5.2 Most appropriate alarm timing 
In order to define timings which correspond to the conditions for ideal alarm timing 
discussed above, alarm timing and its relation to driver performance with alarms and 
subjective ratings of trust were summarised (Table 9-1). Although the data 
summarised in this table was collected in the limited situations manipulated in the 
179 
Chapter 9: Overview results: Towards the integration trust into alarm design 
experimental conditions used in the current research, possible appropriate alarm 
timings will be considered in this section. 
When discussing appropriate alarm timing, the objectives given priority for FCWS 
will influence the required alarm timing. For example, whether alarms should lead to 
a prompt response to the brakes or not plays an important role in determining alarm 
timing. Although the primary objective of alarms is to prevent collision accidents, 
there are other requirements to be satisfied in order to achieve the primary objective. 
First of all, appropriate driver trust is a crucial factor in ensuring a good partnership 
between driver and alarm system. Second, driver response to alarm failure is also an 
important consideration for alarm timing. If imperfect system reliability is inevitable 
for FCWS it is necessary to find alarm timings which mitigate the effect of alarm 
failure on driver behaviour. Although improved driver response to imminent collision 
situations IS an inherent purpose of FCWS, how driver performance is actually 
enhanced IS a more interesting challenge for the alarm design. It should be 
remembered that a reduction of braking response time is not the only positive alarm 
effect, decreased variation in braking response time is also beneficial. Driver braking 
performance without alarms may vary according to the degree of driver attention to 
forward vision. If appropriate alerts can lead to more consistent braking response 
time, resulting in compensation for delayed responses to the brakes due to some 
distraction then the purpose of alarms would be partly achieved. 
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Table 9-1 Summary of alarm effectiveness, trust in alarms and response to alarm 
failures according to alarm timing 
Alarm timing 
Relatively 
early 
Middle 
Relatively late 
Benefit 
Reduction in braking 
response time. 
Decreased variation in 
braking response time. 
Possibly Decreased 
variation in braking 
response time 
No benefit 
trust 
high 
Relatively 
high· 
low 
Response to alarm failure 
Delayed braking response 
It was not considered in this thesis 
No impact on driver response to alarm 
failure 
Taking all the data obtained from the current research and all the considerations 
discussed into account, late alarms should be avoided because of their negative impact 
on driver trust and driver performance. Unless the serious problem relating to delayed 
response to missed alarms can be overcome, early alarms should also be avoided. 
However, there are no standard guidelines regarding the definition of an early alarm. 
As a minimum requirement alarms should have the potential to recover delayed 
recognition to imminent collision situations caused by driver inattention, in addition 
to providing a benefit to drivers applying a 'normal' level of attention in an 
unanticipated collision situation. 
Based on the results reported in this thesis an alaIDl time of between 0.3-0.6s may 
provide the best target value. Although a specific alarm time is a value that varies in 
response to driving conditions, recommended values are useful for the design of 
default alarm timings. This value may be moderated if the system is capable of 
sensing contextual factors (e.g. driver alertness). 
It can be anticipated that advances in technology will allow the provlSlon of 
significant driver assistance (i.e. speed and headway under automatic control) in 
addition to FCWS. When these systems are available driving conditions will be more 
similar to the conditions which applied in the experimental scenarios (i.e. sudden 
deceleration of a leading vehicle occurs when driving with constant speed and time 
headways). Although it is necessary to consider another human factor issue regarding 
driver interaction with automated vehicle control systems, target values could be 
applied to alarm timing with confidence when this situation is achieved. 
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10.1 Final conclusions 
This thesis has described research undertaken to investigate the effect of alarm timing 
on driver response to FCWS and its relation to driver trust and also proposed trust 
models describing the nature of trust in FCWS. A literature review was conducted 
and a series of experimental studies performed. The main conclusions of this thesis 
were: 
• an early alarm timing leads to prompt braking response to potential collision events 
• an early alarm timing leads to prompt accelerator release 
• the presentation of an early and a middle alarm'timings leads to decreased variation 
in braking response 
• generally, a late alarm timing does not affect driver braking response 
• when driving under relatively low demand (relatively long time headways) a late 
alarm timing induces later braking responses 
• trust in early alarm timing is higher than that in late alarm timing 
• driving demand; driving speed or time headway, may influence driver's estimation 
of trust in FC·WS 
• alarms which are presented after drivers have already begun braking can impair 
trust 
• the timing of accelerator release in unassisted driver performance may play an 
important role in determining driver subjective ratings of trust. 
• actual alarm performance should be consistent with driver expectation of alarm 
performance and if it is not then trust is impaired 
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• although an SDA type trigger logic may have the pre-determined alarm timings by 
manipulating alarm trigger parameters the alarm timing achieved may be, affected 
by driving conditions (i.e. headway time or degree of deceleration of a leading 
vehicle), resulting in variable alarm effectiveness. 
• trust towards FCWS comprises two components; trust in individual alarm (TIA) 
and trust in system integrity (TSI) and false and missing alarms affect TIS and TSI 
respectively 
• driver response to alarm failures (false alarm and missed alarms) varies in response 
to alarm timing. 
10.2 Contribution to knowledge 
This doctoral research has investigated the issues surrounding the effect of alarm 
timing on driver braking response and trust, and driver response to alarm failure and 
its influence on alarm timing was investigated from the viewpoint of trust. 
The relationship between trust and alarm timing was quantified, moreover the nature 
of driver trust towards FCWS was explored. The impact of alarm timing on driver 
behaviour has been recognised as an important factor in determining alarm 
effectiveness and has been considered in several studies (for example, Lee et aI., 
2002). However this study provides important new insights on the effect of driver 
cognition on driver response to FCWS. This new knowledge has important 
implications for system design in order to construct appropriate cooperation between 
drivers and FCWS for improving safe driving. Moreover the nature of driver trust and 
its relation to driver response to FCWS was explored through the experiments 
regarding false and missing alarms. Countermeasures for alarm malfunction must be 
thoroughly assessed before being launched in the market place in order to ensure the 
desired safety benefit is achieved. The findings of the research reported here suggest 
a knowledge how to mitigate the negative effect of alarm malfunction on driver 
behaviour. 
In this thesis the concept of 'appropriate alarm timing' has been proposed by 
incorporating driver trust into the design of alarm timing. The comprehensive 
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understanding of driver behaviour in response to alarm timing and its influence on 
driver trust has enabled a specific alarm timing (between 0.3-0.6s) to be proposed as a 
target value. 
The results should help strategy for the definition of optimised alarm timings from the 
view point of driver-centred design. 
10.3 Further research 
The following section presents some of the issues which required further 
consideration. and possible experimental investigation and which mainly derive from 
the limitations of the experimental methods employed in the current work. 
• The experimental work conducted in this research was concerned with driver 
behaviour over relatively short time periods. The drivers were exposed to alarms 
frequently and this inevitably induced high levels of expectation. Accordingly, the 
data represents the short-term effect of alarm timing on driver behaviour and 
attitudes. It is possible that driver experience with FCWS accumulated over long 
periods of driving may influence driver behaviour significantly. It is also 
necessary to consider the long-term effects in order to clarify how driver mental 
models of FCWS develop with long-term experience. These issues can only be 
fully resolved with longitudinal field trials. 
• Potential collision events may occur due to multiple factors; driving conditions, 
degree of driver attention, road design and so on. The experimental scenarios 
provided in these experiments represented one limited cause of potential collisions. 
Specifically the sudden deceleration of a leading vehicle was employed in order to 
give drivers potential collision events without any secondary tasks which might 
induce driver distraction. Alarm effectiveness may be affected by the driver's state 
of attention. Thus it is necessary to consider a variety of collision causes in order 
to establish strategies of system design in response to such situations. 
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Chapter 10: Thesis conclusions 
• With respect to the effect of alann timing on driver response to alarm failure, it 
was found that there is a possibility that the negative effect of alann failure can be 
moderated by alarm timing. A further investigation would be needed in order to 
find an optimal alann timing for maintaining alarm effectiveness and also 
mitigating impairments to system effectives caused by alarm failure. 
• Driver trust was a particular focus of this thesis and was proposed as an important 
contributing factor in determining appropriate cooperation between drivers and 
FCWS. However, it is likely that other factors which could not be considered in 
the thesis also need to be incorporated into the design of alarm timing. It is 
necessary to identify other factors which have the potential to influence driver 
response to FCWS (for example driver self-confidence as proposed by Lee and 
Kantowitz, 1998) and identify their specific effects on system effectiveness In 
order to establish comprehensive guidance on alarm system design. 
• With respect to warning efficiency, the assignment of sensory modalities for alarm 
presentation must be considered (Hirst and Graham, 1996). Visual, tactile, or 
auditory information are available for alerting drivers to potential collision 
situations. In this study auditory warnings such as simple buzzers were used in 
order to investigate driver response to FCWS. Auditory warnings lead to more 
prompt reaction times than those presented visually (Colavita, 1974) and such 
alarms are generally recommended in situations where a swift response to a safety-
critical situation is required. However, any design process leading to the 
introduction of a specific vehicle system would need to complete a thorough 
human factors investigation to determine the most appropriate alarm design 
(modality, location, characteristics) in order to maximise effectiveness. This may 
mean that alarm timing and its relation to driver behaviour must be considered in 
response to alarm types. Moreover, it is possible that the differences in alarm types 
might influence trust in FCWS. Accordingly it is necessary to establish guidelines 
of alarm timing design in response to alarm modalities. 
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Appendix A. Chapter 4 Instructions and Data Forms of 
subjective ratings of trust 
Study Description Presented to the subjects 
General instruction for this experiment 
In this study you have two tasks. One is to drive at 45 miles/h while following 
another car. It is very important that you try and drive in that same way as 
you would drive a real car in this task. Please try not to experiment with the 
simulator. The other is to avoid rear-end collisions. Whilst you are driving 45 
miles/h journey, the leading vehicle may suddenly decrease its speed 
because of a problem on the road ahead. Hence you have to be ready to 
brake so as to avoid a rear-end collisions. 
This experiment involves two sessions. In the first session you have to avoid 
collisions by relying on your driving skills. In the second session the 
simulated car you will be driving is equipped with a collision warning systems. 
However, like any real life system, the warning system is subject to some 
reliability problems and occasionally the timing of the alarms, which alert 
drivers to the critical situations, may be variable. 
You will drive the simulated car for a total 45 minutes. Make yourself familiar 
with driving the vehicle in the simulator before starting session I. During the 
training period the supervisor will be available to help you. After the training 
phase there will be a short brake followed by the experimental phase. While 
you are driving we will ask you to complete some questionnaires but we will 
try not to disturb your driving. The purpose of this study is to understand 
more about warning systems and it is nor a test of your driving skills. It is very 
helpful for us if you would driver in the same manner as yo~ would drive your 
own car. 
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Any questions? 
Introduction to subjective rating 
In this study we are interested in your trust in the rear-end collision warning 
system. We will record your trust in the warning system when alarms are 
presented using a simple rating scale. Specifically we want you to perform 
the following rating. 
How much did you trust in the rear-end collision warning system? 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 I 5 6 7 8 9 10 
You will be asked to respond to the question and give your rating using a 10 
point scale; 1 indicating "not at all" and 10 indicating "completely" after each 
braking event. 
There are no "right" answers. We are interested in how you feel about the 
warning system. Your answers will help us in our research on how to improve 
interactions between driver and warning systems. 
A-2 
Data forms of subjective ratings of trust 
Questionnaires 
How much did you trust in the rear-end collision warning system? 
Trial one 
Not at all com~letely 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial two 
Not at all com~letely 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial three 
Not at all com~letely 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial four 
Not at all com~letely 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial five 
Not at all com~letely 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial six 
Not at all com~letely 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
A-3 
Appendix B. Chapter 5 Instructions and data forms of 
subjective ratings of trust and perceived alarm timing 
Study Description Presented to the subjects 
General instruction for this experiment 
In this study you have two tasks. The first is to drive at a particular speed, 
namely 40 miles/h, 60miles/h, or 70miles/h while following another car. The 
experimenter will tell you which speed (40, 60, or 70mile) to drive. Although 
the driving speed required will change please follow the instructions carefully 
and drive as close to the required speed as possible. It is very important that 
you try and drive in the same way as you would drive a real car in this task. 
Please try not to experiment with the simulator. 
The second task is to avoid rear-end collisions. Whilst you .are driving, the 
leading vehicle may suddenly decrease its speed because of a problem on 
the road ahead. You have to be ready to brake so as to avoid a forward 
collision. 
This experiment will consist of two sessions with a number of potential 
collision events in each session. In one session you have to avoid collisions 
by relying on your driving skills alone. In the other session alarms will be 
provided in order to help you avoid collisions. An experimenter will let you 
know which session (no alarm session or alarm session) you are driving first 
before starting the experiment. A 3-minute break will be available between 
sessions. 
You will drive the simulator car for a total of 45 minutes and you will have a 
chance to make yourself familiar with driving the vehicle before starting your 
trial. During the training period the supervisor will be available to help you. 
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After the training phase there will be a short break followed by the 
experimental phase. While you are driving we will ask you some questions 
"/ 
but we will try not to disturb your driving. The purpose of this study is to 
understand more about warning systems and it is not a test of your driving 
skills. It would be very helpful for us if you were to drive in the same manner 
as you would drive your own car. 
Any questions? 
Introduction to subjective rating 
In this study we are interested in how much you trust the warning system. We 
will record your trust when alarms are presented using a simple rating scale. 
Specifically we want you to perform the following rating. 
How much did you trust in the warning system? 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
You will be asked to respond to the question and give your rating using a 
10 point scale; 1 indicating "not at all" and 10 indicating "completely" after 
each braking event. You can give your judgement by saying the number aloud. 
We also interested in how you perceive the alarm timing. We will record 
your ratings of alarm timing using a 3 point rating. Specifically we want you to 
perform the following question. 
How would you rate the alarm timing? 
You will be asked to respond to the question and give your rating using a 3 
rating scale; Early, Correct or Late. 
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There are no "right" answers. We are interested in how you feel about the 
alarms. Your answers will help -us in our research on how to improve 
interactions between driver and warning systems. 
Data forms of subjective ratings of trust and perceived alarm timing 
Questionnaires: How much did you trust in the rear-end collision warning 
system? and How would you rate the alarm timing? 
Subject number: 
Trial one 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Early Correct Late 
Trial two 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 . 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Early) Correct Late 
Trial three 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Early Correct Late 
Trial four 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Early Correct Late 
Trial five 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8-3 
Early 
Trial six 
Not at all 
1 
Early 
2 
Correct 
3 4 
Correct 
Late 
completely 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
Late 
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Appendix C. Chapter 6 Instructions and data forms of 
subjective ratings of trust 
Study Description Presented to the Subjects 
General instruction for this experiment 
In this study you have two tasks. The first is to drive at 30 miles/h while 
following another car. It is very important that you try and drive in the same 
way as you would drive a real car in this task. Please try not to experiment 
with the simulator. The second task is to avoid rear-end collisions. Whilst you 
are driving, the leading vehicle may suddenly decrease its speed because of 
a problem on the road ahead. Hence you have to be ready to brake so as to 
avoid a forward collision. 
In this trial you will drive at 30 miles/h on an urban road. This trial includes 
a number of potential collision events. You have to avoid collisions by relying 
on your driving skills in the first and last 2 events. In the other events alarms 
will be provided at some timing in order to help you avoid collisions. 
However, like any real life system, the warning system is subject to some 
reliability problems and occasionally the timing of the alarms, which alert 
drivers to the critical situations, may be unreliable. 
You will drive the simulated car for a total of 30 minutes and you will have a 
chance to make yourself familiar with driving the vehicle in the simulator 
before starting your trial. During the training period the supervisor will be 
available to help you. After the training phase there will be a short break 
followed by the experimental phase. While you are driving we will ask you 
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some questions but we will try not to disturb your driving. The purpose of this 
study is to understand more about warning systems and it is not a test of your 
driving skills. It would be very helpful for us if you were to drive in the same 
manner as you would drive your own car. 
Any questions? 
Introduction to subjective rating 
In this study we are interested in your trust the warning system. We will 
record your trust when alarms are presented using a simple rating scale. 
Specifically we want you to perform the following rating. 
How much did you trust in the warning system? 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 5 I 6 7 8 9 10 
You will be asked to respond to the question and give your rating using a 
10 point scale; 1 indicating "not at all" and 10 indicating "completely" after 
each braking event. You can answer your judgement with saying aloud. 
There are no "right" answers. We are interested in how you feel about 
alarms. Your answers will help us in our research on how to improve 
interactions between driver and warning systems. 
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Data Forms of subjective ratings of trust 
-
Questionnaires: How much did you trust in the rear-end collision warning 
system? 
Subject number: 
(30miles/b, lowlhigb deceleration) 
Trial three 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 I 2 3 4 . I 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial four 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial five 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial six 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
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Appendix D. Chapter· 8 Instructions and data forms of 
subjective ratings of trust 
Study Description Presented to the Subjects 
General instruction for this experiment 
In this study you have two tasks. The first is to drive at 60miles/h while 
following another car. It is very important that you try and drive in the same 
way as you would drive a real car in this task. Please try not to experiment 
with the simulator. The second task is to avoid rear-end collisions. Whilst you 
are driving, the leading vehicle may suddenly decrease its speed because of 
a problem on the road ahead. Hence you have to be ready to brake so as to 
avoid a forward collision. 
In this trial you will drive at 60 miles/h on a rural road. This trial includes a 
number of potential collision events. You have to avoid collisions by relying 
on your driving skills in the first and last 2 events. In the other events alarms 
will be provided to help you avoid collisions. 
However, like any real life system, the warning system is subject to some 
reliability problems and occasionally the timing of the alarms, which alert 
drivers to the critical situations, may be unreliable. 
You will drive the simulated car for a total of 30 minutes and you will have a 
chance to make yourself familiar with driving the vehicle in the simulator 
before starting your trial. During the training period the supervisor will be 
available to help you. After the training phase there will be a short break 
followed by the experimental phase. While you are driving we will ask you 
D-1 
some questions but we will try not to dist~rb your driving. The purpose of this 
study is to understand more about warning systems and iUs not a test of your 
driving skills. It would be very helpful for us if you were to drive in the same 
manner as you would drive your own car. 
Any questions? 
Introduction to subjective rating 
In this study we are interested in your trust the warning system. We will 
record your trust when alarms are presented using a simple rating scale. 
Specifically we want you to perform the following rating. 
How much did you trust in the warning system? 
Not at all completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
You will be asked to respond to the question and give your rating using a 
10 point scale; 1 indicating "not at all" and 10 indicating "completely" after 
each braking event. You can answer your judgement with saying aloud. 
There are no "right" answers. We are interested in how you feel about 
alarms. Your answers will help us in our research on how to improve 
interactions between driver and warning systems. 
0-2 
Data Forms o/subjective ratings o/trust 
Questionnaires: How much did you trust in the rear-end collision warning 
system? 
Subject number: 
Session 11 (60miles/h, early/late alarm timing) 
Trial three 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial four 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 10 1 
Trial five 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 I 7 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial six (false alarm) 
Not at all com~letel~ 
1 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 10 I 
Trial seven 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 10 I 
Trial eight 
Not at all com~letel~ 
1 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 ·1 8 9 I 10 I 
Trial nine (missing alarm) 
Not at all com~letel~ 
I 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 I 
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Appendix E. Subject Consent and Payment Forms 
r q:"'" , Volunteer Consent Form esrl (Driving simulation Study) 
Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this research looking at driver behaviour. 
The purpose of this form is to make sure that you are happy to take part in the research and 
that you know what is involved. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do 
not wish to do. 
Have you read the Participant Briefing Sheet? YES NO 
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and 
discuss the study? YES NO 
If you had asked questions, have you had 
satisfactory answers? YES NO 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw 
from the study at any time and without having to 
give a reason for withdrawing? YES NO 
Do you agree to take part in the study? YES NO 
Name in block letters __________________ _ 
Signed. _________ _ Date ________________ _ 
Dateofbirth _____________________ ___ 
Annual mileage _________________________________________ _ 
Number of years driving experience, ___________________________ _ 
I acknowledge receipt of £ for participation in this study. 
Signature. ____________________________________ _ 
Dme~. ________________________________________ _ 
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Appendix F. Summary of experimental data 
Table F-1 Summary of driver response to alarms and trust ratings (from 
chapter 4) 
Alarm timing {non-consistent alarm timing} 
Before 
introducing 
Early Middle Late alarms 
Mean Mean Mean 
{SO} {SO} {SO} Mean (SO} F value p value 
6.7 6.6 4.9 
Trust (1.95) (1.99) (2.22) no record F(2,48)=9.679 0.0029 
Braking event 
to brake onset 0.95 1.18 1.18 time (0.19) (0.32) (0.29) 1.21 (0.36) F(3,70)=3.707 0.0154 
Braking event 
to accelerator 0.58 0.79 0.82 release time (0.22) (0.38) (0.32) 0.79 (0.42) F(3,70)=1.923 0.1336 
Accelerator 
release to 
brake onset 0.37 0.39 0.36 
time (0.14) (0.24) (0.14) 0.41 (0.30) F(3,70)=0.424 0.7361 
Table F-2 Summary of regression analysis (from chapter 4) 
RZ 
Regression Equation Model F Value p value 
T n=0.32(RA T -AT}n-0.44{Oiscouragement}n+0.576T n-1 0.62 F(4,43}=17.17 p<0.001 
Table F-3 Summary of alarm onset to accelerator release time (from chapte~ 4) 
Alarm timing {non-consistent alarm timing} 
Alarm onset to 
accelerator release 
time 
Early 
Mean (SO} 
0.54 {0.22} 
Middle Late 
Mean {SO} Mean {SO} 
0.15 {0.40} -0.15 (0.35) 
F-1 
Table F-4 Summary of braking efforts without alarms in response to different 
speeds and time headways (from chapter 5) 
Velocity(mph) 
Time headways 40 60 70 
Short: Mean (SO) 8.18 (0.98) 8.33 (0.94) 8.20 (0.93) 
Long: Mean (SO) 7.48 (1.34) 7.55 (1.22) 7.82 (0.97) 
Table F-5 Summary of braking efforts without alarms in response to time 
headways (from chapter 5) 
Time headway 
Short: Mean (SO) Long: Mean (SO) Statistical test 
8.24 (0.94) 7.61 (1.18) F(1, 126)=11.01 ,p=0.0011 
Table F-6 Summary of driver response to early alarms in response to time 
headways (from chapter 5) 
Alarm conditions 
Time Early 
headways timing No alarms Statistical test 
Braking Short: Mean 0.93 1.14 
event to (SO) (0.17) (0.45) Z=2.088, p=0.0367 
brake 
onset time Long: Mean 1.12 1.20 F(1,64)=4.720, (SO) (0.26) (0.42) p=0.033 
Braking Short: Mean 0.60 0.82 
event to (SO) (0.14) (0.46) Z=2.088, p=0.0367 
accelerator 
release 
time Long: Mean 0.81 0.81 
{SO} {0.23} {0.42} N.S 
F-2 
Table F-7 Summary of driver response to late alarms in response to time 
headways (from chapter 5) 
Alarm conditions 
Time headways Late timing No alarms Statistical test 
Braking 
Short: Mean (SO) 0.95 (0.31) 0.94 (0.27) N.S event to 
brake 
onset time Long: Mean {SO} 1.07 {0.35} 0.92 {0.25} F {1 ,53}=5.318, Q=0.025 
Braking 
event to Short; Mean (SO) 0.65 (0.25) 0.65 (0.26) N.S 
accelerator 
release 
time Long: Mean {SO} 0.62 {0.19} 0.73 {0.36} F{1 ,36}=8.1 02, Q=0.0059 
Table F-8 Summary of trust ratings of alarm timings response to time 
headways (from chapter 5) 
Time headways 
Alarm timing Short Long Statistical test 
Trust Early: Mean (SO) 6.7 (1.55) 6.8 (1.56) N.S 
Late: Mean (SO) 5.2 {2.18 3.9 {2.0?} F {1,50}=4.668, Q=0.355 
Table F-9 Summary of trust ratings in response to perceived alarm timings 
(from chapter 5) 
Trust: 
Mean 
{SO} 
Correct 
7.3 
(1.28} 
Perceived alarm timing 
Late 
4.3 
(1.70} 
Statistical test 
F{1, 115}=118.32, Q<0.001 
F-3 
Table F-10 Summary of perceived alarm timings and alarm time(from chapter 5) 
Alarm 
time: 
Mean 
(SO) 
Perceived alarm timing 
Correct Late 
0.51 
(O.36) 
0.77 
(0.46) 
Table F-11 Summary of regression analyses of the development of trust (from 
chapter 5) 
Regression Equation Ff Model F Value p value 
Tn=0.231 (RAT-AT}n+0.534Tn_1 0.43 F (2,93}=36.79 p<0.001 
Table F-12 Summary of driver baseline performance with collision events (from 
chapter 6) 
Maximum 
deceleration of 
the following 
vehicle 
Braking event to 
brake onset time 
Oecelerations of the leading vehicle (baseline ) 
High Low Statistical test 
Mean (SO) Mean (SO) 
8.44 (0.81) 6.84 (1.40) z=5.825, p<0.001 
1.05 (O.34) 1.10 (0.26) F(1,94}=0.905,p=0.344 
F-4 
Table F-13 Summary of driver performance with collision events in response to 
alarm timings (from chapter 6) 
Alarm conditions 
Dependent 
Statistical test valuable Deceleration Earl~ Late Baseline 
Mean Mean Mean 
(SD} (SD} (SD} 
0.88 0.99 1.05 l(2)=4.66, 
Braking event 
High (0.16) (0.18) (0.34) p=0.096 
to brake onset 1.06 1.11 1.10 
time Low (0.29) (0.29) (0.26) N.S 
0.56 0.68 0.74 l(2)=3.45, 
Braking event High (0.12) (0.19) (0.34) p=0.072 
to accelerator 0.70 0.71 0.71 
release time Low (0.22) (0.16) (0.22) N.S 
0.34 0.35 0.35 
Accelerator 
release to 
High (0.22) (0.23) (0.26) N.S 
brake onset 0.38 0.49 0.49 F(2,45)=1.213, 
time Low (0.19) (0.31) (0.26) p=0.306 
8.22 8.53 8.44 
High (0.88) (0.58) (0.82) N.S 
Maximum 6.61 6.91 6.84 
deceleration Low (1.54) (1.41) (1.40) N.S 
0.74 0.13 
High (0.14) (0.15) no record 
Alarm to brake 0.76 -0.36 F(1,39)=6.471, 
onset time Low {0.15} {0.70} no record e=0.01504 
Table F-14 Summary of trust ratings in response to alarm timings (from chapter 
6) 
Alarm conditions 
Deceleration Earl~ Late . Statistical test 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
F(1,35)=45.721, 
Trust High 6.5 (1.81) 4.5 (2.38) p<0.001 
F(1,21)=7.130, 
Low 5.7 {2.30} 4.3 {2.31} e=0.0143 
F-5 
Table F-15 Summary of trust ratings in triggered and untriggered alarms(from 
chapter 6) 
Alarm conditions 
Triggered Untriggered Statistical test 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Trust 4.3 (2.31) 
F(1,11)=27.00, 
2.4 (2.02) p=0.0003 
F-6 
Table F-16 Summary of driver response to false alarms (from chapter 7) 
Trials(false alarms) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 statistical test 
Alarm to 
brake onset 
time: Mean 0.84 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.79 0.73 0.91 0.93 0.96 1.01 0.98 0.84 0.81 0.90 0.87 F(14,94)=2.336, 
(SO) (0.11 ) (0.11 ) (0.14) (0.16) (0.11 ) (0.13) (0.27) (0.29) (0.20) (0.26) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.18) p=0.0815 
Trust: Mean 6.4 6.6 7.4 7.8 8.0 8.0 6.3 5.0 4.1 5.3 6.0 6.5 6.9 7.3 7.1 F(14,98)=9.087, 
(SO) (2.20 (2.00) (1.77) (1.58) (1.51 ) (1.51 ) (1.58) (1.31) (1.13) (0.89) (0.93) (0.76) (1.13) (0.89) (0.99) p<0.0001 
Table F-17 Summary of driver response to missing alarms (from chapter 7) 
Trials(missing alarms) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Statistical test 
Braking 
event to 
brake onset 
time: Mean 1.28 1.26 1.19 1.25 1.18 1.16 1.68 1.50 1.55 1.19 1.16 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.32 F(14,112)=9.727, 
(SO) (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.26) (0.18) (0.23) (0.25) (0.16) (0.24) (0.31) (0.35) (0.38) p<0.001 
7.7 8.1 8.4 8.2 8.0 8.3 3.0 2.3 2.0 3.3 4.4 5.4 5.9 6.8 6.8 F(14,120)=21.749, 
Trust {1.50} {1.17} {0.73} p.09} {1.22} {1.12} {2.06} {1.66} p.50} {1.80} {1.51 } {1.67} p.62} {1.79} {1.64} ~<0.001 
F-7 
Table F-18 Summary of driver response to collision events in response to 
experiences of missing alarms (from chapter 7) 
Experiences of missing alarms 
First No alarms Statistical 
exposure Second Third (baseline) analysis 
Braking event to 
brake onset 1.68 1.50 1.55 1.43 F(3,24)=4.276, 
time: Mean {SD} {0.26} {0.18} {0.23} {0.22} E=0.0149 
Table F-19 Summary of regression analyses of the influence of false alarms on 
trust (from chapter 7) 
RZ 
Regression Equation Model FValue pvalue 
Tn=-0.43Fn+0.755Tn_1 0.89 F{2,61}=251.841 p<0.001 
Table F-20 Summary of regression analyses of the influence of missing alarms 
on trust (from chapter 7) 
Regression Equation 
Tn=-0.72Mn+0.296T n-1 
R2 
Model FValue 
0.87 F(2,69}=229.40 
p value 
p<0.001 
Table F-21 Summary of trust ratings in response to alarm timings (from chapter 
8) 
Trust: 
Mean 
{SD} 
Early 
6.7 
p.96} 
alarm timing 
Late 
3.1 
p.63} 
Statistical test 
F(1,118)=116.33, 
E<0.001 
F-8 
Table F-22 Summary of braking response times in response to alarm timings 
(from chapter 8) 
alarm timing 
Early Late Statistical test 
Braking 
event to 
brake onset 
time: Mean 0.86 1.04 F(1,118)=13.47, 
{SO} {0.30} {0.26} ~=0.00036 
Table F-23 The influence of alarm failures on braking response times in . 
response to alarm timings (from chapter 8) 
Alarm conditions 
Before a After a false Missing 
Alarm timing false alarm alarm alarm Baseline Statistical test 
Early timing: 1.06 F(3,10S)=1S.120, 
Mean (SO) 0.82 (0.30) 0.92 (0.30) 1.21 (0.30) (0.33) p<0.001 
Late timing: 1.09 
Mean {SO} 1.03 {0.28} 1.07 {0.22} 1.06 {0.26} {0.37} N.S 
Table F-24 The influence of alarm failures on trust in response to alarm timings 
(from chapter 8) 
Alarm 
timing 
Early 
timing: 
Mean (SO) 
Late 
timing: 
Mean {SO} 
Before a 
false 
alarm 
Alarm conditions 
After a 
False false Missing 
alarm alarm alarm Statistical test 
F(3,69)=43.780, 
6.8 (1.96) 2.7 (2.02) 6.5 (2.00) 2.2 (2.37) p<0.001 
3.4 {1.80} 1.8 {1.34} 2.7 {1.23} 1.4{0.90} N.S 
F-9 
Table F-25 The influence of alarm failures on braking efforts in response to 
alarm timings (from chapter 8) 
Alarm conditions 
Before a After a 
Alarm false false Missing 
timing Baseline alarm False alarm alarm alarm Statistical test 
Early 
timing: 
Mean 8.66 8.46 8.49 8.87 
(SD) (0.32) (0.53) 4.08 (1.35) (0.75) (0.15) 
Late 
timing: 
Mean 8.81 8.62 8.72 8.71 F(4,88)=2.356, 
{SD} {0.14} {0.53} 2.73 {2.82} {0.39} {0.56} ~=0.0597 
Table F-26 The influence of trust ratings on driver response to a false alarm 
(from chapter 8) 
Trust: 
Mean 
{SD} 
Drivers' response to the brakes 
Braking No braking Statistical test 
5.7 
{2.76} 
F(1,22)=3.949, 
3.4 p.90) ~<0.0594 
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